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PREFACE
This dissertation is not the one I first intended to write. My
original plan was to investigate the relationships between patterns of
authority in the workplace and individuals' development of political
efficacy. Unable to conduct the necessary research I turned to a second
idea, an examination of the relationships between realignment and insti-
tutional change.
The two dissertation topics are more closely related than they
might appear to be at first glance. I consider individual political
efficacy to rest on certain cognitive skills as well as subjective feel-
ings of competence. Still, however political efficacy is defined, indi-
viduals act in a structured world. Institutional structure and process
have important effects on how and whether individuals, however effica-
cious, can obtain their political ends.
In the United States, elections are said to provide a mechanism
through which a mass citizenry can control the actions of governments.
This assertion can be viewed as a central political myth of American
society. I do not evaluate the validity of this myth in this disserta-
tion. However, even staunch believers in the myth of popular sovereign-
ty accept the fact that there is often a large discrepancy between
majority views and government action, often for substantial time
periods. Realignments, some argue, provide the most important way to
overcome this discrepancy.
V
students of realignment generally identify the conformity between
citizen preferences and government action in terms of political agendas
and public policies. I have no objection to this choice of indicators.
However, another indicator should be added, institutional structure and
process. My reason is simple. Structure and process influence what
can and cannot be accomplished. If realignments constitute a transfer
of long term political dominance to a new partisan coalition, then
there is a prima facie reason for institutional change to take place.
Institutional structure and process that helped a previously dominant
coalition to obtain its policy goals would necessarily discourage the
adoption and implementation of substantially different policy goals.
This dissertation is an investigation of the existence and pro-
cess of post realignment institutional change. In Chapter I, I examine
the realignment literature to see how these questions have already been
treated and for suggestions on how to proceed with my investigation.
Chapter II is an analysis of the meaning of the term governmental insti-
tution and in turn what it means for such institutions to change. This
analysis is built on the concept of social practice as the key element
of institutional life. Institutional change is understood mainly as
the transformation and subsequent crystallization of institutional
practi ce
.
Chapters III, IV, and V are case studies of institutional change
following electoral events. The first two case studies examine insti-
tutional change in the 1930s, focusing on the development of the EOP
and the evolution of the pre-NLRA labor boards. The third case study
vi
is an examination of recent changes in the budget process. Because the
1980 election is not considered a realigning election, the choice of
the third case study requires additional comment. A current issue in
realignment theory is the absence of a critical realignment since the
1930s. There is growing skepticism over whether a classic realignment
is possible under current conditions. Yet the degree of policy change
following the 1980 election more closely resembles the level of change
associated with realigning elections than with other kinds of elec-
tions. Thus the 1980 election may represent a new type of election,
one not easily placed in present classifications of elections but
performing some of the functions associated with realigning elections.
The case studies focus mainly on the process of institutional
change following elections. In Chapter VI my goal is to explicate the
connections between institutional change and the periods of debate and
politicization that occur before realigning (and comparable) elections.
Finally, Chapter VII examines the inadequacy of the metaphor that under-
lies realignment theory, the exercise of popular sovereignty, I make
initial suggestions about a substitute understanding, based on Alain
Touraine's idea of debates.
Whatever is of value in this dissertation is the result of the
help and support of many people, not all of whom I can mention here.
In particular I owe much to the members of my dissertation committee,
John Brigham, Sheldon Goldman, and James Wright. John Brigham deserves
special thanks for his painstaking efforts to help me improve my writing
vi i
and thereby the clarity of my argument. Despite the improvement, I am
aware of how much more can be done.
This dissertation would not have been completed without the sup-
port and encouragement of Helen Schneider. As my supervisor at the
Orchard Hill Residential College at the University of Massachusetts/
Amherst, Helen not only insisted that I finish my dissertation, but
facilitated that process in many ways.
Finally, I must acknowledge the support of my wife, Shirley Ann
Haslip, and of my daughter, Polly Jo Haslip. Polly's main contribution
was to humor me and when that was impossible to simply tolerate me. I
also wanted to complete my college education before Polly started hers.
I have managed it with a margin of several days to spare. I owe an
enormous debt to Shirley, who completed her dissertation several months
ago. The fact that she found the time and patience to give me both
emotional support and editorial help implies the praise she so richly
deserves
.
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Barry S. Delin, B.A., University of Illinois,
M.A., University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor John Brigham
The United States has been characterized by long periods of rela-
tive stability in electoral coalitions, issue agendas, and public poli-
cies. These periods begin and end in partisan realignments, which are
major and persistent changes in electoral coalitions. Realignments are
normally followed by major policy changes that are supposed to be in
close accord with the electoral majority's preferences. The literature
also suggests that important institutional change follows realignments.
This claim, and the evidence and argument that support it, receive only
passing attention. This dissertation presents a sustained exploration
of the relationships between realignments and institutional change
through examination of case study material.
Particular attention is given to the process of institutional
change. Institutional structure and process necessarily influence what
can or cannot be done through institutions. All governmental institu-
tions embody political purpose. This dissertation explores what it
means for an institution to embody political purpose and what it means
to say that an institution has changed. I argue that institutional
structure and process are rooted in the practices and understandings of
ix
institutional participants. Realignments are seen as contextual
events that provide incentives for the development of new practices.
Realignment theory, and the research based on it, contain a charac-
teristic understanding of how realignments encourage policy and institu-
tional change. Change results from the electorate's use of its latent
power of popular sovereignty. This viewpoint provides an insufficient
understanding of the process of change following realignments. An
alternative is suggested based on Alain Touraine's concept of debate.
While realigning elections retain an important role in encouraging gov-
ernmental response to deep social tensions, an election is only one
moment in the process of articulating, joining, and resolving a social
debate. One implication of this understanding is that some functions of
realignments can be performed by elections and other political events
that do not fit the classic idea of realignment.
X
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE
Chapter
I. REALIGNMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A REVIEW OF
THE LITERATURE
Institutional Stability and Change in the United
States
]
The Realignment Literature: Application to the
Analysis of International Change 12
Initial Work: Developing the Concept 12
Later Work: Dynamics and Impacts of Realignments ... 26
Realignment and Institutional Change: Other Pertinent
Literature ] 42
Lowi and McConnell 43
Radical Analyses 49
II. INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 55
Governmental Institutions as an Ambiguous Phenomenon .
. 55
Toward a Concept of Governmental Institutions 64
The Interactionist Approach 68
Rules, Practices, and Understandings 75
Some Applications 83
Governmental Institutions: Selectivity and Legitimacy
. . 92
Conclusion 104
III. A CASE STUDY: REALIGNMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 106
Realignment Debates and Institutional Change 106
The 1930s Realignment and the Formation of the EOP . . . 116
The BOB and the Debate on the Positive State 117
Realignment and the Institutionalization of the EOP . . 131
IV. CASE STUDY #2: REALIGNMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 151
Realignment and the Rise of Labor 151
Elites, Insurgents, and Elections: Transforming the
Debate 162
Evolving Practice: The National Labor Board 175
Evolving Practice: The Old NLRB 189
xi
Chapter
V. CASE STUDY #3: THE 1980 ELECTION AND THE CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET PROCESS
^wiNUKt5:iiUiMM
Introduction 204
Pre-1980 Practice of the Budget Act*
. 211
1981: Presidential Centralization
. 222
1982: The Beginnings of Congressional Centralization' '. 244
VI. ELECTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 257
Elections and the Transformation of Political Debate
.
. 257
Non-Realigning Elections and the Potential for
Change 258
Elections and Social Debates
. . 262
Debates and Institutional Change
. . . . 265
The 1980 Election and the Transformation of Debate
. !
'. 269
Stagflation and the New Political Debate 269
The Limits on Debate
[ 279
1930s Realignment and 1970s Governance 284
The Opportunity for Change
[ 290
VII. DEBATES, REALIGNMENTS, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE:
A SUMMARY 298
Elections and the Focusing of Incremental Change .... 298
Realignments as Debates 307
Debates and the Alteration of Institutional Practice
. . 322
NOTES 327
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
. 363
XI
1
CHAPTER I
REALIGNMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE:
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Institutional Stability and Change in the United States
In their broad outlines the government and political institutions
of the United States of America have changed very little in comparison
to those of most other nation states. Even in comparison with those na-
tion states with political systems similar to that of the United States,
i.e., those systems termed liberal democratic, the United States has
exhibited an unusual degree of institutional stability over the course
of its history. Despite the enormous social and economic changes com-
parable to those in other liberal democracies, the United States Consti-
tution has been in continuous operation for nearly two hundred years.
Amendments to that document have had remarkably little effect upon
either the formal structures or powers of the national government. This
stability even extends to many institutional features of the political
system which are not specifically mentioned in the Constitution.
Nevertheless, some observers have perceived significant institu-
tional change in the American political system. A distinction is some-
times drawn between the Constitution as a written document and the
actual structure, process, and function of a government and political
community in the United States. That is, the form and operation of
institutions is related to but in no sense simply an outgrowth of a
1
2literal reading of the constitutional document. This distinction be-
tween a formal and real constitution is not a new one. As early as the
1880s Woodrow Wilson wrote that:
... the Constitution is
. . . only the sap-centre of a system of
government vastly larger than the stock from which it has branched -
a system, some of whose fomis have only very indistinct and rudimen-
tal beginnings in the simple substance of the Constitution, and
which exercises many functions apparently quite foreign to the
primitive properties contained in the fundamental law
. .
.1
In a more recent and far stronger statement of this viewpoint, Theodore
Lowi has claimed that the United States is currently operating under a
regime that in its essential operation and basis of legitimacy is dif-
ferent than the regime defined by the Constitution of 1787. In Lowi's
terminology, the present government of the United States is a "Second
Republic." Lowi also contends that in reality the U.S. has gone through
several basic regime alterations since the revolution; he calls the pre-
sent regime the Second Republic only because the other changes had not
2been properly noticed and enumerated in the past. Whether Lowi is cor-
rect in his assertions is not as important here as his proposition that
important changes in the structure, process, and function of the U.S.
political system have taken place through its history.
Discussions about how significant political change occurs in the
United States (or elsewhere for that matter) is bound up to underlying
ideas about the nature of political activity. To speak about political
change is to at least implicitly make claims about the nature and dis-
tribution of power. Thus, I will also be making such claims throughout
this dissertation. For the moment, however, I only wish to alert read-
ers to the many sources of political change, such as change initiated by
3a cohesive elite outside the government, interest group initiatives,
acts by government officials, inevitable adjustments to social or econo-
mic imperatives, or even the unforeseen results of purportedly incremen-
tal changes. In a liberal democracy there is also the possibility of
important change initiated upon the demand of ordinary citizens, that
is, change initiated on the basis of popular sovereignty. Given the oft
repeated claim that governments in liberal democracies, particularly in
regard to important long term policies and commitments, rest on the con-
sent of the governed; the question of popular sovereignty should be
examined as one source of major political change in such systems.
Furthennore, those policies that shape a government's basic structure,
process and function are the most important in the long run. Indeed,
the question of how a liberal democracy alters its structure and process
is central to any investigation of the efficacy of a democratic politi-
cal system, both in terms of a system's response to majoritarian needs
and wishes and in terms of the possibility that citizens, individually
and collectively, can act efficaciously within that system.
There is no universally accepted definition of the concept of pop-
ular sovereignty. However, I contend that in the United States popular
sovereignty generally means that the preferences of long term majorities
will be translated into governmental policy. There are many ways in
which citizens either explicitly or implicitly attempt to influence
governmental activity and there is significant disagreement over whether
majority preferences are in fact expressed and if so, when and how. In
terms of the sheer numbers of participants involved, national elections
4provide the most fully utilized form of political participation. Fur-
ther, elections are a form of structured decision making."^ Because
electoral choices are highly structured, virtually the entire citizenry
can participate. However, individuals can make electoral choices with-
out devoting much in the way of their own time and effort. Elections
provide an extremely "cheap" form of participation. Also, the very
aspects of elections that allow low cost participation mean that neither
citizens nor government officials can learn anything directly about pub-
lic preferences beyond the choices structured into the ballot. In the
United States all national elections are for the selection of govern-
mental officials, only two of which, the President and the Vice Presi-
dent, are elected on a national basis. There are never any issues on
the ballot. While candidates and political parties can choose to wage
electoral battle on well defined issues or upon clear presentation of
ideological positions, it is widely recognized that American candidates
and major parties have rarely done so. Then, on what basis can anyone
claim that national elections provide a mechanism for promoting popular
sovereignty in the United States?
Even the most cursory examination of American political history
will demonstrate that elements of the body politic change over time.
Tariff policy was one of the preeminent political issues of the 19th
century. While not without importance today, the tariff is now a secon-
dary concern. Few people would support a candidate or party simply
because of the position taken on that issue. Besides changes in the
issue agenda, there have been changes in public policy and in the
5fortunes of different political organizations and coalitions. This list
is meant to be indicative not exhaustive; the point is that persons in-
terested in understanding United States politics need to talk explicitly
about the existence of political change and its possible relationship to
the exercise of popular sovereignty by a mass electorate.
Robert Dahl has suggested talking about political change in the
United States in the context of what he calls "historical commitments,"
that is, choices made at times among a number of possibilities. These
choices structure or mold future political and social development in the
society. The commitments made cease to be seen as choices, but simply
as expressions of the natural order of things. Dahl cautions us not to
see this process as rational and neat, but to identify it by the exis-
tence and cessation of conflict that was "... overt, bitter, sometimes
prolonged, and in one way or another came to involve a substantial num-
4ber of citizens." While Dahl's primary aim is to investigate the im-
plications of historical commitments, one can infer that the involvement
of numerous citizens suggests some role for elections, and thereby
popular sovereignty, in the process of making a historical commitment.
Particularly suggestive is Dahl's point that conflict on the relevant
issues generally dies quickly and that the end of most of the periods of
conflict coincides with presidential election years, such as 1800, 1896,
or 1932. These election years are somehow thought to be especially sig-
5m ficant.
Of course Dahl, or any other current political scientist with an
interest in American national politics, knows that there is a whole body
6of work which seeks to explain why certain elections are more important
than the others over the long haul. Long periods of relative electoral
stability have been punctuated by occasional periods of partisan re-
alignment. In realigning periods significant numbers of voters form or
reconfinn long standing attachments to a political party. The elections
where major realignment takes place, or at least in retrospect where
realignment can be observed, are termed "realigning" or "critical" elec-
tions. These elections are presumed to have a significant impact on the
subsequent character of political life.
Given that most elections or most non-electoral mass political
participation in the United States are not acts of popular sovereignty
in the sense of determining public policy, the concept of realignment,
i.e., that some elections have long term implications, provides a basis
from which to claim that popular sovereignty exists and in turn to in-
vestigate its meaning. For example. Trilling and Campbell, two promi-
nent students of the realignment phenomenon, speak about realignment and
popular sovereignty as follows:
The essential element--ci tizen control of government--exists only in
a potential form most of the time. Realignment translates this con-
trol into kinetic form, and it is the fact that control can occur
that makes a system democratic.
^
Thus, realignment theory provides a kind of last ditch defense that the
citizenry as a whole, on the basis of majoritarian decision making, con-
trols the general nature and activity of the United States political
system as opposed to merely influencing the decisions of a political
elite. However, there is no inherent reason why a different contention.
7that realignments at best mediate the activities of a political elite,
would be untrue. Even if this weaker contention (from the standpoint of
democratic values) is the more accurate description of political real-
ity, realignment might still be a phenomenon of some importance in ex-
plaining how and why political change occurs.
Over the years since V. 0. Key's path breaking article in 1955, "A
Theory of Critical Elections," a rudimentary theory of the realignment
process has gained wide acceptance. Although there are a number of
important disagreements about how realignments occur and what their ef-
fects are, most observers conceptualize realignment as a five step pro-
cess which links the political environment to both mass and elite
behavior and thence to public policy formation. The process begins with
the existence of severe social or economic tensions that gradually rise
to levels which seem to threaten social stability. Eventually there are
rapid and persistent electoral shifts in the makeup of the coalitional
bases of the two major political parties. This is the critical elec-
tion, or series of elections, itself. The fourth part of the process is
the turnover, resulting directly or indirectly from the realigning
election, of elected officials, party leaders, and to a lesser extent
appointive governmental officials such as judges and career bureaucrats.
Finally, the political system responds to the underlying crisis with new
policies which are in accordance with the interests or perhaps the
expressed preferences of the new majority coalition. While this process
is most often described as sequential, it is only roughly so. For
example, shifts in political leadership and government policy may
8proceed concurrently. Most observers concede that any "theory" of re-
alignment is still in a very tentative stage of development.''
Before proceeding, it is also important to note the distinction
between the terms "critical" and "secular" realignment. Critical re-
alignment refers to an important and sudden shift in the composition of
electoral coalitions. Secular realignment refers to important electoral
changes arising from long tenn demographic changes. The distinction is
analytical, not necessarily empirical. However, it is important to
remember that unless otherwise qualified, the term realignment will be
used to mean critical realignment for the duration of this dissertation.
The results of critical realignments may manifest themselves in an
area other than voter identification and party competition, alternation
in political leadership, or public policy formation. Despite the ap-
pearance of long term institutional stability in American politics,
realignments also have an impact upon the very structure and operation
of political institutions themselves. How institutions are organized
influences what can or cannot be done through them. Any attempt to
enact important changes in public policy will be encouraged or dis-
couraged by existing institutional arrangements. There is no reason to
assume that institutional forms that proved useful to the dominant in-
terests of a particular political era would necessarily prove as useful
to those of the subsequent political era. Indeed one should expect the
opposite. New clusters of interests wanting innovations in public poli-
cy would need to make some institutional changes to facilitate their own
9goals. One purpose of this dissertation is to inquire into the empiri-
cal truth of this contention.
Before proceeding, it is important to give some content to the
idea of significant institutional change. On one extreme, one can talk
about wholesale changes in the nature of a regime; for example a shift
from a system based on separation of powers to a unified parlimentary
system, or a change from hereditary privilege to popular consent as the
basis of political legitimacy. If this is the standard used, I would
certainly agree with those who say that the United States has experi-
enced little significant institutional change over the past two centu-
ries. Alternatively, one can claim that virtually any modification in
institutional organization, recruitment patterns, internal procedure,
etc. is important. Rejecting both these extremes, I am proposing sev-
eral indicators of "significant institutional change" that would apply
to the United States. Although the full range of important political
institutions may stretch far beyond the confines of government formally
defined, in this dissertation I will consider only change among and
within governmental institutions.
Given that institutional change in the United States government
usually involves something less than the creation of new branches of
government, the search for significant institutional change must be car-
ried out within the structure of the government. Organizations are
created and disbanded occasionally; the functions and jurisdictions of
organizational units also change over time. What counts as truly
important? My first suggestion is to look for the appearance of new
10
institutional forms, especially when the government creates a large num-
ber of organizational units constituted on the basis of the new form.
For example, the independent regulatory commission was created as a new
institutional form in the late 19th century. These organizations pro-
liferated in the 20th century, particularly after Franklin Roosevelt's
administration came to office. It wasn't simply the creation of an
institutional fonn that was important, but its increased use at a later
time.
Another indication is when established institutions take on sig-
nificant functions different in subject matter from those they performed
in the past. For example, after World War II the Department of Defense
took on a major role in foreign policy making and implementation that
DOD's organizational predecessor, the War Department, did not have. As
a third area of significant institutional change I would suggest examin-
ing changes in the formal and even informal relationships among govern-
mental institutions. As a case in point, when Congress created the
Bureau of the Budget, Congress hoped that the agency would provide
information and expertise that would strengthen the legislature itself.
Today, the BOB's successor agency, the Office of Management and Budget,
is often viewed as a major political competitor of Congress, especially
of many of Congress' committees and subcommittees. Ironically, Con-
gress, in the 1970s, felt the need to create a new budgeting agency of
its own to perform many of the same purposes as the original Bureau of
the Budget.
11
Finally, when governments begin to perform new kinds of functions,
as opposed to simply adding a new version of a familiar function, impor-
tant institutional change has occurred. If a government that has subsi-
dized a given activity, let us say railroad transportation, now decides
to subsidize air travel, it may have to create a new organizational
unit. Still, that new unit would not need to operate in a radically
different fashion than the agency aiding the railroads. I would not
classify this example as significant institutional change. On the other
hand, if the government wanted to design, implement, and operate an
entirely new transportation technology, previous institutional forms
would not be as relevant to the task. Further, new kinds of functions
seem to require new forms of justification to legitimate them.^
Significant institutional change might well occur in other ways.
However, the subject here is whether and in what ways institutional
change arises out of electoral realignment. The remainder of this chap-
ter is devoted to examining what researchers interested in realignment
have to say on this subject. Because they have said relatively little,
the primary foci of research have been to establish the empirical vali-
dity of the concept, to develop a methodology to accurately identify
realignment periods, and to understand the electoral and coalitional
shifts that occur in realignments. As Campbell and Trilling point out,
the concept of realignment was originally seen as an electoral phenome-
non. Only later did researchers begin to explore its other ramifica-
9
tions. Nonetheless, the earliest researchers were concerned with the
overall nature of American politics and their interpretations provided
12
hints that institutional change was among the results of the realignment
process. This chapter will close with a brief examination of several
other writers who do not focus on realignment per se, but have consi-
dered the issue of significant political or institutional change in the
United States.
The Realignment Literature: Application to the
Analysis of Institutional Change
I am dividing my consideration of realignment research into three
chronological periods. In the first period, roughly 1955 through the
early 1960s, researchers aimed at defining the concept and demonstrating
its empirical existence. Important figures in this period include V. 0.
Key, E. E. Schattschneider, and the Michigan Survey Research group. In
the second period, centering around 1970, most researchers focused on
describing and explaining the causes and mechanics of realignment. The
studies by Burnham and Sundquist are probably the definitive ones of
this period. The third period, that of the past decade, has witnessed
an increasing concern with the implications of realignment on political
leadership and public policy, though not specifically on institutional
adaptati on.
Initial Work: Developing the Concept
The terms "realignment" and "critical election" were originally
defined by V. 0. Key. Key's initial work in this area focused on the
classification of United States national elections; although this inter-
est in classification was certainly linked to broader interests into how
13
the political process operates. The author notes that .
. the at-
tempt to move toward a better understanding of elections in the terms
here employed could provide a means for better integrating the study of
political behavior with the analysis of political systems. "^^
Key's definition of the critical or realigning election has been
the one, which with various modifications, has been used by subsequent
researchers investigating realignment and electoral cycles. The central
elements of his definition include: (1) unusually deep voter concern,
(2) high voter turnout, (3) decisive results that show important changes
in pre-existing electoral alignments and divisions, and (4) persistence
of new electoral alignments for at least several future national elec-
tions. Key stresses this fourth element, persistence of the new align-
ment, as the single most important indicator of a critical election.
Implicit in Key's original work on critical elections is the notion of
electoral cycles, although he did not explore either what prompts a re-
alignment or what happens between critical elections in any detail. Yet
Key observed that, ". . .An understanding of elections and, in turn, of
the democratic process must rest partially on broad differentiations of
1
2
the complexes of behavior that we call elections." Key's observation
implies that electoral cycles have an important impact on subsequent
political developments.
Key's discovery and interpretation of electoral realignment rests
on aggregate voting data. However, among the students of voting behav-
ior of the 1950s and 1960s, Key was unusually sensitive to the possibil-
ity that voting constituted rational acts by many, perhaps most, voters
14
within the limits of the information and alternatives available to
themJ3 His views on this matter are important here insofar as any con-
nection between any policy or institutional impact of realignment and
popular sovereignty requires that voters are rational actors pursuing
their understanding of their individual and social interests, at least
during periods of realignment. Specification of the form and dynamics
of voter rationality would inform ideas of how the expression of voter
preferences influences, or directs, the actions of government officials
and other powerholders in the social order.
According to Key, the most useful and accurate explanation of an
individual's vote is his or her perception of past candidate perfor-
mance. In the context of presidential elections, this clearly means the
performance of the administration not just the incumbent. Key acknow-
ledges that election campaigns, childhood socialization, and other
factors have an impact on the vote, but he says that impact is secon-
1
4
dary. As Key points out:
Governments must act or not act and action or inaction may convert
supporters into opponents or opponents into supporters. Events,
over which government may, or more likely may not, have control,
shape the attitudes of voters to the advantage or disadvantage of
the party in power.
If Key is correct electoral judgements are largely retrospective, one
cannot claim a direct relationship between electoral results and insti-
tutional change. However one can conceptualize a relationship in which
a new administration would undertake institutional change as part of its
policy response to the perceived dissatisfactions of the electorate with
the previous administration. Further, institutional adaptations might
15
then, in a general way, be ratified or rejected by voters in the next
election.
Key divides voters in any given election into three categories:
"standpatters," "switchers," and "new voters." Individuals do not
necessarily stay in these categories in future elections and members of
all of the categories are presumed to act rationally in casting their
votes. Standpatters are individuals who vote for the same (presiden-
tial) party they did in the previous election. Switchers change their
party allegiance. However, it is important to note that such changes
may or may not be longstanding. The category of new voters includes
registered voters who did not vote in the previous presidential election
as well as those not registered before. Even in nomal , that is non-
realigning elections, switchers and new voters constitute a very sig-
nificant part of the electorate. Key reported that typically 30 to 40
percent of the electorate did not "standpat" in any given normal elec-
1 g
tion. These percentages are probably higher today given the decline
in party identification and organization in the two decades since Key
wrote The Responsible Voter . Realignment necessarily means an even
greater degree of either switchers or new voters, and probably both, in
the electorate.
However, the dynamics of the election following realignment, i.e.,
the one in which the new political order presumably receives the elec-
torate's blessing, are not as obvious. One possible expectation would
be a relatively stable electorate as those who had wanted a change now
standpat. Notwithstanding this expectation. Key found evidence of a
16
post-alignment movement of voters based on the policies and ideological
appeals of the newly dominant political party and coal itionJ^ This
second effect is more consistent with the idea of retrospective judge-
ment in that persons dissatisfied before realignment might be equally or
more dissatisfied with the record of the new administration.
The preceding material should not be taken to suggest that a cri-
tical election is little more than an extreme case of a typical elec-
tion. Key notes two differences in the election itself and two more in
its outcome. It is clear that while issues are not necessarily better
defined they are more salient. More voters are usually involved, not
only in the act of voting, but in the political discourse that surrounds
the election as well. Similarly, the results are different in kind.
New aggregate structures of voting patterns and other kinds of political
support become apparent and these new structures, while not static, are
persistent. For instance, the patterns growing out of the realignment
of 1896 were still clearly discernible on the eve of the Great Depres-
sion. Today, even a half century after the New Deal realignment, enough
of the structure of the great Democratic majority remains that contem-
porary Democrats can still seriously talk about its remobi 1 i zation.
Key never wrote at length about institutional change arising from
realignment. Key did pay greater attention to the question of policy
changes after realignment and he did so in a way that suggested there
was a linkage between realignment and institutional change. As early as
1955 Key speculated that critical elections might have implications upon
public administration, the legislative process, and the operation and
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regulation of the economyJ^ In later work, Key, speaking about the New
Deal, emphasized the basic changes in the relationship between the state
and the citizenry that occurred at that time. While Key writes mostly
about policy initiatives, he seems aware that new kinds of institutions
were needed to implement these departures, e.g., a WPA for direct relief
or an NRA to support industrial self-regulation.^^ In truth the dis-
tinction between policy change and institutional change may sometimes be
only an analytical one. If institutions are in the end human creations
meant to serve certain purposes, then a prima facie reason for institu-
tional change is to implement new purposes.
A second approach to the study of realignment stemmed from the
work on individual voting behavior conducted by Campbell, Converse,
Miller, and Stokes. The group's primary concern was to understand indi-
vidual voting decisions in terms of individual perceptions and atti-
tudes. As such they were less immediately concerned with the social and
political context in which the individual vote occurs. However, since
one of their key attitudinal variables was voters' psychological identi-
fication with a political party, i.e., "party identification," Campbell
et al
.
realized that they had to understand why there are both short
term and long term variations in the votes given to party candidates in
different elections, despite the relative stability of party identifica-
tion among individual voters.
The concept Campbell et al . use to capture the meaning of elec-
tions, as opposed to describing individual attitudinal and behavioral
change, is the "normal vote." The meaning of elections is understood by
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the degree of deviation they exhibit compared to the ideal, although
empirically unknown, situation of an election where voters act in per-
fect accordance with their long standing identification with a given
political party. 2'' All presidential elections are in some sense differ-
ent from the normal vote, although the party with the largest percentage
of identifiers is usually expected to win. Campbell and associates call
this a "maintaining election." Occasionally there will be enough varia-
tion from the normal vote for the minority party to win. This is called
a "deviating election." Finally, there is the situation where devia-
tions from the normal vote are both massive and permanent. In this
situation it is also likely that many new voters will come to the polls
for the first time. Like Key, Campbell et al. call this a "realigning
election.
"
Campbell et al
.
said little about either the mechanics or the ef-
fects of realigning elections. This is consistent with their emphasis
on individual attitudinal stability and change as determined through
pre-election surveys. All of their data collection was done during
maintaining and deviating elections. Yet the SRC group has made some
suggestions about the relationships between voters and government offi-
cials which provide insights into understanding the relationship between
realignment and policy and institutional change.
Campbell et al. recognize the limited formal decision that occurs
in United States national elections, that is, the selection of office
holders. However, they also argue that all elections hold an implicit
meani ng:
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We have said that popular elections are one of several means ofdecision making in the political system, that this system cohereslargely because its decision processes are bound together by rela-
tions of mutual influence, and that, as a result, decisions of the
electorate are of interest for their influence on what occurs else-
where in the system.
Reviewing their survey evidence, the authors note that the electorate as
a whole does not have detailed information about the past actions or fu-
ture plans of public officials, political parties, or governmental in-
stitutions. They also point out that extremely few voters think in ways
that can be characterized as ideological. Rather, Campbell et al
. claim
that the electorate defines the broad universe of political discourse
and action by approving or rejecting presidential candidates and their
parties based on general understandings of the notions of "general
societal goals" that these candidates/parties represent. These "deci-
sions" are most focused during realignments. Indeed, the authors
believe that realignments are times of increased ideological focus and
that this focus provides incentives for a minority party, an insurgent
group within a major party, or a third party to suggest new governmental
. . 25
priorities. Thus, the substance of the so-called Campbell -Key debate
on voter rationality is hardly substance at all when it comes to re-
alignment. During realignment the ill informed non-rational independent
voter portrayed by the Michigan group acts very much like Key's rational
switcher.
A third major example of early work on the concept of realignment
is that of E. E. Schattschneider, particularly as presented in The Semi-
Sovereign People . Unlike Key or the SRC group, Schattschneider pays
scant attention to how voters make their choices or to how to classify
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elections. For the most part Schattschneider doesn't use the same ter-
minology as most other scholars in the field. His stated purpose in The
Semi
-Sovereign People is
:
... to work out a theory about the relation between organization
and conflict, the relation between political organization and demo-
cracy, and the organizational alternatives open to the American
people. The assumption made throughout is that the nature of poli-
tical organization depends on the conflicts exploited in the politi-
cal system, which ultimately is what politics is about. 26
Schattschneider holds that in a liberal democracy elections provide a
simple and regular avenue of public participation in working out politi-
cal conflicts. But elections are also by their nature highly struc-
tured, that is, organized events. Schattschneider offers a normative
standard for judging if the organization of popular sovereignty through
elections is a viable one. He points out that the importance of the
decisions made by the public is more significant than the number of
decisions made. Furthermore, he contends that the nature of available
alternatives, i.e., the "completeness" of the options, is every bit as
important as the nature of the issues. Elections, in the broadest
sense, should be organized in a way in which political leadership will
27have incentives to act in a manner consistent with these standards.
Schattschneider was aware that United States national elections
rarely meet these standards. Still, Schattschneider noted that about a
half dozen presidential elections had a truly important impact on Ameri-
can society; the very elections that Key, the Michigan group, and subse-
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quent writers identify as critical or realigning. Schattschneider
clearly identifies the elections of 1896 and 1932 as realigning and dis-
29
cusses the nature and some of the implications of these realignments.
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However, Schattschneider
' s contribution to understanding realignment
does not come from his ability to identify the phenomenon. His main
contribution comes from providing a language suitable for talking about
the reasons for and the implications of great electoral and political
shifts
.
Like most American political scientists, Schattschneider saw poli-
tics as a quasi-market process where individuals and groups competed in
a framework of widely accepted rules and institutions. Within this
framework it is the conflict over differences rather than any shared
sense of community that provides the key to comprehending political
life. Community or solidarity is seen as mainly the product of con-
flict, that is, as a result of people either pursuing their goals or
opposing others pursuing different goals. For Schattschneider, it isn't
important that conflict exists, as he sees that as inevitable, but how
particular conflicts get to be defined as important ones. Major con-
flicts literally define the political system, drawing lines of both
division and unification. Many new or potential conflicts remain,
either unimportant, suppressed, or unrecognized, because a previous ma-
jor conflict has already organized political forces in a distinctive
way. New conflicts which divide and unify people along similar lines as
preexisting political divisions are more likely to penetrate the politi-
cal system. That is, in a stable political alignment it will be diffi-
cult to pursue new issues outside the existing structure of conflict.
However, should the original structuring conflict become, to use
Schattschnei der' s term, "displaced," a new set of conflicts, and
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inevitably a new alignment of political forces will replace the previous
one. This is what happens, or at least becomes apparent, in a realign-
Of)
ing election.
Perhaps Schattschneider' s most felicitous idea was his concept of
"mobilization of bias," that is, the purposefulness built into any form
of human organization. The term was originally used to examine the
kinds of purposes a given fonn of political organization would carry
out, such as interest groups or political parties. For example, due
to their particularistic nature interest groups are inherently biased,
i.e., have strong organizational incentives, to limit the scope of poli-
tical conflict. In contrast, political parties, because they rely upon
the votes of a mass electorate, have strong incentives to expand the
scope of conflict. Schattschneider then extended this notion of organi-
zational bias to more abstract forms of organization such as political
alignments, i.e., the structuring of conflict. He contended that the
very structure of political conflict produces incentives and penalties
for anyone seeking to raise new issues or to obtain new public policies.
Schattschneider showed how the sectional alignment of the 1890s reduced
the incentives for political parties to expand political conflict on
economic or racial issues and how the more national, quasi-class based
alignment of the 1930s had the opposite effect. That is, the incen-
tives and constraints embedded in the overall structure of political
conflict are more important than the mobilization of bias built into any
particular institution.
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Like Key and Campbell et al
. , Schattschneider often alluded to the
important changes in political agendas and public policy that follow
realignments. Unlike Key and the Michigan group, and all too many later
students of realignment, Schattschnei der ' s concept of the mobilization
of bias allowed him to talk about the linkages among realignment, insti-
tutional change, and policy initiatives in an intelligible and systema-
tic way. He notes that "... The function of institutions is to chan-
nel conflict; institutions do not treat all forms of conflict impartial-
ly, just as football rules do not treat all forms of violence with
indiscriminate equality. "^^ Thus institutional forms are both a part of
and an expression of a political order's characteristic mobilization of
bias. Institutional forms are part of the mobilization of bias in that
they structure conflict in predictable ways, but they are also an ex-
pression of the mobilization of bias in that they reflect a given set of
political and social priorities. When social and political conflicts
were displaced in a significant way, newly dominant interests would
necessarily seek to remove prior institutional structures and practices
which worked against them with structures and practices that would favor
the attainment of their goals. Previously dominant interests may try to
utilize old institutional forms to prevent policy changes or to raise
doubts about the legitimacy of newly dominant political forces. To
argue to the contrary would mean that either institutional forms have
trivial impacts on political competition and public policy fonnation or
that Schattschneider is wrong about the exclusionary tendencies of im-
portant conflicts.
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While the first argument may be true in some political systems, it
is unintelligible within any understanding of American political life.
Even those observers who stress the power of economic elites or organi-
zations to limit the range of the decisions made within formal govern-
mental institutions recognize that governmental institutions shape
policy and enhance legitimacy. The second argument fails to recognize
an inherent limit of all human creations, whether language, or tools, or
institutional forms. Intent and partiality are two sides of the same
coin; to specialize one must limit and vice versa. As it would be im-
possible to communicate all of one's thoughts with a single word or to
build a house with a single hand tool, so too it would be impossible to
design a form of social organization and practice that could perform an
infinitude of functions and do them all well.
While Schattschneider did not make a detailed examination of the
impact of realigning elections upon institutions, he did make several
suggestions about where to look to find these effects. Specifically,
the author notes a number of changes in the operation of the United
States Senate and the Presidency related to the extension of the fran-
chise and the creation and extension of national patterns of partisan
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conflict. In particular, Schattschneider examines the periods follow-
ing 1932 and 1896 realigning elections for indications of institutional
change. After discussing the 1932 realignment and the subsequent, if
not necessarily related, increased United States involvement in inter-
national relations, Schattschneider says that ". . . the cumulative
effect of these two revolutions has been to produce what is virtually a
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new government and a new political base for American public policy. "^^
One implication of his statement is that the 1930s realignment was a
contributing factor to important institutional change in the United
States government.
In contrast, Schattschneider says that the 1896 realignment did
not bring about major institutional change. The 1896 realignment was an
affirmation of the status quo; that is of the dominance of a corporate
dominated elite associated with the Republican party. The Republicans
remained the political bulwark of economic privilege, except in the
South where an equally or more conservative elite associated with the
Democratic party gained near total ascendency over its previous rivals.
Thus Schattschneider claims that institutional change was not substan-
tial at the national level. Rather previous institutional features were
used more assertively on behalf of dominant elites, for example, judi-
cial review and the refusal of the executive branch to enforce certain
existing laws. One might ask if the kinds of institutional change
adopted later in this historical period, i.e., those embodying the prin-
ciples of nonpartisans hip and the managerial ethos, were related to both
the nature of the dominant elites and the noticeably non-competitive
nature of the regionally based alignment itself. In a more general way
Schattschneider seems to imply a relationship between broad social
change and political change. "Every change in the organization, tech-
nology, and scope of the economy has had to be matched by parallel
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changes in the organization of political power." The linchpin of this
process is the realigning election.
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Later Work: Dynamics and Impacts of Reajj^nmpnt^
Still, what is the nature of this linch-pin? In what ways is
socioeconomic change connected to electoral phenomena and then to elite
turnover, policy change, and institutional alteration? Indeed, is re-
alignment the only way in which major political adjustments can be made
in the context of the current United States political order? It is to
these questions of when, how, and why realignments occur that the re-
searchers of the second period of realignment inquiry addressed them-
selves. Once again, most researchers gave secondary consideration to
the impacts of realignment; that is, to impacts other than the composi-
tion of the new party coalitions. Yet, if any claim is to be made that
policy and institutional changes following realignments stem from an
exercise of popular sovereignty, one must be able to specify how the
public generates demands or expectations for significant change or at
least mediates the demands of newly dominant elites.
Gerald Pomper's writings on the subject of realignment are indica-
tive of this shift in emphsis. Like members of the first generation,
Pomper directed much of his attention to recognizing and classifying
different types of elections. In common with the members of the second
generation Pomper paid increased attention to the dynamics of realign-
ment.
Pomper's most fruitful insight in regard to institutional change
is that realignments have structuring effects on subsequent political
conflict and outcomes. Pomper describes these effects in terms remin-
iscent of Schattschneider with a particular focus on the relationship
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between party coalitions and dominant conflicts. Pomper contends that
the main long term effect of any election is seen in terms of its effect
on the majority party coalition in any electoral era, i.e., between re-
alignments. In the absence of major changes in the composition of party
coalitions there is little likelihood of major policy departures or
alterations in the political agenda. The actions of government offi-
cials will rarely deviate from established practices. In other words,
Pomper suggests there is little chance of important institutional change
without realignment.
Pomper' s strongest example of the impact of elections on policy
does not involve realignment. Rather, it involves an examination of the
policy responses of both state and national governments to the use and
suppression of suffrage among American blacks. Pomper makes a fairly
convincing case that public policy in a number of fields such as civil
rights, public education, and law enforcement reflects to some extent
black voter turnout. He goes on to claim that the very terms of politi-
cal discourse, that is of what is politically acceptable, also reflects
the need, or lack of need, of public officials to anticipate the reac-
tions of black voters towards them in future elections.^^ While the
author is not specific on details, changes in these policy areas no
doubt required some changes in institutional practice.
James Sundquist might qualify as the archetypical analyst of this
period of realignment studies because of his concentration on the issue
of how realignments come about. Not only does Sundquist have almost
nothing to say on the question of institutional change; one can read his
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most important work on realignment, Dynamics of the Party System , with-
out finding any important reference to policy or leadership changes fol-
lowing a critical election period. Nonetheless, through his discussion
of the process of realignment Sundquist considers in detail how insur-
gent groups prompt a realignment and how the nature of that realignment
arises from the circumstances of the insurgency. His work thus provides
insights into the possible connections between realignment and subse-
quent institutional changes.
Like Schattschneider, Sundquist begins his analysis by looking at
the basic structure of conflict in a political system. He uses the term
"organic" to denote this structure. Giyen that the author is interested
mainly in the United States, he assumes that political conflict will al-
ways be mediated by a party system with normally two dominant members.
Thus, a realignment requires a shift in the organic composition of a
party system rather than the movement of voters, however large, among
parties within the pre-existing structure of conflict. However, Sund-
quist recognizes that, empirically, no change in a structure of conflict
completely erases past structures. Instead, new realignments overlay
previous ones creating a complex situation where dominant conflicts are
somewhat muffled by the remaining echoes of earlier conflicts. Seeking
clarity, Sundquist chooses to deduce a number of hypothetical scenarios
for electoral realignment and then to examine historical cases of both
realignments and unsuccessful attempts to induce realignment to ascer-
tain the utility of his constructs.'^^
29
Sundquist sees five variables as central to understanding the dy-
namics of realignment. These are "... the breadth and depth of the
underlying grievance, the capacity of the proposed remedy to provoke
resistance, the motivation and capacity of party leadership, the divi-
sion of the polar forces between the parties, and the strength of the
ties that bind voters to the existing parties. "^^ It is important to
note that these variables interact with each other rather than having
separate effects.
The first two factors, the nature of the new dominant issue and
the capacity of that issue to provoke resistance is a restatement of the
adage that important conflicts unify and divide at the same time. To
begin the realignment process, these factors need to be strong enough to
create serious political uncertainty through the formation of "polar
blocks" whose members feel extremely strongly about the ultimate resolu-
tion of the new conflict. Sundquist asserts that this strong feeling
may often take on a moral quality, that members of the respective polar
blocks see their own positions representing good and their opponents'
embodying evil. This is important in that it suggests that, for at
least the members of the polar groups, realignment is more a prospective
than a retrospective process.
Also important is the translation of the original grievance into
an explicitly political issue with a proposed or at least implied reme-
dy. For Sundquist, it is the suggestion of a remedy that is critical to
both the mobilization of an opposition and the exact composition of that
opposition. By implication, the nature of the opposition will in turn
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influence the continued mobilization of the original aggrieved group,
which will add or lose active sympathizers based on the nature of the
opposition as well as the issue itself. It is at this point that the
character of political leadership plays a singular role.^"^ Certainly,
one should also expect that any institutional change arising out of a
particular realignment would be related to attempts to resolve the
issues that were central to the new structure of conflict.
By political leadership, Sundquist means the leadership of the
dominant political parties before realignment. While leadership may
have only a secondary role in creating the conditions for realignment,
leadership behavior is critical to whether a realignment will occur and
the form it will take.
The power and capacity of the established party leadership are, in a
sense, matched against the strength and momentum of the issue. If
the leaders have the skill and motivation to handle the issue in a
way that will check the growth of the polar blocs, and if the issue
is the kind that allows such handling, a major realignment will not
take place. If, on the other hand, they throw in their lot with one
or the other polar group, the realignment becomes inevitable. The
historic realignments of the American party system occurred because
the leaders either did not try to mediate and compromise the issue
or tried and failed.'^^
Thus one of the main variables that might affect the nature of institu-
tional change following a realignment is the extent to which members of
the previous leadership are able to stay in power during the realign-
ment. To some extent such leadership will attempt to maintain connec-
tions to their previous (or indeed current) constituencies. This could
easily influence the extent to which institutional forms are altered to
implement new purposes or remain as before. Thus, one implication of
Sundquist' s work is that the strength of institutional resistance to the
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new political agenda is related to the remaining strength of previous
electoral/coal itional alignments in the new structure of political con-
flict.
Sundquist's last two factors, the division of polar forces between
the major parties and the strength of existing partisan attachments, no
doubt serve to mediate the previous three variables, particularly that
of leadership. For example, it is easier to get individuals to reconsi-
der inherited party identifications, than to get them to put aside iden-
tifications resulting from personal choice in a highly politicized
situation. Certainly this influences the readiness of weakly committed
political leadership to embrace new constituencies.
Of more importance in Sundquist's schema is the size and relative
growth of polar forces within the existing two major parties. Sundquist
says that if opposing forces have significant and relatively equal sup-
port in both parties, party leaders will seek to delay realignment.
However, if and when realignment happens, the scale of the realignment
will be greater and the degree of disruption to the existing political
system will also be increased. One implication of this position is
that the scale of subsequent institutional change would be greater in
those situations where there is a commensurate level of change in prior
patterns of constituency/leadership relationships. Sundquist also notes
that the leaders of both parties normally seek to diffuse new issues by
inaction or incremental policy responses. He notes that professional
politicians as a group benefit from and therefore seek to preserve the
existing political alignment; especially those politicians who hold
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leadership positions in institutions where members tend to form strong
constituency relationships, for instance, legislatures.^^ Thus, on the
basis of Sundquist's work, one can postulate that a similar process
operates in the area of post-realignment institutional change. For
example, most formal institutional change in the United States govern-
ment must be approved by Congress. Yet, the members of this institution
are normally apt to have fewer incentives to puch for such change, even
after realignment.^^ Thus, major formal institutional change might be
delayed or may not occur at all; although informal change could still be
quite extensive.
Along with Sundquist, Walter Dean Burnham is one of the most im-
portant figures of the second period of realignment research. Like
Sundquist, Burnham gives particular attention to the details of how re-
alignments come about. While there are some significant differences
between the two men on these issues, it is clear that they are describ-
ing and explaining the dynamics of the same political reality. Unlike
Sundquist, Burnham is explicitly concerned with the impacts of the
realignment process. Indeed, he is the first prominent researcher
clearly interested in examining the impact of realignment on institu-
tional development.
The critical realignment . . . constitutes a political decision of
the first magnitude and a turning point in the mainstream of nation-
al policy formation. Characteristically, the relationships among
policy making institutions, their relative power and decision making
capacity, and the policy outputs they produce are profoundly af-
fected by critical real ignments.48
While Burnham is not primarily concerned with documenting institu-
tional change arising out of realignment, he notes several examples of
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such change. Among these Burnham stresses the institutionalization and
fragmentation of the United States House of Representatives, the rise
and decline of the Supreme Court's role in economic policy making, and
the current (or perhaps now declining) dominance of "groupism" in United
States politics.
Burnham contends that before the 1896 realignment power in the
House of Representatives was largely in the hands of partisan leaders.
Further, these leaders were highly subject to the will of their party
caucuses. After 1896, the power of the partisan leadership was reduced
and that of the committees, and of their chairs, enhanced. Seniority
gradually became the near absolute basis of attaining committee power.
Concurrently, party leadership positions became "professionalized," that
is, not so subject to turnover. The party caucus became an agency of
legitimation rather than of leadership selection and policy making.
Burnham sees these phenomena as closely related to what he terms the
negative public policy purposes of the new party system. His argument
concerning the role of the Supreme Court after 1896 is similar. The
Court's extensive use of judicial review to negate both federal and
state legislation on economic matters reflects the often essentially
issueless nature of politics in the 1896-1932 period. Finally, Burn-
ham's discussion of the rise of subgovernmental politics following the
1930s realignment is based on an understanding of the constraints of
liberalism, that is in its broader sense of liberal individualism, on
institutional adaptation. While Burnham sees this governmental response
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to the problems of a complex industrial society as a partial outgrowth
of the decline or disaggregation of American political parties, he
states that even this adaptation could not have occurred outside the
realignment process.
Burnham, in contrast to Sundquist, does not construct a formal
model of realignment dynamics. Yet Burnham' s analysis of electoral
change in one state, Pennsylvania, tends to confirm the importance of
the five elements that Sundquist emphasizes; that is, the nature of the
new conflict, the nature of the opposition it provokes, the role of
political leadership, the distribution of conflicting forces in the
existing major parties, and the residual strength of party attachments
formed in and since the previous alignment. In concurrence Burnham
states
:
Each realignment was in effect a set of constituent decisions by
critical minorities within the electorate and by elites working
within majorities brought into being by critical elections. These
decisions reallocated the processes and outputs of politics in terms
of the major elements in the new coalition and, in one form or
another, served to manage and contain the political tensions which
contributed to the realignment.^^
Thus, while Burnham in large part validates Sundquist's model, he does
so with a distinctive edge of his own. Realignments change the process
of government as well as the participants and issues of the political
process.
While Burnham notes that realignment is a surrogate for revolution
in the United States, Burnham also contends that realignment serves to
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hold political change within certain limits. The limiting factor is
the American ideological heritage of Lockian liberalism. More
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precisely, realignment allows the redefinition of political processes
and policies and of the secondary principles of liberalism without a
wholesale change in either the material or subjective underpinnings of
the political order. 5^ If true, the li.its of as well as the opportuni-
ties for institutional adaptation through realignment become apparent.
In contrast to Sundquist, Burnham implies that the potential results of
realignment are not completely determined by the process of the realign-
ment itself.
Burnham is clear in his assertion that realignment is a way in
which the United States political system adjusts to major socioeconomic
change. Thus the role of moral combat in realignment must be a secon-
dary factor and voter decisions are more likely to take on the retro-
spective quality suggested by Key and others. Burnham emphasizes the
integrative and aggregative functions of political parties as the Ameri-
can nonn and duly notes the inability of United States parties to act as
a policy link between the electorate and political officials. Thus,
Burnham sees normal politics as a process that produces an ever widening
disjuncture between new political demands arising out of an evolving
social and economic context and the irrelevant or counterproductive
public policies produced within the existing mobilization of bias. As
Burnham puts it, there is "... a chronic, cumulative tendency toward
underproduction of other than currently 'normal' policy outputs. "^^
Realignment became more likely as tensions grew, or at least did so in
the past.
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as a
Burnham also sees a more prominent role for third parties in the
realignment process than Sundquist. Sundquist sees the third party
last resort, a political option to be used only if all attempts at in-
surgency within the major parties faiL^^ Burnham sees third party
activity as a protorealignment phenomenon, that is, as the first place
in which the growing disjuncture between the political status quo and at
least some major elements of society is clearly articulated. Burnham
attaches great importance to the democratic and "leftist" orientation of
most third parties. However, it is still usually a major party that
provokes the realignment by using the third party issue, rather than the
third party itself.^'' As a result, there will be a somewhat different
constellation of political elites following a realignment, even when the
insurgents win, and with it a different and often less radical flavor to
any institutional adaptation that takes place.
Yet it would be misleading to say that Burnham claims that re-
alignments normally result in extensive institutional change. He agrees
with those observers who hold that United States policy making institu-
tions have been, to use the author's phrase
. . astonishingly little
transformed in its characteristics and methods of operation. "^^ Criti-
cal elections are explained by the very failure of such stable institu-
tions to make the policy adjustments demanded in a very dynamic social
and economic system. Thus, Burnham is greatly concerned about the cir-
cumstances that promote or impede eventual realignment. This explains
his attention to electoral disaggregation, that is the reduced ability
of political parties to mobilize electoral support based upon long
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standing and committed partisan attachments. Burnham's fear is that
electoral disaggregation, which he sees as a long tem and possibly
irreversible trend, will make it difficult or perhaps impossible for
realignments to take place. While a disaggregated electoral system
might not necessarily be an issueless one, Burnham believes that it
would be virtually impossible to get public officials to coordinate
their activities in ways supportive of majority preferences, a condition
that he thinks has occurred, if incompletely, following realignment.
Restated, Burnham thinks that future political change will not be based
in any sense upon popular sovereignty.^^
Concurrent with Burnham's work, and probably influencing it, was
the work of a number of writers focusing on the broad dynamics of social
and economic change and its impact on political life. Everett Carll
Ladd and Thomas Jahnige serve as two important and representative ex-
amples of this group. Like Burnham, they generally agree that realign-
ments arise from the tensions created by underlying and persistent
social and economic forces. Ladd and Jahnige differ from Burnham and
previous students of realignment in that they do not see each realign-
ment as an equally significant event.
Ladd is particularly insistent on this issue. He does not cate-
gorize United States political history in terms of periods of party
alignments, but in terms of "socio-political periods" that can extend
over two or more realignments. In a sociopolitical period, a single
"political class" dominates the majority party coalitions of the entire
period. That is, coalition members, and some relatively transient
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aspects of the political agenda, can change in the realignments within a
sociopolitical period. However, the dominant political class, which
Ladd defines as a social collectivity which because of its resources
and/or functions is particularly important in the economic life of the
time, remains in control of the political agenda and directs to itself a
disproportionate share of governmental benefits throughout the socio-
political period. A given era of political history ends when there is a
new political alignment in which a new political class achieves domi-
nance. Ladd claims that only at such times can a minority party become
6
1
a majority. Thus Ladd implies that the extent to which the organiza-
tion of political life changes is not the same after all realignments.
Further, it would appear to vary in a regular fashion. Realignments
within a sociopolitical period would result in less dramatic changes in
political elites and the political agenda than realignments that marked
the beginning of a new sociopolitical period. If the subsequent impact
of the realignment is closely related to the alteration of the structure
of political conflict, then the probability and significance of institu-
tional change should also be greater in the initial post-realignment
period of any sociopolitical era.
Both Ladd and Jahnige use the term "political style" to refer to
differences in the behavior of elites and the expectations of publics in
different political eras. The term is left undefined, although examples
elucidating its meaning are interspersed through the two men's writings.
For example, both authors claim that pre-Jacksonian politics was based
on a deferential style of relations on the part of most citizens toward
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a social and political elite.^^ similarly, the New Deal period was a
time in which most citizens substituted the image of the state for that
of business as the principal agent of nation building." While changes
in political style need not mean that there must be formal institutional
change, the concept implies at least informal change in how institution-
al elites operate within the existing framework of institutional rules.
It is this change in the modus operandi that Jahnige appears to have in
mind when he writes, "Lastly every party system period has associated
with it a particular style of politics ... and institutional structure
which has often differed radically from those which characterize the
preceding and succeeding periods. "^^
Current work on the issues of realignment deals increasingly with
the impacts of realignment. This work has been focused on changes in
public policy and elite composition and behavior rather than institu-
tional change per se; but these matters bear upon the question of
institutional change, especially of the sort that occurs without legal
sanction. As there has been no grand synthesizer of this research, as
say Burnham or Sundquist were during the earlier period, I will briefly
discuss several examples of current work that I think have important
implications for understanding the connections between realignment and
institutional change.
Seligman and King have found that important changes occur in the
occupational and demographic profile of members of Congress during
realignment. Individuals with lower social/economic status win legisla-
tive office in greater numbers. Further, the authors found that the
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influx of this kind of member had an effect on coalitional patterns in
Congress and on legislation.
During realignments, however, background factors successfully pre-dicted congressional voting behavior, indicating that new legisla-
tors, elected in the midst of realignment, acted as a cohort
seizing opportunities presented by the realignment crisis to'repre-
sent the interests of the disaffected. ^5
They also found that the old demographic profile of Congress was gradu-
ally restored in the years following realignment.^^ Studies of this
sort provide useful material for conceptualizing the dynamics of both
formal and informal institutional change. On the basis of Seligman's
and King's research it is possible to make a counterargument to Sund-
quist's claim that Congress, because of strong constituency based rela-
tionships, tends to restrain the extent of post-realignment change.
The research conducted by Benjamin Ginsberg and David Brady also
serves to confirm the impact of realignment upon public policy. Both
authors look at the passage of legislation in selected issue areas and
seek correlations with variables such as national party platform con-
tent, changes in congressional membership, and changes in congressional
committee membership. Both authors found that the number and scope of
policy changes in the issue areas they examined are greater than average
in the years immediately following realignments. They also indicate
that the degree of policy change is greatest in those issue areas re-
lated to the kinds of conflict that prompted the realignments. However,
their data also shows that significant policy changes have occurred
without realignment, although this appears to be an occurrence less
C -I
common than realignment itself. Brady's work is noteworthy in that it
41
goes beyond demonstrating the strong association between realignment and
policy change to suggest causal relationships. Brady posits and then
examines several models of how the realignment process might influence
congressional committee actions. He concludes that no single model fits
the data well, that different models seem to be valid for different
68issue areas. Brady's results imply that realigning elections have
variable impacts in different policy areas. Thus the degree to which
post realignment policy or institutional change can be tenned a result
of popular sovereignty also appears to be variable.
David Adamany comes to a similar conclusion in his examination of
the role of the Supreme Court in the realignment process. He claims
that the Court's role is complex, that perhaps the Court's most impor-
tant role is in helping to restructure majority coalitions within what
Ladd called a sociopolitical period. Key judicial decisions may have a
vital role in attracting and rebuffing coalitional partners for the
dominant political class. Adamany sees Supreme Court decisions in the
1890s as a good example of this phenomenon. The author also suggests
that the Supreme Court plays an important through lesser role in a pro-
cess of restraining and to some extent delegitimating the policy and, by
implication, institutional innovations of the new majority coalition.
This would be particularly true after a realignment that begins a new
sociopolitical period. An example of this would be the Court's hostil-
ity to some aspects of the New Deal.^^
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Other Pertinent L1 teraturp~~^
—
While the main thrust of this dissertation is to look at realign-
ment as a precondition of subsequent institutional change, available
research on the impact of electoral alignment does not yet document any
such relationship. It only implies it. Apart from realignment research
I find at least two other kinds of political science literature perti-
nent to the issues I want to examine. The first group of works focuses
on the interactions between national government institutions and organ-
ized segments of the private sector. Writers such as Theodore Lowi and
Grant McConnell are prominent representatives of this perspective.
These authors are primarily concerned with institutional arrangements
since industrialization. Therefore, their material and insights are
most applicable to understanding the impact of the 1930s realignment.
The second kind of literature I will review examines political and gov-
ernmental adaptations to changes in the nature of an underlying capital-
ist economy. Most of this work is radical or Marxist in orientation and
tends to be skeptical of the impact of elections on political life in
any capitalist society. This work is relevant because these writers
still need to explain how and when economic elites promote or shape
political change to deal with problems or crises arising out of the
operation of the economic system. Once again, these writers are chiefly
concerned with the period after industrialization.
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Lowi and McConnell
Lowi explicitly claims that a new form of government, a "Second
Republic," has evolved in the United States since the realignment of the
1930s. Lowi uses the term Second Republic only because previous "re-
gimes" went largely unrecognized as such. However, Lowi fails to link
the origin of these other republics, or the Second Republic for that
matter, directly to electoral realignment. He does note that "Every
regime develops a politics characteristic of itself, consonant with its
own claims of legitimacy and congruent with its own particular uses of
government. "'^^ This might be restated as follows: Every regime creates
its own pattern of institutional structure and process within the
general fornis of the United States Constitution.
Lowi speaks about the process of institutional adaptation in more
detail than the authors I previously discussed. His analysis is consis-
tent with all the forms of institutional change I presented earlier in
this chapter: (1) the widespread use of new institutional forms,
(2) the performance of new functions or those captured from previously
existing institutions, (3) major changes in the interrelationships among
political institutions, and (4) the performance of new kinds of govern-
mental functions. In principle, all four kinds of change may occur
informally, without specific legal sanction. Lowi stresses the fourth
type of change in his evaluation of the institutional adaptations of
Roosevelt' s New Deal
.
The transition to the Second Republic began in earnest during the
1930s. . . . The best known but least significant characteristic of
the New Deal period was the increasing size of the national govern-
ment, measured in budgetary terms ... of far greater significance
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Lewi then notes that these new functions brought fundamental changes in
institutional relationships. Among these changes were the shift toward
executive oriented government, the rise of delegated power to the
bureaucracy (particularly in the extremely wide discretion given to
agencies to enact "administrative legislation'^)
, and in the gradual
adjustment in the function of the federal courts to these other new
institutional fonns and functions.
Lowi's work gives substantial content to Ladd's and Jahnige's con-
cept of political style. Lowi would say that the style of the Second
Republic is administrative, that the most characteristic kind of politi-
cal relationship is one in which the likelihood of governmental coercion
is immediate but the incentives and likelihood for peaceful adjustment
are high. In this situation, participants have largely internalized the
probable sanctions so that the sanctions rarely need to be applied.
Lowi states that the administrative style develops a degree of legiti-
macy precisely because the coercion is internalized, unnoticed, and thus
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mundane. Within the context of the fragmentation of formal government
authority and of the dominance of liberalism in the United States, the
characteristic institutional expression of the administrative political
style is what Lowi calls the process of tripartite bargaining. Others
have referred to tripartite bargaining and its institutional forms by
terms such as groupism, cl ienteleism, subgovernments, and iron
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triangles. Lowi notes that the characteristic policy making process
the post-1932 period has become this process of privatized negotiati
among relevant bureaucratic agencies, congressional committees, and
organized interest groups.
In fairness to Lowi ' s views, I must note that he does not think
that the Second Republic is the direct result of the New Deal or of the
1930s realignment. While Lowi acknowledges that the preconditions for
the new regime were established in the 1930s, the Second Republic came
to fruition in the Democratic administrations of the 1960s and was fi-
nally legitimated upon the continuance and extension of the new style of
governance by the Republican administrations of the 1970s.^^ This
raises the question of the time scale in which one must look for the
impacts of a realignment. Should one limit inquiry to the years imme-
diately following realignment or look at the entire period between two
critical election periods? Lowi
' s position seems to be the former, and
is supported by research such as Seligman's and King's on Congress. Yet
an effective counterargument can be based on a number of factors includ-
ing the gradualness of elite turnover in other institutions such as the
federal courts and bureaucracy and of the tendency of some elected offi-
cials in the dominant party coalition to maintain strong ties to old
constituencies and/or to remain committed to various aspects of the old
political agenda.
Lowi says nothing about the impact of elections upon the process
of institutional change. Indeed, he does not present a model to explain
the fundamental political change he documents and interprets. Yet one
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may infer the outlines of a model from his concept of "the public philo-
Sophy.
"
Lowi appears to use the concept of the public philosophy to mean
something similar to what others might call an ideology or a system of
political beliefs. A public philosophy provides an understanding of the
realities of social life, suggests a set of values or goods for public
life, and implies the boundaries of acceptable political action. How-
ever, for Lowi, the public philosophy is different from an ideology in
that it shapes institutional practice and policy fomation. Above all
else the public philosophy is the set of legitimizing ideas behind a
regime and the preeminent source of justification or rationalization for
that regime's actions. Therefore, it is more than an ideology; although
an ideology may become the public philosophy or a discarded public
philosophy may remain an important ideological force. Lowi also appears
to think that the public philosophy constrains the range of serious
ideological discourse.
Lowi contends that the public philosophy primarily t^epresents the
interests of a social and political elite and only secondarily those of
the general citizenry. He argues that a public policy exists only when
there is widespread agreement among the elite over the nature and pur-
poses of public life. When agreement is not general, there are only
competing ideologies. This is a sure sign of the decline of any public
philosophy .^^ Lowi characterizes the public philosophy of the Second
Republic as interest group liberalism, a synthesis reflecting the need
of elites to accommodate capitalist ideology, the previous public
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philosophy, with the increasing need to build and justify a positive
state emphasizing administrative rule.^^ While the decline of capital-
ism as the public philosophy began about 1900, the rise of interest
group liberalism to the status of the new public philosophy takes place
in the 1930s. Thus the rise of the public philosophy of the Second
Republic is concurrent with the New Deal realignment and a major crisis
of the social-economic order, the Great Depression.
Realignment can therefore be conceptualized as a time of transfor-
mation of elites and/or elite ideas. Nonetheless, it must be cautioned
that Lowi never claims that there is a unified economic or political
elite in the United States. Indeed, Lowi emphasizes the multiplicity of
constituencies and therefore elites that arise out of the complexity and
specialization of a modern industrial society. For Lowi, the observed
importance of subgovernments documents this point. '^^ So how does a
public philosophy coalesce and become acceptable or at least accepted as
a given to the citizenry in general? Lowi has nothing to say on this
point, but I think his concept of the public philosophy fits well with
Ladd's idea of a political class. That is, one might investigate
whether the dominant political class of each sociopolitical period
accepted an ideological perspective which it was later able to enshrine
as that era's public philosophy. Toward the end of an alignment or of
the longer sociopolitical period, a decline in the reality value of a
public philosophy might signal the weakening of a dominant political
class and foreshadow the emergence of new social forces and of a new
alignment or sociopolitical era. Further, the persistence or decline of
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public philosophies might serve as one way to tell the difference be-
tween realignments that mark the boundaires of sociopolitical periods
from realignments that are within one political era.
Grant McConnell views American poltical institutions much like
Lowi, particularly with regard to the domination of areas of public
policy by particularlistic coalitions. Like Lowi, McConnell sees this
phenomenon as mainly occurring since the New Deal and as defended by a
widely accepted orthodoxy or public philosophy In contrast to Lowi,
McConnell does not see as sharp a transition in the patterns of gover-
nance. McConnell believes that many of the ideas of the New Deal are
implicit in its supposed antithesis, the Hoover administration. The
differences involve in part the sheer size of Rooseveltian initiatives;
but the central difference is in the national government's willingness,
beginning in the New Deal, to make use of coercion to create and enforce
the policies of clientele centered policy making coalitions. This is
exactly the departure from past federal practice that Lowi says consti-
tutes the main change in institutional practice. Elsewhere McConnell
admits that F.D.R.'s administrations have had a major impact on the
institutional practices of the United States government. For instance,
McConnell notes that all presidents since the 1930s were Rooseveltian in
the sense that all of them, when compared to pre- New Deal presidents,
are activist or strong presidents, irrespective of policy preferences or
82
personal temperament.
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Radical Analyses
In general, radical observers of the United States political pro-
cess pay little attention to the institution and phenomenon of elec-
tions. The political system is seen as largely reflecting the needs and
aspirations of a relatively unified elite who get their power mainly
from the control of productive wealth. Of course, these observers are
hardly of a piece in their interpretations of how the political process
mediates elite control; but institutional decision makers, interest
group leadership, party leadership, etc., tend to be seen as having more
effective impact upon policy than does the mass electorate. Elections
provide infomation about popular dissatisfactions and a safety valve to
discourage more disruptive forms of political action based on these
grievances. More importantly, radicals tend to see elections as a mech-
anism through which the elite can greatly control the granting of con-
cessions to public demands, even to the extent that concessions can be
shaped to the actual advantage of all or at least part of the political-
go
economic elite. Other observers stated that the main functions of
elections in the United States are to create a sense of (false) social
solidarity and a legitimation of elite decisions in terms of the demo-
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cratic ethos.
Nevertheless, radical observers need to explain why an elite needs
to utilize electoral mechanisms to accomplish significant change in gov-
ernment policy and institutions. Given that all aspects of social life,
including politics, in a capitalist society are already expected to be
shaped to the advantage of the elite, why would elite members seek
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change? The answer is twofold. First, no pol itical
-economic elite is
likely to be fully unified. Few radical observers would deny that dif-
ferences of interest arise within an elite because of competing economic
interests, social attachments, or even the vagaries of individual devel-
opment. They would only say that in most circumstances these divisions
within an elite are much less important than most pluralist observers
claim. Secondly, individuals and organized groups can sometimes be mis-
taken about the efficacy of existing policies and institutional arrange-
ments. For example, some members of an economic elite may explain a
drop in corporate profits as the result of government regulations or the
wage inflation promoted by organized labor. Yet a more objective analy-
sis of the problem might find that capital's failure to reinvest past
earnings in new technological processes was the root of the problem.
Similarly, an elite, or part of one, may remain committed to old govern-
ment policies or forms of organization long after they cease to further
elite interests.
Within the context of elite differences and the expression of
popular grievance, it becomes possible to talk about a radical interpre-
tation of electoral realignment. For example, Piven and Cloward agree
with the general proposition that elections are a way to express grie-
vances that is essentially non-disruptive to the operation of a capital-
ist, industrial system. Yet given the fragmented and constituent nature
of United States political parties, Piven and Cloward understand that
majorities are necessarily transitory being composed of diverse ele-
ments. Individual officeholders can easily lose their offices because
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of electorally channeled dissatisfaction. Thus elections are anything
but non-disruptive events to elected officials. As Piven and Cloward
go on to explain, "Political incumbents try to use the powers and re-
sources of governments to intervene in the institutional arrangements
that bred dissension or to develop public programs intended to recapture
the allegiance of disaffected voting blocks. "^^
However, major concessions to subordinate groups are not the rule
in political life, but occur only under rather atypical circumstances.
For the most part, following Burnham's argument, Piven and Cloward see
realignments and crises in the larger social-economic systan as closely
related. However, Piven and Cloward do have a distinctive view of the
actual process of realignment. In part, the impact of electoral insta-
bility arises from the concurrent build up of disruptive protest outside
the bounds of sanctioned political activity.^^ Serious disruptive pro-
test is likely to occur only when the normal constraints of work and
other aspects of everyday routine are no longer present. This is most
likely to occur during periods of economic depression and other severe
88forms of social dislocation. Interestingly, the very success of gov-
ernmental responses initiated by "new" members of the political elite to
the crisis, provides the basis for reimposing social control and even
some degree of retrenchment of government policy. As a case in point,
Piven and Cloward observe that the most innovative stage of the New
Deal, especially in regard to policies improving the status and condi-
tion of non-elites, ended once electoral stability returned with the
massive Democratic electoral victory in 1936.
52
Although it was not recognized at the time, the election of IQ^fi h.H
~ic ' those who believed mlZl iin America
... the extremist parties polled only 2 9 oerrent ofthe vote
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the underlying popular unrest upon whi-ch^insurqencv
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quelled. The little the poor had gotten was
The dynamic of dissatisfaction among the populace, particularly of
those parts of it in economic distress, is one side of a radical theory
of realignment. The second side is the political conflict among members
of the elite within the same context of a serious social or economic
crisis. For example, Edward Greenberg says that the New Deal was a
period when one segment of the corporate elite was able to extend the
size and function of the slowly emerging positive state. The members of
this segment had long wanted a greater role for the state in the regula-
tion and support of the capitalist economy but had not been able to
overcome the opposition of those members of the elite who were still
committed to "laissez-faire" or strictly volunteerist policies. The
disintegration of the economy, and the electoral and social disruptions
of the era, produced a context in which the more "advanced" wing of the
corporate sector was finally able to prevail. The role of the elec-
torate in this process was to select public officials more amenable to
new approaches for responding to social and economic difficulties and
then to legitimize the new policies by returning these officials to
office. Innovative members of the corporate elite would have ample
opportunities to convince elected officials to try their plans,^^
Thus realignment might be seen as part of the process of the
readjustment of state forms to the needs or tensions produced by the
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historical evolution of a capitalist system. In the case of the United
States, this readjustment is greatly slowed by the built in fragmenta-
tion of both the governmental process and of the nature of American
electoral arrangements. One can conceive of government policies, taking
loosely James O'Connor's categories of "accumulation" and "legitima-
tion," as actions aimed at maintaining both the profitability of econom-
ic units and of the social quiescence on which industrial production
depends. The particular form, level, and mix of policies aimed at ful-
filling the functions of accumulation and legitimation, may not neces-
sarily fill either the technical or political demand for them in a given
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society. Thus in the American political system, realignment may be
viewed as furnishing one way in which appropriate adjustments can be
made in such policy outputs, and by implication, in the institutions
that create and implement these policies.
In this chapter, I have examined current political science litera-
ture pertinent to the examination of the impact of electoral realign-
ments upon institutional change in the United States national govern-
ment. While none of these sources provide substantial documentation of
such change, examples of institutional change are given, sometimes
explicitly, sometimes implicitly. While none of these sources fully
explicates the fashion in which realignment causes or mediates institu-
tional change, the literature does put forward a general framework in
the form of a chain involving social /economic crisis, electoral insta-
bility, elite turnover and policy innovation, and electoral restabiliza-
tion. Particular authors provide suggestions about the relationships
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among the various elements of this chain. The remainder of this disser-
tation will focus on two major issues: (1) the further documentation of
institutional change following and integrally related to realignments,
and (2) the further explication of both the process by which such change
comes about and of important variations in that process.
CHAPTER II
INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Governmental Institutions as an Ambiguous PhPnnmpnnn
Because government institutions are sites of political conflict,
loci of public decision making, and seem, at least in liberal-democratic
societies, to bestow legitimacy upon public policies, institutions are
an essential subject for political inquiry. "I As I noted in the last
chapter, institutions are purposeful. They embody the intentions and
preferences of human beings. These may be the purposes of persons long
dead, the living poorly served, or the most powerful segment of a social
order; but in any case institutional forms are never neutral. There is
a meaning to what they do and how they do it. Thus, as I argued earli-
er, changes in the structure and processes of governmental institutions
imply modifications in the purposes they serve. Conversely, changes in
the interests of those who hold power or in the social or economic bases
of holding political power imply that powerholders will seek to modify
institutional structures and procedures.
The "purposeful ness" of governmental institutions provides an im-
portant justification for their study, which is reinforced in putatively
democratic political orders where it is expected that government poli-
cies rest on the consent of subject citizens, that is, upon the exercise
of popular sovereignty. In the United States, and in liberal democra-
cies in general, at least some government officials are selected by an
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electorate which is nearly coextensive with the adult population. Other
major officeholders are then selected by elected officials or by proce-
dures set up by elected officials. It is useful to study governmental
institutions both in the ways they are organized to embody "popular
sovereignty and the ways in which their policies reflect and in turn
structure citizens' needs and desires. The results of such study can
infonn judgements about the degree to which the American electorate
actually exercises sovereignty. The results can also inform proposals
for institutional reform.
As noted in the United States an electoral realignment seems to be
the situation in which significant changes in government officials and
public policy are most closely related to the expression of the public
will through electoral mechanisms. I have also discussed why it makes
sense to look for changes in the structure and process of governmental
institutions following realignments. Ultimately, my reasons for this
contention are based on the proposition that institutions embody pur-
pose. However self evident this assertion may be, it says nothing about
exactly how governmental institutions embody purpose nor how those pur-
poses are altered. The main function of this chapter will be to analyze
more precisely what it means for a governmental institution to embody a
purpose; that is, what defines the concept of "governmental institu-
tion." My explication will be aimed at making sense of this concept
within the United States. Ideas which prove to be useful there will no
doubt apply to institutions in many other political orders.
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The previous material is not an attempt to obscure the obvious.
Almost everyone knows a governmental institution when they see one.
Everyone knows that the Congress and the Presidency are institutions.
Individuals more familiar with the United States government know that it
is differentiated into numerous institutions and subinstitutions, in-
cluding diverse elements like the House Agriculture Committee, the
Office of Management and Budget, and the Court of Appeals of the 9th
Circuit. Each of these subinstitutions is identifiable as an entity
with relatively stable functions and processes. They are also unambigu-
ously part of a larger entity called the United States national govern-
ment. Then, why is there any need for further analysis of the identity
of governmental institutions?
For the most part political scientists interested in United States
national politics have chosen to ignore definitional questions in regard
to institutions. One might think that at least newcomers to the formal
study of politics would need to be given an explicit definition of the
term "governmental institution" or the more general term "political
institution." Yet a brief examination of introductory texts will show
that their authors rarely discuss the subject. The working presumption
seems to be that students will recognize a governmental (or political)
institution when they encounter one; that is, as a persistent entity
within or continually associated with a government.^ Although true,
this is hardly a complete description of the standard, though usually
implicit, view of institutions. In most textbooks chapters on institu-
tions follow chapters on the Constitution. Governmental institutions
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are seen as entities within the government which are set up through the
Constitution either directly or indirectly. ^ This implicit definition
includes the criteria of 'organization" and "legality" along with "per-
sistence." Yet many non-governmental institutions can meet all three of
these criteria.
A few textbook authors do adopt a more explicit definition of in-
stitution. Several authors define governmental institutions on the
basis of certain organizational characteristics derived from Max Weber's
discussion of the ideal type bureaucracy.^ Alternatively, at least one
"radical" text speaks of government institutions as mediations between
social structure, especially the means of production, and individual
citizens.^ Still these views add little to the idea that governmental
institutions are identifiable entities within a government. While both
of these viewpoints say something potentially useful about the relation-
ship of government institutions to the rest of a society, these concep-
tions do not respond to the question of what it means for institutions
to embody purposes.
Research intended for the professional community suffers from the
same sort of problem. Nonetheless many of these studies provide useful
ideas and examples for explicating the nature of institutions. While
little attention has been given to the problem of explicating the con-
cept of governmental institution, substantial attention has been given
to the question of why a certain class of institutions, for example
legislatures, is different from another class, for example executives.
Similarly, there is a good deal of work concerning how and why specific
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institutions within a particular class, e.g., legislatures, are alike or
different from each other. Nevertheless, even authors dealing openly
with questions of defining particular kinds of governmental institutions
do not deal with the more general question of what a governmental Insti-
tution is. But to make claims that certain events or processes (for
example, realignments) result in institutional change, researchers must
be able to identify objects or processes central to something called a
governmental institution. Further, as governmental institutions are a
subset of a larger universe of institutions, it is also necessary to
find criteria for identifying that subset. However difficult it may be
to articulate the distinctions that underlie our ability to know a gov-
ernmental institution when we see one, the explication of those distinc-
tions is crucial to any systematic investigation of institutional
change.
Conceding it is relatively simple to identify governmental insti-
tutions in the United States, there are still ambiguous situtions where
one can identify a governmental institution but the usual definitional
characteristics of organization, legality, and persistence do not com-
pletely fit the phenomenon. At first glance, "governmental institution"
appears to be an example of what has been called an essentially con-
tested concept. If so, the decision to call a phenomenon a governmental
institution would be based on the observer's political or moral pur-
pose.'^ Yet, the fact that governmental institutions are intuitively
recognizable in stable political systems suggests that the idea of
60
institution as a contested concept is most useful only where a govern-
ment or social order is under severe attack.
Following Frohock, I will define governmental institutions in
terms of their core properties. Core properties are those aspects of a
phenomenon necessary to maintain the basic intelligibility of its defi-
8
nition. That is, I am looking for a formulation of the concept of
governmental institution that is more flexible than a taxonomic defini-
tion, and yet will still be relatively free from differences in meaning
based upon political perspective. I will now discuss some political
phenomena which do not fit neatly into the usual ideas about governmen-
tal institutions and yet are things most political scientists agree are
governmental institutions. These ambiguous cases will alert us to the
range of conditions that a truly useful concept would include.
The Presidential Cabinet is called a governmental institution.
Richard Fenno, the author of perhaps the most widely cited study on the
Cabinet, said that ".
. .
The President's Cabinet is a distinct, dis-
crete, and describable political institution."^ While Fenno uses the
term political institution, he makes it clear that in the context of his
writing he means government. That is, the core personnel of the insti-
tution are in fact part of the government. Then, in seeming contra-
diction, Fenno goes on to note that the Cabinet has no legal existence
as part of the government. Its legitimacy as an institution comes from
its persistence and from the needs it serves. While no President is
required to form a Cabinet (as opposed to appointing heads of executive
departments) or meet with one, not to do so is thought to have enormous
political cost. Nonetheless, the Cabinet has no legal basis fro. which
to act^as a Cabinet; that is, it does not have a manifest legal func
tion.ll Given the prevailing implicit definition, how can the Cabinet
be a governmental institution without a legal status or function?
Further, it is clear that the Cabinet neither acts nor deliberates
as a Cabinet. As Fenno points out, the institution is not capable of
effectively promoting interdepartmental coordination despite the fact
that its members include the President and the chief executive officers
of the departments of the executive branch. ^deed, some presidents
have difficulty in even recognizing some members of their own cabi-
1
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nets. This reflects the tendency of presidents to restrict their
interactions with most cabinet members to symbolic occasions or to those
policy matters involving the members' departments. Presidents usually
engage in general discussion and planning with only some Cabinet mem-
bers. Is this inner circle an institution? After all there is a ten-
dency to include certain Cabinet posts in this so-called inner circle
(e.g.. Defense, Justice), as well as certain non-Cabinet members (e.g.,
the National Security Advisor, the White House Chief of Staff). At
least this pattern has been typical of recent administrations.
The Cabinet presents definitional problems because it is an organ-
izational entity without a clear legal mandate. The "institution" of
United States Federalism presents problems for different reasons. The
legal functions of the federal system are identifiable and relatively
persistent in their broad outline. However, there is no organized en-
tity that performs and situates the federal function in the sense that
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the Congress performs and is the location of the legislative function.
Rather, federalism is a set of relatively stable relationships among
governments and their constituent institutions. Therefore it is not
surprising that the treatment of United States Federalism as an institu-
tion in political science literature is in turn uncertain.
Typically, in introductory material, a "structure and process" of
Federalism is described in much the same way as the structure and pro-
cess of national government institutions, although the material on
Federalism is placed in a separate section of the text.^^ The same un-
certainty over the institutional status of United States Federalism is
also found in professionally oriented material. For example, the Hand-
book of Political Science includes its review article on federalism in
the volume on governmental institutions. Yet, the author, William
Riker, treats the term federalism as a concept describing certain kinds
of governments and their constituent institutions rather than conceiving
it as an institution per se. Still, to call a political order a federal
system, the concept must be expressed in concrete institutions. For ex-
ample, Riker says the key indicator of a federal system is the location
of final decision making power for at least one area of policy in the
1
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institutions of at least two separate governments.
These two examples demonstrate there are governmental institutions
without either legally defined status and functions or a clearly identi-
fiable organizational center. There are even governmental institutions
that have neither of these two characteristics. The web of relation-
ships called a subgovernment can serve as an example of this kind of
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phenomenon. Basically, a subgovernment is a longstanding pattern of
bargaining and accommodation among interest groups, bureaucratic agen-
cies, and congressional committees dealing with a narrow policy area of
immediate mutual concern. The subgovernment normally makes policy in
the interests of its members. The unit persists because its members
better able to provide each other with desired resources and supports
than non-members. Subgovernments operate in a context that is a result
of the high degree of formal fragmentation embodied in United States
bureaucratic and congressional structure. While some subgovernments
(e.g., many dealing with agricultural issues) have some legal status,
most subgovernments are not formally a part of the United States govern-
ment. Yet these units make or implement public policy in a wide variety
1
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of areas. Furthermore, these units are hardly sub rosa. Subgovern-
ments can be clearly identified and studied, so much so that political
scientists can develop generalizations about the conditions and policy
areas where these entities are apt to form or to be most effective.^''
Therefore, two of the three standard identifying criteria of gov-
ernmental institutions must be questioned, if not rejected. Some insti-
tutions are neither legal in function (e.g., the Cabinet, most subgov-
ernments) nor origin (e.g., most subgovernments). Some institutions
have no organizational center (e.g.. United States Federalism, subgov-
ernments); although these still consist of organized relationships among
organizational centers. Indeed, an institution need not be part of the
government to be a governmental institution. This is one implication of
considering subgovernments as a type of governmental institution. While
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it is true that subgovernments contain members who are government offi-
cials belonging to identifiable government agencies, at least one member
of the coalition is usually a representative of a private interest. In
fact, all sorts of supposedly non-governmental organizations make public
policy in the sense that their actions have important effects upon the
general public. Must I now concede that any line separating government
from the rest of the social order is an arbitrary one? Ultimately I
think not. I will construct an argument for the distinctiveness of
governmental institutions which will include the understanding that such
institutions are political and even social as well as governmental. I
will start by examining what, in a general sense, constitutes a social
institution.
Toward a Concept of Governmental Institutions
The implicit understandings about institutions that political sci-
entists use have been borrowed from other disciplines, most notably
sociology. One kind of understanding begins from the proposition that
institutions are organizations. According to the proponents of this
approach, those who want to understand institutions need to look at the
division of labor, the location of power centers and the content of
1
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organizationally defined roles. A second approach focuses on the
norms and values of an institution's participants or subjects. Institu-
tions are defined mainly by internalized roles acquired and maintained
largely through socialization rather than through the conscious deci-
• • 19
sions of individuals. Finally, a third general approach focuses on
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individual behavior and the motivations of institutional participants.
From this point of view, institutions are relatively permanent con-
straints in the marketplace of individually derived tastes. All three
of these approaches have informed some substantive research about the
operation of governmental institutions. However, none of these ap-
proaches to institutional understanding sufficiently captures the
relationship between human purpose and institutional form.
While I reject the view that one can create a perspective toward
institutional inquiry that straightforwardly incorporates the insights
of disparate approaches, analysts must deal with the strengths of other
approaches within the boundaries of their own perspectives. David
Apter, in his series of essays entitled Political Change , focuses on
this very point. His main concern is not institutions per se, but his-
torical change on a societal, though particularly political, level.
Apter contends that human societies, in a collective sense, involve
choice— the choice to maintain the status quo or to change. The author
sees choice as a process occurring within certain boundaries rather than
as an unstructured process. These boundaries coincide with the three
general approaches to institutional study that I noted above. Apter
calls these constraints (1) the normative boundary, (2) the structural
boundary, and (3) the behavioural boundary. The normative boundary is
manifested socially in culture and ideology, individually as norms and
values. The structural boundary refers to the organization of human
relationships. Finally, the behavioural boundary refers to conscious
human action. This includes the perceptions and motivations that
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activate behavior which Apter sees as distinguishable from norms or
values .^^
In principle, one should be able to predict the general nature of
any one of the boundaries if one understands the status of the other
two. 22 Apter concedes that in most historical situations the relations
among the three variables are not easily predictable. Instead, each
variable alters dialectical ly with the others. In fact, Apter sees the
boundaries interacting in an asymmetric fashion. He understands norms
and structures as constraints upon choice. The behavioural boundary
represents the active process of choicemaking working within and against
the constraints. On this basis he defines political orders as the sys-
tems of choice created by the normative, structural, and behavioural
boundaries
.
While my immediate concerns center on institutions rather than en-
tire political systems, Apter's suggestions about open and closed bound-
aries to social systems are useful because I must confront the simulta-
neously open and yet closed appearance of social life. However, I am
changing Apter's notion of choice to the more restricted terms of pur-
pose and function. This is defensible because the term "choice" im-
plies intentionality, although the congruence between the intentions of
individuals and the choices embodied in collective action is far from
automatic. Restated then, an institution embodies purpose through the
reciprocal effect of current human action within and upon the normative
and structural constraints created through previous human action.
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Since I am claiming that institutions arise and are maintained
through human action I must explain the concept of human action and then
show how it becomes crystallized into institutional forms. This re-
quires making a distinction between human behavior and activity or
action. Behavior refers to all observable responses of a human organism
to its environment. The terms action and activity refer to all re-
sponses, observable or not, that arise from the intentions of a human
being. I am explicitly considering thought as well as observable phe-
nomena such as movement and speech as forms of action. This means that
any valid analysis of institutions must begin from the position that the
participants or subjects of any institution must be understood as self-
conscious agents. Persons are not simply acculturated into holding
certain norms. They must in some sense recreate the norms out of their
own experience. Thus persons are not usually "forced" into subservience
to institutional structure and process. They must recreate institution-
al forms through their actions. Yet these implications seem unaccept-
able; persons are confronted with alien norms and institutions and
usually face heavy sanctions if they fail to take the normative and
institutional structure of a social order as given. In effect, this
reality raises Rousseau's dilemma, "Man is born free, and everywhere he
23
IS in chains." The response to this quandary is, to paraphrase Marx,
that human beings create their own social existence, but not in the
circumstances of their own choosing.
While human beings have self-consciousness only as individuals and
thus directly act only as individuals, they do so only in a social
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environment. Indeed, self-consciousness can only develop through social
interaction with other human beings. If the preceding assertions are
correct, then any interpretation of institutions, or of social order
more broadly, as a contract between or the congealed tastes of previous-
ly asocial individuals is illogical on its face. Yet, if what Apter
calls the behavioral boundary is socially produced, would not a direct
focus on either the constraint of values or of structure provide the
proper beginning for the study of social institutions? It could, but at
the cost of reducing personhood to the causal product of the external
social environment. To retain the position that persons genuinely pro-
duce social life through the process of self-conscious thought and
action, one must establish the nature of the connection between human
action and the creation of norms and organization. The perspective of
social analysis called symbolic interaction provides one plausible un-
derstanding of that connection. I will use several elements of the
interactionist approach to describe how institutions embody human
purpose.
The Interactionist Approach
The key concept of the symbolic interactionist approach is "mean-
ing." Its importance is that it serves as a bridge between what others
might call the normative and behavioral realms. More accurately, there
are no separate realms. The meaning of human action is embedded in the
action. Neither the actor nor the observer need refer to a separate
domain of principles in order to understand the action. Symbolic
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interactionism is constructed upon three basic premises.
thar;h!;"th- ^^'H^'
^^^'"9^ on the basis of the meaninqst the th ngs have for them. Secondly, these meaninqs are a oroduct of social interaction in human society. Thirdly these meanings are modified and handled through an i nterprelive' process ?hai
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The third premise is of crucial importance in that it stresses the abil-
ity of individuals to self-consciously alter what they have learned
socially and that communication, especially through the mechanism of
language, is the basic glue of the social process.
A detailed review of the relation of language to reflective
though and ultimately to the process of institutionalization would go
beyond my needs in this chapter. However, these themes need to be
briefly sketched to provide a basis for understanding institutional
rules and practices. Communication in some sense occurs when one indi-
vidual by his or her action can call out a predictable response from a
second individual. However, human thought that is self-conscious occurs
only when the action of an individual calls out the response in himself
as well as in another individual. That is, the action or, in the case
of language, the symbol calls out the same response in both individuals.
This is the least complex situation. The action need only call out the
response in the individual's own mind, not in the external world. Fur-
ther, since the response is no longer automatic, an element of choice is
now present, if only in the sense of either choosing to or choosing not
26to complete the act. Thus the individual is as George Herbert Mead
said divided into a "me" and an "I." Rather than being two separate
personalities, the terms refer to different orientations of the self
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with respect to thought and action. The 'me" is both the internaliza-
tion of significant symbols learned through social interaction and the
modifications of those symbols through self-consciousness. The "I" is
the self in action, with the possibility of uncertainty in both the
execution and result of either thought or action. The human or environ-
mental responses that result provide the basis for the recognition of
novelty by the "me." In a certain sense the dialogue between the "I"
and "me" parallels the dialogue between two individuals or between
individuals and society.
Societies, in turn, are constituted by individuals who have inter-
nalized similar significant symbols. There is no presumption that all
such symbols or meanings are either fully shared or similarly inter-
preted by all members of a social order. Indeed variation should be ex-
pected because of differentiation in the social order and the potential
of most individuals for creative thought. However, when Mead defined
the term "institution" he did so on the basis of shared significant
meanings
.
The institution represents a common response on the part of all
members of the community to a particular situation.
. . . When we
arouse such attitudes, we are taking the attitude of what I have
termed a "generalized other." Such organized sets of response are
related to each other; if one calls out one such set of responses,
he is implicitly calling out the others as well. 28
By implication the institution, as part of the social environment, in-
fluences the development of individuals, although Mead did not present a
fully developed theory of the impact of social organization.
Later advocates of an interactionist approach have dealt somewhat
more explicitly with this issue. In an attempt to apply the framework
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explicitly to politics, Peter Hall wrote, "Order or structure is not
something that automatically occurs but rather must be worked at and
must occur, to the extent that it does, out of the repeated, reaffirmed,
reconstituted acts of participants . "29
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
of "negotiated order," a variant of the social contract based on either
shared agreements or tacit understandings within a social context. Hall
also notes that negotiated orders leave room for significant conflict
based upon the perspectives of different participants . ^0 Erving Goffman
takes a similar position. Although, in the context of what the author
calls total institutions--for example the mental hospital Goffman
studied, the impact of formal structure is much more apparent. In this
case the negotiated order is the underlife of the institution. It takes
place in the areas of social life left unorganized by the more formal
aspects of institutional structure. A reasonable inference is that
the realm of negotiated order must be far greater in the larger society
outside the total institution.
Yet however much institutions are constituted by shared meanings,
institutions are seldom experienced as the products of cooperative
action. Rather, institutions are usually experienced as givens to which
persons adjust their behavior and sometimes as sites of human oppres-
sion. Critics of the symbolic interactionist approach have subjected it
to intense disapproval because of this issue. They charge the approach
with being ahistorical and blind to the implications of organization and
32power. These charges are in my view substantially true. How then can
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one address these issues and still retain the insight that in the end
human beings create the social world through their activity?
One approach to this problem is to compare the ideas of social
process and social structure. Social process refers to the interactions
of individuals and groups based upon their intentions (in the case of a
group "aggregated" intentions). Thus social process is in principle
voluntary in nature. In contrast, the concept of social structure rests
upon the idea of constraint. The relations among individuals and
groups are structured or organized externally to their intentions.
Human activity takes place within those constraints; that is, structure
finds expression through the behavior of individuals and groups. Just
as supporters of the social process perspective find it difficult to
explain why persons often see their actions as highly constrained, sup-
porters of a social structural viewpoint find it difficult to account
for deviant behavior or, more importantly, efforts aimed at social
transformation.
Tom Bottomore, following Georges Gurvitch, suggests a way of exam-
ining these two faces of human society, and by impliciation, institu-
tions. Bottomore defines social structure as a permanent process of
destructuration and restructuration, that is, of the transformation and
maintenance of social structure. Bottomore makes no claim that social
structure is a negotiated order, although he would probably agree that
one could imagine social orders that approximated that condition. The
advantage of Bottomore's definition is that it focuses on the role of
human activity in the creation and maintenance of structure and thereby
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the creation and maintenance of institutions. One must now look a lit-
tle deeper into Botto.ore's idea and ask what it means for human action
to create, support, or overturn structure. What do human beings do when
they engage in the process of destructuration and restructuration?
To begin this analysis I am returning to Mead and his ideas of the
significant symbol and the generalized other. The significant symbol is
a gesture, whether through language or physical action, that calls out
the same response in both the observer and the actor. According to
Mead, both human thought and social activity rest upon the sharing and
the use of significant symbols. Although Mead's ideas about social
structure and organization were not fully developed, he implied that
organized social life is grounded in more than the possession of common
significant symbols.
Mead develops this point by examining the differences between what
he calls "play" and "games." Pure play requires only the existence of
common significant symbols to coordinate and give meaning to the activi-
ties of the individuals involved. There is no coordinating purpose
built into the participants' actions. In any situation that can be
called a game this changes. As Mead points out,
The fundamental difference between the game and play is that in thelatter the child must have the attitude of all the others involved
in the game. The attitudes of the other players which the partici-
pant assumes organize into some sort of a unit, and it is that
organization which controls the response of the individual . 35
It is this unity in thought and action, structured by the common
activity, that Mead calls the generalized other. Note that the general-
ized other rests on more than internalized norms and values. It can be
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no more than a mere shadow outside of a context of social action. It is
this generalized other that provides the basis of both the process of
institutionalization and institutional control. As Mead continues.
The complex co-operative processes and activities and institutionalfunctiomngs of organized human society are also possible ^sofar asevery individual involved in them or belonging to^t at oc ety ?antake the general attitudes of all other such individuals wUh refer-ence to these processes and activities and institutional function-ings, and to the organized social whole of experiential relations
and interactions thereby consti tuted-and can direct his own beha-
vior accordingly .3d
Thus the individual encounters structure through the taking of the role
of the generalized other. Yet how then can persons experience institu-
tions as alien or oppressive?
At this point in my discussion institutions appear as clusters of
significant symbols relating to structured activity, that is to the
arrangement or coordination of diverse individual activities on some
relatively persistent basis. Yet this is only part of the reality of
institutions, or at least of institutions as normally understood. All
institutions certainly rest upon patterns of common understandings and
actions, but institutions also organize the material world outside human
interaction. That is, institutions organize space, material resources,
and so on. Further, institutions also direct human actions in ways out-
side of or in opposition to the intentions and understandings of indivi-
duals. While grounded in human understandings and practices, institu-
tions are themselves environments which persons must interact with or
respond to. Just as the game, through the embodiment of the generalized
other in constitutive rules and actual practices, appears as a given
reality in most circumstances to new participants; so too, in principle,
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do almost all phenomena that can be called social institutions. The
most salient difference is the character of the sanctions and rewards
available to many institutions relative to those built into games.
Thus, an institution embodies purpose through the crystallization of
social understandings into rules and rule governed social practices,
normally understood as institutional structure or organization and in-
stitutional process. These rules, in turn, guide the manifestation of
the institution in the material world and thereby the creation of the
environment that people experience as the institution.
Rules, Practices and Understandings
Thus, institutions are structured through two kinds of rules. The
most explicit rules publicly codify the organization and process of the
institution. These rules need not be entirely formal or legal as long
as they are in principle public; that is, easily intelligible to a
community significantly wider than active participants in the institu-
tion. For example, one can talk about the rules that codify the organi-
zation and operation of a standing committee in the Congress. These
rules may in fact be formal, as in the jurisdictions granted standing
committees in the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act; or they may be
informal, as in the rules that govern the party composition of different
committees. My understanding of these codifying rules is roughly equi-
valent to Rawls' view that institutions are "... a public system of
rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties,
powers and immunities, and the like."
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However, there is often also a set of rules, in addition to the
public rules, which guides and supports participants' understandings of
an institution. These rules consist of social practices within the in-
stitution and the understandings that make these practices intelligible
to institutional participants. These rules are never as explicit as
those that codify the institution and should not be assumed to be shared
or indeed sharable in the same sense that the codifying rules can be and
often are. Rawls expresses this notion when he describes institutions
as being simultaneously an abstract form of human conduct (i.e., codify-
ing rules) and the concrete activity of human beings in reference to
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rules. I will refer to this second kind of rules, or more properly
activity structured or governed by such non-public understandings as
institutional practices. The situation where a congressional committee
is led by a person other than the chair serves as a good example of this
difference between codifying rules and institutional practices. Active
participants in the committee's environment would understand this real-
ity and modify their actions in that environment accordingly. Few
members of the general public would be aware of the impact of this
situation on the committee's operation.
Peter Winch gives a particularly useful analysis of rules as prac-
tices based upon participant understandings. It is worth noting the
many places at which Winch's ideas are congruent with Mead's and those
of most other symbolic interactioni sts . This congruence is strongly
reflected in their respective views of the relationship between human
thought and action and social process.
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Winch is interested in explicating the conditions in which indivi-
duals may be said to be following a rule in their action or thought. He
contends there are three necessary conditions, the first of which is
that rules can only occur in social settings. One can say that an indi-
vidual is following a rule, in language or any other context, only if
other persons can, in principle, discover the rule in question. Two
implications follow from this criterion. First, all individuals must
engage in a sort of internal social relationship. To understand one's
own use of a rule is equivalent to the way in which others understand
that use from an external perspective. Stated differently, human beings
experience themselves indirectly as an "other" or an "object." Second,
rules can be followed without fully conscious knowledge of their nature.
A person need not recognize his use of rules except "in principle."
That is, the individual would recognize the rule if it was explicitly
brought to his attention. Hence, one can speak of tacitly following a
rule. Certainly this provides a partial explanation for why individuals
do not perceive their actions as part of the process of restructuring
social institutions.
A second condition of using a rule is that a rule establishes and
embodies connections between previous experience and action and that of
an individual in the future. "The rule can only seem to me to produce
all its consequences in advance if I draw them as a matter of course. "^^
Therefore one could say that a person is following a rule only if, in
principle, other persons can deduce from it expectations about the first
person's future actions. Further, if these other persons were to follow
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the same rule, all of them would have a common understanding of what to
expect from each other in the specific context of that rule.
.
Given a certain sort of training, everybody does, as a matter of course,
continue to use these words in the same way as would everybody else."^^
It follows that commonly understood rules provide the basis for roles
and institutions.
Finally, rule following is identified by its logical inseparabil-
ity from the notion of "making a mistake." Winch contends that it is
nonsensical to talk about rules except when it is possible to judge if
someone is following the rule correctly. For example, in the case of
language. Winch says that if one claims that he is using a word correct-
ly, he must also, at least tacitly, know what constitutes incorrect
usage. Indeed, others must be able to determine if mistakes in usage
are being made in order to understand the first individual. As evalua-
tion of language usage is ultimately social, it follows that the evalua-
tion of the usage of or appropriateness of any rule is also social.
Additionally, if the idea of contravention is a necessary part of the
idea of a rule, then one can consider the possibility of deliberately
making a mistake; that is, of choosing to reinterpret or abolish exist-
ing rules. Thus, consciousness or understanding of a rule involves,
above all else, understanding what it means not to follow that rule. As
one can choose to contravene a rule, in principle the range of alterna-
tives to the rules is vast, perhaps infinite. Thus, the rules that
human beings possess are potentially open textured and the actions
related to them are likewise alterable. To the extent that
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institutions are experienced as constraints, it is because institutions
through their very existence as systems of rules impact upon individuals
to construct boundaries to the open field of human activity, much as the
organization of Mead's games produces the similar appearance (and exper-
ienced reality) of constraint.
This tension between constraint and the potential for choice is
an important feature of institutions. That is, as John Brigham notes,
institutions are the possible forms of conduct realized in the social
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world. In this view,
. . understanding an institution implies
awareness of the dynamics between possibilities and action. "^^ Brigham
then gives examples of this tension in the context of the Supreme Court,
describing situations showing the variable constraint of practices
(i.e., rules in Winch's use of the term). For example, the practices
governing interpretive latitude in the meanings given to terms like
commerce, contract, full faith and credit, and due process are quite
broad. This allows Justices to have commensurate flexibility in the
range of intelligible decisions possible in cases involving these terms.
In contrast, the use of the term equal protection in anything but a very
specific way would not be intelligible to those persons who understand
the institutional environment of the Court. Brigham says the applica-
tion of equal protection to cases of search and seizure would not make
sense to other judges, lawyers, the relevant press, etc., even if that
application might make sense to many members of the general public.^^
That is, such understandings or practices are not on their face sharable
with those persons who are not active participants in the institution.
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In such cases it may be difficult to convince outsiders of the intelli-
gibility of such practices for insiders. The outsider might perceive
institutional action based on privatized practice as fixed or corrupt.
For the insider the action would likely be viewed as arising through
correct procedure.
In contrast, what I called codifiable rules, such as the formal
process of voting in the Supreme Court to decide cases or to decide what
cases to hear, carry a much wider and more immediate sense of intelli-
gibility. One should not assume that rules are inherently intelligible.
Rather, the probability that a rule will make sense may be largely a
function of the audience addressed. Rules, in terms of social under-
standings and practices, usually require a greater degree of active par-
ticipation in the business of the institution to make sense. Codifiable
rules, that is the rules governing the most publicly available aspects
of organization and process, may require only a person's internalization
of the preconceptions of a given culture to be intelligible. This may
be particularly true in liberal societies like the United States where
it is generally believed that institutions either are or should be rule
governed. This cultural preconception is particularly strong in the
case of governmental institutions. Such institutions are expected to
operate according to fair procedures, not simply by procedures. Indeed,
codifiable rules may be a precondition for institutional effectiveness
in liberal democratic societies.
One way of looking at the respective roles of codifiable rules and
of practices in constituting institutions is to imagine an institution
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without structure and process, without common understandings of the
range of required, expected, possible, or impermissible activity.
Plainly such institutions would violate common understandings of the na-
ture of institutions, perhaps even of the nature of social interaction
generally. However, occasionally people have tried to design institu-
tions to minimize rule generated constraints on participants' actions.
Examples of institutions of this type are rmny of the women's groups
established in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. In a study
of such groups, Jo Freeman discovered that a set of rules governing
group practice arose despite the intentions of group members. Indeed,
Freeman found that such unrecognized rules were usually more pernicious
both to the interests of most group members and to the expressed pur-
poses of the organizations than formal rules concerning structure,
decision making, etc. would have been. Freeman contends, to adopt
Brigham's terminology, that when the practices of unstructured groups
are unavailable to all of its members, those members who know the prac-
tices are far less likely to act responsibly, i.e., in the interests of
the entire membership. Private rules often result in the creation of an
elite, whether by intent or coincidence.^'^ In a more theoretical con-
text, John Commons agrees with this point; although he qualifies the
argument by stating that public access to rules embodied in practices
are only a precondition for institutional responsibility.^^
Commons' work also is helpful in differentiating an institution
from a persistent system of social interaction. That is, his work helps
to explain why, for example, a legislature is an institution and a
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cross-generational friendship between two families is not. Both kinds
of social relationship are in some sense rule governed, dependent on
common understandings and practices. Nonetheless, for Commons, only
institutions are "going concerns," that is, chains of what Commons calls
transactions. He defines a transaction as a pattern of human interac-
tion in which there are rules which specify what individuals must do,
may do without interference from the institution, can do without expect-
ing the institution to use its power and resources to aid, and can do
with the aid of the institution."^^ Thus, Commons holds that institu-
tions must exist for some public. Institutions cannot be totally
private arrangements.
Still, institutional publics are seldom identical to the entire
community or cultural unit, nor may those institutional publics share
fully in the knowledge of all significant rules and practices. Govern-
ments and governmental institutions in liberal democracies do provide a
case in which the institutional public is nearly equivalent to the
entire (adult) community. This is a result of the inclusive notion of
citizenship found in most liberal democratic societies. However, there
is no reason to expect that different parts of that public know the
rules and practices of governmental institutions either fully or in the
same ways. As I noted before, there are good reasons to think that
rules in the sense of practice are relatively private in comparison to
the more abstract, and often formal, rules that constitute the most
public face of an institution.
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Some Applications
I will explicate this idea of social differences in the knowledge
and understanding of institutional rules and practices by using it to
analyze a common description of United States political parties. Sorauf
and others have described American political parties as having a loose
but identifiable three part structure consisting of "the party in gov-
ernment," "party organization," and "the party in the electorate. "^^
These structures through their interactions form the institution called
a major poliitcal party in the United States. However, these structures
must not be mistaken as organizational units. Each of the three struc-
tures is an abstraction rather than a structure that is directly experi-
enced by participants. There is no party in government per se. Instead
there is a President of a given party who may seek support from or give
support to members of Congress belonging to the same political party.
This pattern of interaction may occur between the President and indivi-
dual members of the House and Senate, the partisan leadership of these
bodies, or through a number of other mechanisms. Further, party in
government can involve other interactions involving neither a President
or members of Congress. Cooperative activity between two appointed
bureaucrats representing different agencies also qualifies as an example
of party in government.
A similar analysis can be done for both party organization and the
party in the electorate. Major United States parties are often de-
scribed as loose coalitions of state parties. Yet, the state parties
may not always have coherent organizations. Some local components may
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be strongly organized, but other local party units
.ay exist in na.e
only. Similarly, there is nothing in the American political environment
that can be simply isolated and called the party in the electorate.
Different parties in the electorate may be found or constructed for dif-
fering purposes. For example, most Southerners call themselves Demo-
crats in regard to state and local politics and they usually vote in
ways consistent with those self perceptions. Since about 1970, Southern
whites have increasingly called themselves Independents in regard to
national politics. Some have theorized that nonaffi liation provides a
socially acceptable way to vote Republican in presidential elections.
Rather than viewing political parties as three distinct if overlapping
elements, it makes greater sense to think of political parties as dif-
ferentiated patterns of understandings and practices within a system of
potentially public rules.
This idea that different persons can share common understandings
about the existence of an institutional form and yet in some ways per-
ceive that institution in radically different ways need not be re-
stricted to political or governmental institutions. It applies to
social institutions in general. For example, both supporters and oppo-
nents of the Equal Rights Amendment seem to share a similar conception
of the family on the most general level. I suspect that if a number of
concrete groupings of individuals were described, most proponents and
opponents would label most of the same groups as either "families" or
"not families." Should supporters and opponents then be asked to give
reasons for their answers, I still doubt that members of the two camps
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would differ greatly in their replies. They would be basing their
answers on the widely available public rules about how to recognize a
family in United States society. However, if these same people were
asked to estimate the effects that implementing the ERA would have on
the quality of family life, I believe that supporters and opponents
would now tend to give extremely different replies. While part of this
expected divergence might reflect different perceptions about the con-
tent of the ERA, I also expect that differences in the less public
understandings of what a family is are now coming into play. That is,
they are basing their judgements in part on implicit understandings
based on actual social practice. It is important to remember that the
meaning of practices lies in action as well as thought. Despite simi-
larity in the public rules that define families, the actual practice of
real families may give rise to different understandings of the institu-
tion of family.
Differences among individuals, groups, and broader publics over
the nature of institutional practices, within broad agreement over the
nature of institutional rules, may be the most common source of tensions
that generate institutional change in the United States. The court
packing incident in Franklin Roosevelt's second administration provides
an example of this dynamic. After 1933, the Supreme Court declared
several major laws unconstitutional. These laws had strong support in
the rest of the national government and, apparently, among the general
public. At least the second claim seems reasonable on the basis of the
1936 landslide for Roosevelt and congressional Democrats. Yet the
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Supreme Court appeared ready to use judicial review against additional
New Deal legislation. Roosevelt sought to gain a working majority on
the Court by proposing legislation aimed at giving him the power to
appoint new justices should Court members refuse to retire at a certain
age. In brief, the Supreme Court and its allies were able to mobilize
the public against Roosevelt's proposal by using the publicly held ex-
pectation that the Judiciary is predominantly a legal rather than
political body. Although Roosevelt correctly understood the intrinsic-
ally political function of the Supreme Court, he was unable to convey
this to the public. That is, he was unable to convey the differences
between the public rules that define an institution in a general way and
his understanding of the practices that defined the institution's actual
51
operation.
The court packing example provides a useful beginning for showing
how the interplay of different persons' understandings of institutional
rules and practices can serve as a window into both the nature of insti-
tutions and of institutional change. I will extend this analysis
through a second example based upon Fenno's analysis of the Interior and
Insular Affairs Committee of the United States House of Representatives.
I want to show how Fenno's examination of changes in the composition,
operation, and policy decisions of this committee in the early 1970s can
be further elucidated by looking at the interplay of committee rules and
practices.
Despite the fact all House standing committees operate under the
same general formal and informal rules established by the House, Fenno
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found important differences in the character and operation of the six
committees he examined. In the 1955-66 period, Fenno observed the
Interior Committee to have the following characteristics: (1) members
usually came from western states and sought conrnittee membership to aid
their reelection,52 (2) members had extensive interaction with special-
ized but diverse clienteles," (3) members attempted to secure passage
of all member sponsored and clientele supported bills and thereby to
give priority to the interests of commercial users of natural resources,
and (4) members engaged in logrolling, both in the committee and in the
House, on the basis of non-partisan expertise, to move bills through the
legislative process. In reality, these practices were far more speci-
fic and yet more flexible in application than my summary indicates. For
example, Fenno observed that despite the pro-business orientation of the
committee's western majority, members made real efforts to mollify the
concerns of a senior eastern member with strong conservationist views.
It is doubtful that any member of the House Interior Committee
during the 1955-66 period believed that the committee operated in an
illegitimate fashion. While members might concede that the immediate
goal of the committee was to act in the interest of specific functional
and electoral constituencies, rather than some broader concept of na-
tional interest, there is no reason to believe that most members would
understand their constituents' interests and those of the nation as
ordinarily opposed. There is no way to document how the general public
felt about how the Interior Committee operated during this same period.
Given the low level of information and interest that the public
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generally has in the day to day operation of the United States govern-
ment, it would be surprising if any substantial element of the citizenry
knew of the committee's existence. Nonetheless, the public has some
awareness of Congress and that its function is to make law for the
entire nation. Thus, one might expect that there would be a general
public expectation that Congress should make law in primarily the
nation's interest rather than primarily in the interest of any particu-
lar constituency. I would expect the same standard to be applied to the
judgement of committee activity, except to the extent that self or group
interest is directly affected by that committee's actions.
Therefore, to the extent that the general public became aware that
the first priority of the House Interior Committee was to serve the tan-
gible interests of western commercial resource users, the question of
legitimacy would be raised. I am not claiming that the public would be
surprised to learn that members of a congressional committee would act
in ways supportive of special interests that could aid those members'
goals or reelections. Certainly, there is a public folk lore concerning
how politicians "sell out the people" to further their own personal in-
terests. Rather, practices and decisions that were perfectly acceptable
on the basis of members' understandings of the Interior Committee become
potentially suspect from the perspective of the general public.
Traditionally, the Interior Committee's work was relatively non-
controversial. Beginning in the late 1960s, this situation began to
change. Greater societal concern with what can be broadly called envi-
ronmental issues gradually changed the political environment in which
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the committee operated and generated greater awareness and concern among
at least some elements of the public over the subject matter included in
the Committee's jurisdiction. By 1972 Fenno discovered the beginnings
of change in the committee's operation. New members interested in
environmental policy making rather than constituency service began to
join the committee. There were also some changes in committee rules
which reduced the formal powers of the Chairman and strengthened those
of the subcommittees. Fenno, as of 1972, did not think these changes
had made an important difference in the committee's decisions on legis-
lative matters, but he noted that the preconditions for major changes in
committee outputs had been set in pi ace. Thus, the environmental
movement represented a situation in which tensions resulting from dif-
ferences in members' understandings of acceptable practice and those
latently held by the public became important enough to require some form
of resolution. Whether these changes were mainly symbolic or have made
an impact upon the substantive actions of the committee or of Congress
are of course matters subject to empirical investigation. However, it
is clear that Interior in the early 1970s was gradually changing from
what Fenno calls a corporate type committee to a permeable type commit-
tee. Corporate type committees are more likely to get bills they report
to the House passed, but these committees are usually responsive to
rather narrowly defined interests or constituencies. In contrast, per-
meable type committees operate in a more pluralistic environment. How-
ever, such committees are less able to effectively pass legislation
through unified committee action.
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While the apparent transformation of the House Interior Committee
from a corporate to a permeable type committee resulted in a number of
changes in what I call codifiable rules, most of the changes took place
at the level of what I call rule governed practices and understandings.
For example, neither the House nor particular committees have formal
rules governing how seriously a committee should take its subcommittees'
recommendations about pending legislative business. In the case of the
Appropriations Committee, acceptance of subcommittees' views was almost
pro forma. Fenno describes this committee as a near perfect case of the
corporate type. During the 1955-66 period the Interior Committee fol-
lowed, if somewhat less fully. Appropriations with respect to having a
high degree of subcommittee autonomy in making policy decisions.
Over the same time period, the House Education and Labor Committee, the
very model of a permeable type committee, paid little attention to its
subcommittees' reports. If the House Interior Committee was in fact
becoming more permable during the 1970s because it was operating in an
intensely partisan and pluralistic environment similar to Education and
Labor, then Interior's previous tendency to ratify subcommittee deci-
sions should be declining. While the changes in Interior's codifiable
rules appear to support more power for subcommittees, the committee
members should be learning to act and to understand their actions in
quite an opposite manner.
While institutions may change through alterations in either codi-
fiable rules or in practices, in the long run there should be a large
measure of coincidence between explicit and implicit rules. Yet,
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particularly in societies subject to rapid change, one should expect
that full coincidence between rules and practices would be rare. When
Brigham says that, "... understanding an institution implies awareness
of the dynamics between possibilities and action" he seems to be focus-
ing on this very point.^^ In very stable institutions, a great deal of
change may take place through alteration in institutional practices
without any immediate change in the formal or formalizable rules. In-
deed, a change may be fully institutionalized when observers or partici-
pants can realize that the new rule can be consciously stated by parti-
cipants. The changes described in the operation of the House Interior
Committee fit this pattern. On the other hand, rapid disjunctive insti-
tutional change seems to be related to major changes in the formal rules
governing and defining the institution. Institutional changes coming
from the victory of revolutionary movements serve as a useful if extreme
example. Yet even in this case underlying social practices may affect
the way institutions operate. For instance, despite the official abol-
ishment of the untouchable status in India after independence, members
of that caste are still effectively barred from most positions of insti-
tutional authority in that nation.
As I noted earlier, the governmental and political institutions of
the United States are highly stable as such things go. Thus, I expect
that institutional change occurs as much or more by the gradual altera-
tion of institutional practice and its eventual impact on codifiable
rules than vice versa. To the extent that electoral realignments pre-
sent situations when there are relatively large shifts in political
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relationships, I expect that an unusual degree of change in formal
institutional rules would occur. Still, realignments can be called
revolutions only if one is given to rhetorical excess. There is no
reason to reject the expectation that post realignment institutional
change will be reflected mainly through changes in understandings and
practices. In any case, the total amount of institutional change
occurring in the wake of realignments should be greater than that
occurring at other times provided that the electoral process is either a
significant expression of the public's power or provides opportunities
for elites to initiate political and social change.
My analysis to now has focused on institutions and institutional
change in general. To apply this material to understanding how govern-
mental institutions change requires the ability to differentiate govern-
mental institutions from other kinds. Further, the term political
institution is sometimes used as a synonym for governmental institution.
Yet, the terms are not used interchangeably in either political science
or ordinary discourse. A discussion of this issue will also help to ex-
plicate the meaning of the term governmental institution and what it
means for a governmental institution to change.
Governmental Institutions: Selectivity and Legitimacy
Previously I discussed some of the problems resulting from the use
of conventional definitions of governmental institutions. As noted, the
Cabinet, Federalism, and subgovernments do not fully meet conventional
defining criteria such as having a legal existence or a definite
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organizational structure. Yet the Cabinet, Federalism, and subgovern-
ments are still called governmental institutions. Further, almost all
political scientists call all three of these examples political institu-
tions as well as governmental institutions. Yet, the term political
institution is regularly applied to a much more diverse group of phenom-
ena than the term governmental institution. Most political scientists
would call interest groups a type of political institution. However, I
am not aware that the National Rifle Association or the AFL-CIO's
Committee on Political Education have ever been called governmental
institutions.
Nevertheless, political scientists, or people generally, may dis-
agree over what constitutes a political institution. For example, I may
say that the Chase Manhattan Bank is a political institution. I might
claim that the bank's management has a great deal of power to shape
economic development in the United States and elsewhere and has a sig-
nificant ability to influence government policymakers. Another individ-
ual, even one who agrees that I have accurately portrayed the bank's
operations, may still reject my characterization of the bank as a poli-
tical institution. He or she might answer that the Chase Manhattan Bank
is an economic organization which may at times act in the political
environment.
Clearly, ideas about which entities or sets of social relations
should be called political are closely related to ideas about the nature
of politics. Furthermore, ideas about politics inevitably serve some-
one's political purposes. Yet the concept of politics involves more
94
than a debate over the objects the concept describes. Any Intelligible
Idea of politics Involves questions of preference; that Is, the condi-
tions to be preferred, the means chosen to obtain these conditions, and
the persons and processes that will decide the first two items. While
politics is more than just a moral or normative concept, both ideas
about politics and the practice of politics refer to conditions that
have moral or normative implications.^^
While politics can be an unbounded or contested idea, most persons
are uncomfortable calling all aspects of the human condition solely po-
litical. I doubt that anyone would go beyond saying that all aspects of
social life can be politicized, that is made political under some cir-
cumstances. Individuals may differ in their use of the concept of poli-
tics, but in any culture some situations are regularly seen as politi-
cal, others as non-political. In the United States for example, the
passage of tax bills through Congress is normally considered political,
the birth of a child is not. Sometimes usage is ambiguous. For example
an individual might talk about the politics of a charitable organiza-
tion. While some persons may conceive of such organizational struggles
over power and policy as fully and unambiguously political, most people
would agree that this situation is not political in the same sense that
the legislative process in Congress is political. Rather, the situation
will be termed political insofar as the actions of the participants in
the charitable organization resemble the actions of participants in what
would normally be called a political process in ordinary language.
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To the extent that one can identify those aspects of the concept
of politics that are more central than others or indeed constitutive of
the concept, one has a firmer basis to differentiate political from non-
political institutions. Along these lines, Fred Frohock suggests three
standards to identify central or what he calls core properties. These
include (1) that core properties remain "constant" despite changes in
other properties, (2) that if core properties change, all other proper-
ties must also change, and (3) that a change in a core property results
in a radical change in the meaning of the concept. The implication is
that core properties are those that allow individuals to understand a
concept differently and still know they are expressing the "same" idea.
Frohock goes on to claim that the core properties of politics are "di-
recting" and "aggregations." Politics involves "directing" in that
politics always involves actions to influence human behavior. Politics
also involves "aggregations" in the sense that political actions are
only intelligible as such when they involve the fortunes of social col-
lectivities. Frohock holds that both core terms are central to the idea
of politics.^^
The absence of either core term renders any situation incompletely
political. For example, the internal dynamics of the charitable organi-
zation appear to meet the condition involving "directing" but does not
meet the condition involving "aggregations." Thus, the internal strug-
gles of the charitable organization can be meaningfully described in
political terms but without other justification should not be called po-
litical. However, if I were convinced that the organization in question
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had through its actions a large impact on the benefits and burdens
placed upon some identifiable collectivity (e.g., "the poor"), I would
probably reconsider my position. That is, I might now say that the
charity was a political institution and/or was engaging in politics. To
the extent that Frohock's two core terms actually capture the basic na-
ture of politics, distinctly political institutions would need to embody
purposes involving these dimensions of power and large scale social
relations
.
Still, Frohock's specification of the core terms of politics seems
to be missing at least one crucial dimension of how politics is experi-
enced. Any useful concept of politics must reflect the potential open-
ness of all social life. It must involve a recognition of the possibil-
ity of human choice in thought and action. Politics is based on the
interactions of human beings pursuing their choices in a social environ-
ment. For want of a better term, I claim that politics always involves
"reciprocity." However, I am not claiming that politics is restricted
to relations among relative equals. Thus, an institution that made
policies without something that can be called discussion or negotiation
in the broadest sense of those terms would not be intelligible as a
political institution.
If the core terms of politics could be fully specified, then the
basic dimensions on which political institutions embody purpose would be
those consistent with the core terms. Still, such terms are highly ab-
stract and give little information about how political or governmental
institutions operate or change. To understand an institution and what
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happens when an institution changes one needs to know the concrete for.s
in which the core properties of politics are embodied in institutional
structure and process. Among the universe of ways in which such proper-
ties can be expressed, an actual institution can embody only a very lim-
ited part of this universe in rules and rule governed practices.
Otherwise the institution cannot embody purpose. Institutions are con-
stituted on the basis of selectivity. More specifically, political
institutions involve selectivity on the specific understanding and prac-
tice of forms of direction, definitions of aggregates, and so forth.
E. E. Schattschneider stresses this idea of selectivity when he says,
"The functions of institutions are to channel conflict; institutions do
not treat all forms of conflict impartially
. .
.
"^^
Recent work on the theory of the state also focuses on the issue
of selectivity, despite the fact that this work proceeds from assump-
tions quite different from Schattschneider's. Authors such as Charles
Benda and Claus Offe see political institutions as entities exhibiting
policy selectivity through the operation of their rules. That is,
institutional rules ".
. . act as 'selection mechanisms,' actively
sorting or filtering the demands placed on the state and actively formu-
lating certain policies without external demands or participation being
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necessary." Observers of political institutions should give attention
to how rules structure the likelihood that certain issues will be raised
and certain policies will be adopted. This approach is especially
appropriate to the study of realignment insofar as realignments are
expected to result in significant changes in public policy.
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Political institutions, then, appear to be organizations with
selective rules that effect outcomes that require the direction of human
behavior, involve significant collectivities, and result from a process
based on reciprocal human action. Earlier in this chapter I rejected
the view that institutions are equivalent to organizations. As cases in
point I referred to patterns of relationships such as subgovernments and
American Federalism. These are patterns that many call institutions,
but patterns not centered in organizational entities. Yet neither sub-
governments nor Federalism exist or act apart from organization. Thus,
I have not fully divorced institutions from organization. One writer,
Alain Touraine, makes this departure. While I believe that Touraine is
wrong on this point, I also believe Touraine's approach to institutional
questions offers valuable insights into the nature of political and
governmental institutions.
Touraine understands institutions as decision processes, not as
organizations. He views institutions as being in principle distinct
from organizations or administrative entities. Touraine defines insti-
tutions as follows:
We shall therefore use the term "institutions" here for that set of
mechanisms by which the doubly open field of historicity is trans-formed into a set of rules for social life which, in their turn
predetermine the functioning of organizations. 65
That is, political institutions are involved in a mediating process,
adjusting organizational structure and process to the demands and con-
straints arising out of a particular sort of social order. In point of
fact, Touraine makes no distinction between the terms institutional and
political. It would be more accurate to say that Touraine is talking
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about a system of decision making rather than identifiable institutional
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entities. While this approach may appear to be similar to Marxist
ideas about the state, Touraine denies that the institutional system and
the state are identical. He contends that the state, while rooted in
the political/institutional system, acts mainly on the level of social
organization. In Touraine's terms, the state is more an instrument of
power than the producer of decisions and rules that structure social
life.^^ Therefore, political institutions, or more properly the politi-
cal/institutional system, decide the basic rules for social life and the
structure and functions of its constituent units. In contrast, social
organizations are involved in the management and repression of that
social life. Yet where and how are the rules determined? It is one
thing to say that institutions operate in an environment structured by
class relations, technology, forms of knowledge, etc.; however it is
unwarranted to abstract a decision making process outside any identifi-
able set of human relationships and concrete human actors. If, as
Touraine would agree, society is ultimately the product of human action,
just where do human beings act when they make basic decisions? The
separation of institution and organization on the concrete level must be
rejected.
Still Touraine's ideas are valuable precisely because organization
can now be treated as a dependent rather than independent variable.
Organization becomes the result rather than the source of institutional
purposes. In the context of this study, I expect that changes in the
nature or priority of political purposes held by members of dominant
100
coalitions following a realignment will result In institutional modifi-
cations aimed at fulfilling those new or reprioritized purposes. Yet
What is the dynamic relationship between changes in purpose and changes
in organization to embody purpose? After all if previously existing
institutional forms are selection devices, then the relation between
purpose and form cannot be unidirectional. Previous organization, un-
less totally uprooted, will certainly have an impact on how new purposes
will become embodied in organizational form. Touraine suggests this
process can be examined by looking at what he calls societal debates,
".
. .
the public expression of the tensions between the elements of a
system, particularly between the elements of the system of historical
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action." Because political institutions are selective, that is open
to some interests and purposes and closed to others, not all debates
will occur in the setting of political institutions. Further, those
debates which are carried on in or through political institutions will
be distorted to some degree by the nature of the institutional forms.
Touraine expresses this idea as follows:
Institutions, because they are mechanisms of discussion, negotia-
tion, and translation, at the same time as being the political
expression of a social domination, are always simultaneously instru-
ments of constraint and legitimation. They do not codify the total-ity of the field of historicity; they distort it, exclude certain
components from it, limit the action of the social classes, above
all that of the dominated classes. 69
The study of institutional change following realignment can provide some
insight into this process. An examination of the interaction between
formal institutional rules, the understandings and practices of insti-
tutional participants, and the understandings of outside groups or
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publics during and following realignments can provide a useful way to
grasp the channeling and ultimate institutionalization of what Touraine
calls societal debates.
Some writers use the terms political, government, and governmental
institution as essentially synonyms. This view has merit only so far as
the realm of politics is restricted to the government proper, its
actions, and to a select group of institutions which are almost totally
concerned with the operation of government (e.g., nBjor political par-
ties). Those people who hold a more extensive view of the domain of the
political usually claim that some institutions can be political without
being governmental. Using an earlier example, I might want to claim
that major banks are political institutions. Yet I cannot intelligibly
claim that American banks are governmental entities, no matter how
powerful they may in fact be. What is the basis for this distinction?
To begin with, the idea of government is sometimes seen as identi-
cal to that of the state, sometimes not. Initially, it will be easier
to proceed working within the first approach. Most American political
scientists work from Max Weber's assertion that governments are those
social entities that have or can intelligibly claim to have a monopoly
on the legitimate use of violence in a given terri tory. ''^ In this tra-
diton, institutions are organizational sites which make decisions ulti-
mately enforceable by legitimate force. Other observers hold that the
state and the government are not the same. Government is merely a part
of the state, though usually a very important part. The basic reason
for this distinction is that such analysts think that real decision
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making and enforcement powers are often held by groups or institutions
outside the government. Still, the ideas of government and governmental
institutions are important ones in this tradition. The reason is again
the question of legitimacy, particularly over the use of violence.
Touraine notes that government is the most important part of what
he calls the institutional system because governments can appear, in
principle if not actual practice, to be autonomous from dominant social
fomations.^l Nico Poulantzas elaborates on this view by saying that
governments act to legitimate the actions of the state by taking action
in the name of a "people-nation" which is inclusive of almost all social
groupings. This is important because process and discourse are often
structured to give preference to the interests of a dominant class.
However, to be legitimate, such process and discourse cannot be reduced
to simply a mystification of class power.
Perhaps this idea and its implications for institutional operation
and change are best grasped through C. B. Macpherson's description of
governments as dual systems of power. Macpherson contends that govern-
ments act upon society both directly through their own policies and in-
directly by giving sanction for non-govenmental institutions to exercise
legitimate authority over some area of human activity. That is, non-
governmental institutions borrow legitimacy from the government and if
need be these institutions can call upon the government to use legiti-
mate violence to enforce their authority. Though real power may be
concentrated elsewhere, in most contexts it is proper to restrict the
term governmental institution to those rule governed patterns of social
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interaction that are for^lly part of a government or are 1n priory and
constant interaction with a government.
Thus, the essential difference between governmental and other
kinds Of political institutions is that the characteristic of legitimacy
is central to the former. Should governments or governmental institu-
tions lose legitimacy completely, they are simply another sort of poli-
tical institution. That is, there is no substantive function or form of
organization which is inherently governmental. The paradigm case of the
loss of legitimacy is the revolutionary overthrow of a government. Be-
fore the overthrow, the pre-existing government was legitimate to the
extent that the way it operated assured that its decisions would be
either obeyed or disobedience would be hidden or disguised. The govern-
ment's legitimacy rested upon its ongoing social relations with its
citizens rather than on merely how the citizens felt about the govern-
ment. Similarly, the destruction of the regime automatically destroys
its legitimacy. The new government becomes legitimate because it acts
like a government, i.e., in Macpherson's terminology a dual system of
power, and becomes imbedded in the ongoing activity of the total social
order. While in more stable political orders the disjunction of social
and political life is far less, changes in institutions imply changes in
the operative character of legitimacy. As Robert Grafstein points out.
In the purest sense, a legitimate institution secures obedience to
Its decisions by the very fact of having made them through appro-
priate institutional procedures. Its outcomes are accepted, in the
behavioral sense, when they are generated through the decision-
making process of the institution
. .
.74
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Concl usion
In this chapter I have attempted to explicate the idea of what it
means for an institution to embody a purpose. By doing so I hoped to
lay a basis for penetrating into the nature of institutions and institu-
tional change at a somewhat deeper level than mere description of struc-
ture and process over time. I also sought to understand institutions
from a perspective consistent with my understanding of persons as
active participants and makers of their social life.
I have taken the position that institutions are best understood as
human created but crystallized patterns of social interaction based upon
both explicit rules and implicit but ultimately rule governed practices
and understandings. I have sought to understand institutional change
through the interplay of rules, practices, and efforts to redefine or
modify them. I have also tried to distinguish governmental institu-
tions, the actual subject of my inquiry, from social institutions in
general and political institutions in particular. While I have not been
able to find a simple standard of differentiation, I contend that gov-
ernmental institutions must be identified by the activity of bestowing
legitimacy upon their own policies and those of non-governmental insti-
tutions
.
Through the rest of this dissertation I intend to use the concepts
developed in this chapter to explicate the process of institutional
change arising out of major electoral realignments in the United States.
The demonstration and explanation of such change is important. First,
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changes in institutional structure and processes imply changes in public
policy and it is public policy that in the end affects the lives of
ordinary people. Secondly, in a society that claims that legitimate
government action must in the end arise through some process involving
popular sovereignty, it is important to evaluate the ways, if any, in
which elections are related to policy. As I have pointed out, in the
United States the relationship between elections and policy formation is
a murky one, but any such relationship should be strongest and most
clearly seen following realignments.
In the previous chapter, I suggested several places to look for
significant institutional change following realignments. These included
(1) the appearance of new institutional forms, (2) the creation of new
institutional functions, (3) changes in the relationships among institu-
tions, and (4) the initiation of new governmental functions. To these
four, I want to add a fifth. Changes in institutional process, particu-
larly those related to new constituencies or policy goals should be
added to the list. While these changes can be most obviously identified
in alterations in formal or codifiable rules, in many cases these
changes might occur, at least initially, primarily on the level of prac-
tices and understandings. Therefore, attempts to document and explain
institutional change following realignments could focus on rules, prac-
tices, or both.
CHAPTER III
A CASE STUDY: REALIGNMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Real ignment Debates and Institutional Chanrp
In my review of the realignment literature, I noted that most
scholars found a definite relationship between realignments and altera-
tions of government policies. To a lesser degree, researchers also
claimed there was a connection between realignment and institutional
change. This connection was noted by Burnham, Schattschnei der. Key, and
others. However, these authors did not make a serious effort to docu-
ment this point. Rather, they supported their arguments through brief
historical examples and vignettes. In this and the following chapter I
examine the relationship between realignment and institutional change in
more detail. I show that the forces and conditions that produce signif-
icant institutional change following realignments are integrally related
to the forces and conditions that prompt major electoral and coalitional
change.
In the realignment literature great stress is placed on the re-
aligning election itself as a cause of subsequent political change. In
brief, realignments are seen as exercises in popular sovereignty. This
characterization is unfortunate because the realigning election is a
response to deep political tensions that arise from major social and
economic problems. The realigning election is but one moment in a
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longer period of political debate and conflict. Thus, any understanding
of policy or institutional change following realignment must be linked
to the history of the debate that led to the realignment.
A full discussion of the debate and transformation of discourse
that would accompany any realignment would be a massive undertaking.
Yet any institutional change following a realignment would be more com-
prehensible in light of understanding the realignment debate. After
all, I claim that institutions embody purpose through the crystalliza-
tion of social understandings into rules and practices. New institu-
tional structure and process would correspond to the crystallization of
the discourse of the newly dominant political coalition. At least one
tradition of work focuses, if coincidental ly, on these very issues.
During the 1960s a number of American political scientists became
interested in the formation and consequences of the peculiarly American
form of the positive state, usually called interest group liberalism.
Members of this school, including Kariel
,
McConnell, and Lowi , were not
explicitly concerned with electoral realignment. However, each to some
extent perceived that the current procedures of United States national
governance had either their origin or their first complete articulation
in the New Deal, i.e., following the 1932 realigning election. As a
group, these authors saw this new style of governance as a politically
viable response to the need for a more activist state in a society where
most politically active members had deep misgivings about the exercise
of state power. These authors viewed interest group liberalism as an
ultimately self-defeating form of governance.^ Of these authors.
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Theodce L0W1
.ost fuUy t.aces the connections between Ideological dis-
course before the realignment, the Institutionalization of the new dis-
course following realignment, and the Implications of that discourse for
subsequent policy and institutional adaptation.
As I noted In Chapter I, one of Lowl's
.ost important concepts Is
the "public Philosophy." that Is. an ideology that dominates political
action and discourse over a relatively long period of time. The domi-
nance of the public philosophy that Lowl calls capitalism was recon-
firmed by the 1895 election, but soon came under questioning given the
various tensions and irrationalities still produced by Industrial capi-
talism. Thereafter, according to Lowl. a debate was joined by propo-
nents of what most 20th century tericans call conservatism and liberal-
Ism over the proper use of state power. Lowl says this debate ended in
FDR's second term with the retreat of the Supreme Court from conserva-
tive principles. The conservative-liberal debate was replaced by the
hegemony of interest group liberalism.
After 1937, the Constitution did not die from the RooseveltRevolution, as many had predicted, but the basis for the , beral
-
ource^o 'oub Jr'Z? "'V' liberal ism-conserva«sm as e''s f p l c philosophy no longer made sense. Once the prin-ciple of positive government in an indeterminable but expandinqpolitical sphere was established, criteria arising out of ?he vervissue of expansion became Irrelevant. 2 ^
The author then continues by exploring the consequences of the public
philosophy of Interest group liberalism that began to emerge in the
1930s upon the policies and forms of state action adopted In a sampling
of policy areas.
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Lowi-s work, by its very scale, is strong on the elucidation of
cause and effect but is less convincing in te.s of process. That is, he
does not provide the reader with a detailed view of the concrete actions
and events that resulted in the conversion of ideas into practice and
policy. Reading Lowi, one may be able to see why there is a particular
form of positive state in the United States, but it is hard to grasp the
actual process of its creation. A large scale "history" of a realign-
ment, or better, a series of realignments, including the full sweep of
the process from its origin to its uttermost consequences, would be a
most useful addition to the literature. But that project is far beyond
the capacities and resources of this writer. Instead, it is more man-
ageable to look for case studies of institutional change following
realignments and then to relate those cases to the general debate that
constituted that realignment.
While I am not aware of any case studies of that sort, there are
case studies upon which a reader can interpose that kind of framework.
One example of this material is Matthew A. Crenson's, The Federal
Machine. Crenson's intention is to understand why bureaucratic forms of
governmental organization began to replace forms based on other prin-
ciples during Andrew Jackson's administration. Specifically, Crenson
looks at the rapid pace of bureaucratization in two agencies, the Post
Office Department, and the General Land Office. These agencies employed
about 75 percent of the civilian federal employees and were the most
important points of direct citizen contact with the national
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government. Most realignment theorists consider Jackson's election in
1828 a realigning election.
Ladd and Jahnige have each characterized United States national
politics in the half century prior to 1828 as having a style of defer-
ence to a so-called natural aristocracy Jacksonian politics were
built on the decline of this political style, a decline resulting as
much from the rise of entrepreneurial capitalism on a vast scale as from
the rapid extension of the egalitarian frontier. Guardianship of the
previous concepts of public morality and the possession of economic
power no longer coincided as in the past. This created new problems of
governance for the incoming Jackson administration. As Crenson states,
. . .
the social conditions of the era would present these execu-
tives with a special set of administrative problems. In the absence
of the old institutions' regulating power, it would be necessary for
civil servants to find new mechanisms for securing peaceful reli-
able compliance with laws and administrative directives. 5
'
Given that government officials came from the same social order whose
members no longer obeyed social or political authority on the basis of
deference, Crenson 's argument applies to these officials as well.
The Federal Machine presents the story of how the Jacksonians
gradually established bureaucratic forms in the government's largest
agencies to deal with the crisis caused by the decline of the political
style of deference. Bureaucratic reorganization was not the Jackson-
ians' first attempt to deal with the crisis of non-compliance. The tra-
ditional, almost familial, structures of agency operation were first
replaced by the extensive use of party based patronage. This, by
itself, proved insufficient to maintain administrative and political
Ill
control in the growing and more geographically dispersed agencies like
the Postal and Land Offices. While positions were still filled through
the spoils system, the principles of office operation changed radically.
For the first time the government instituted a clear separation between
official and private acts in office, genuine internal specialization of
functions in agencies, and the specification of duties by formal rules.
^
Of key interest is the relation of these administration actions to the
public debate of the realigning election itself.
Crenson believes that the Jacksonians came to Washington without
any major policy changes in mind. Rather, they came to reestablish the
old moral order of civic virtue in government.^ Ironically, they were
both the products and the beneficiaries of that breakdown. Many of
their actions, including government reorganization on bureaucratic prin-
ciples, the direct support of local constituencies, and even patronage
itself, can be understood as attempts to recapture civic virtue through
institutional mechanisms instead of by direct appeal to individual con-
science. Crenson proceeds to claim that the net result of these activi-
ties was the creation of a new standard of political legitimacy based
upon the affections of the citizenry for the government (and governors)
rather than the standard of Washingtonian virtue the Jacksonians had
o
hoped to preserve.
A second kind of case study is represented by Kenneth Finegold's
article on the origins of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. The
relation of this work to realignment research is fairly obvious; the
passage of the AAA, a radical departure from the government's
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agricultural policies of the 1920s, occurred soon after the 1932 re-
aligning election. Unlike Crenson, Finegold does not see the election
as a direct factor leading to policy change. Instead the election re-
sulted in a new political context in which the power and opportunities
of various political actors were substantially altered. The author
focuses on the interaction among four groups of actors: corporate busi-
ness, political parties, farmers' organizations, and the academic-
government complex of agricultural economists. Until about 1930,
reflecting the alignment of 1896, large business interests and their
governmental allies were simply not interested in responding to the
agricultural depression of the 1920s. The business community generally
sought to keep agricultural prices down to subsidize their own inter-
ests. Reflecting their dominant position in the post 1896 majority
coalition, big business had an effective veto over most public policy.
From 1933 onward, the business community's interests counted for
less in the emerging structure of political power. Business lost its
veto power. Concurrently, FDR's massive electoral victory reduced the
ability of organized agriculture to initially control the specifics of
New Deal agricultural policy. The Democratic administration was freer
to turn to the agricultural economists for programmatic ideas. As a
result, organized agriculture accepted elements in the AAA that it
normally would have opposed (e.g., production controls).^
Both the Crenson and Finegold case studies provide examples of
what should be included in a case study that explicitly attempts to link
a policy or institutional change to a realignment. Both studies focus
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on appropriate topics. In each case the policy or institutional change
selected for examination has an organic relationship to at least a part
of the overall political debate arising prior to realignment. Once
again I am using the term debate in a broad sense, to encompass the
whole range of the public expression of tensions arising out of the
operation of the social order. These debates are often carried on
through many means outside the usual confines of political action, i.e.,
electoral competition, interest group activity, and formal government
institutions. Crenson's examination of changes in the operation of the
executive branch is appropriate in that those changes are organically
connected to the tensions arising from the decline of traditional pat-
terns of social power and the rise of new ones based on the expansion of
entrepreneurial capitalism in early 19th century America.
Finegold's examination of New Deal agricultural policy is also a
good subject for a case study for much the same reason. The agrarian
insurgents were among the biggest losers of the 1896 realignment. The
boom-bust cycle that in large part prompted the insurgency did not abate
over the following three decades, nor did all demands for structural
change to respond to agriculture's plight. However, the use of govern-
ment for these purposes was effectively blocked by the structure of
political conflict and power of the 1896-1932 period. The agricultural
question was but a part, though an important one, of the ongoing debate
over the need for positive government in the United States.
The differences between the two case studies are equally instruc-
tive. Crenson is directly concerned with tying the discourse of the
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wi th
election and of politics generally to subsequent institutional change.
Finegold is more interested in the interaction of various social actors
directly concerned with a policy area. He is not overtly concerned
the more publicly available discourse of party and electoral competi-
tion. For Crenson, the election of 1828 provided the Jacksonians with a
fairly explicit message, if no instructions on how to proceed. For
Feingold, the 1932 election was a context altering event. It changed,
in often uncertain ways, the relations of political actors who normally
operate in a fairly privatized context. As politics in the United
States proceeds in both public and private modes, whether in realign-
ments or normal times, case studies of change after realignments should
focus on both types of political action.
Still, I think there is a necessary third element to appropriate
case studies, especially ones looking at institutional change. The
Postal Department, the General Land Office and the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Administration all were or became identifiable entities of social
action where participants behaved in cognizance of explicit or implicit
rules and understandings. That is, all were identifiable as social
institutions. Thus, in each of these institutions, participants had an
identifiable way of life or way of doing things. While the creation or
alteration of such institutions may be traceable to the realignment
debate, much of the actual process of change occurs within the institu-
tion itself or in its interaction with its immediate environment.
This approach should be especially fruitful in the American con-
text given the incremental tendencies of the United States political
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process, tendencies that have been noted within all political eras.
Earlier I noted that institutional change could be conceptualized as
either a process where changes in explicit rules force an ultimate re-
conciliation of institutional practices with these rules or as a process
where changes in institutional practices and understandings eventually
result in alterations of codified institutional rules. To the extent
that the second process is more typical of institutional change in the
United States, as should be expected in an incrementally oriented poli-
tical order, then researchers should emphasize investigations of how
the realignment debate influences the internal life of governmental
i nsti tutions
.
In the rest of this chapter and in the next I will look at two
examples of institutional change stemming from the 1930s realignment.
Since the use of cases from more than one realignment would seem an
obvious strategy because it would allow comparative analysis, some jus-
tification for limiting the cases to the New Deal must be given. After
all the 1930s realignment was atypical in some important respects, for
example its rapidity and that no third party threatened to replace one
of the major parti es.^^
I made this choice for two reasons. I wanted to look at realign-
ments where the discourse was truly national in scope. Since the
national communications media are a product of the late 19th and 20th
centuries, only the 1896 and 1932 critical elections are appropriate
choices. I eliminated 1896 because the proponents of change failed.
Certainly the Republican coalition after 1896 was somewhat different
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than before, but the elements who already managed to i.ple.ent policies
favoring the development and consolidation of large scale capital were
even .ore powerful in the new political era. While many of FDR's sup-
porters (and opponents) may not have imagined the nature and extent of
change that the new administration would enact, few observers expected a
reprise of the business oriented government and public policies of the
1920s. I will limit my analysis to the 1930s because unlike the 1890s
the purposes of government and therefore its institutions were changing.
The 1930s Realignment and the Formation nf fho^pnp
An important element of the executive branch of the United States
government is the Executive Office of the President (EOP). The EOP is
the most important element of the executive branch under direct presi-
dential control. The EOP is the institutional apparatus that allows
presidents to make a credible attempt to control and coordinate the ac-
tivities of the national government. The EOP has varied in its size and
constituent elements. In 1980 the EOP contained ten units with about
two thousand employees. Important and familiar units include the White
House Office, the National Security Council, the Council of Economic
Advisors, and most notably the Office of Management and Budget. This
important institutional cluster is surprisingly new, being legally
established late in the New Deal on September 8, 1939 by Executive Order
8248.
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On the surface, government reorganization does not seem to be the
kind Of issue involved in realignment. Instead, one thinks of economic
depression, federal supremacy, slavery, or the relative political power
of industry and agriculture as the sort of issue involved in transforma-
tions Of the United States political order. Nonetheless issues relating
to government organization seem to often follow realignments; for
example the Jacksonian innovations directed at enforcing government
authority in a changing social order^^ and the institutionalization of
congressional seniority and the disenfranchisement of blacks and the
poor that followed 1896.^^
While one can find hints of most of the programmatic innovations
of the New Deal in the discourse of the 1932 campaign, the Roosevelt ad-
ministration entered office largely uncommitted to any set of programs.
However, it was clear that the new administration would be an activist
one that would use public power in new forms for new objectives. Yet
the structure and process of a business oriented government were clearly
not adequate for supporting programmatic innovation. Thus, FDR stressed
the need for reorganization in the campaign and in the first days of his
administration.
In retrospect it seems amazing that Roosevelt waited until January
1937 to submit his first formal reorganization proposal to Congress.
Nevertheless, a kind of reorganization, especially of the Presidency,
took place from the start of the administration. This reorganization
occurred in part through changes in the fornial rules and structure of
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admittedly ad hoc Institutions. However, the ™re important elements of
this process of reorganization, the ones that led to the formation of
the EOP, initially took place as alterations in institutional practices
and understandings.
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. tells a story of FDR's first day in office
that sounds nearly unbelievable to those familiar with the current in-
stitutionalization of the Presidency, and the current process of presi-
dential transition. Schlesinger writes that FDR literally found nothing
in his office save a desk and a chair. There was nothing to write with,
nothing to write on, and no way to even summon his secretary except
Roosevelt's own voice. Schlesinger reports that Rexford Tugwell
recalled that Roosevelt saw the situation as a metaphor for both the
nation's helplessness before the forces of Depression and of the weak-
ness of the presidential office to take appropriate action. Roosevelt,
believing in the tradition of Wilson and the first Roosevelt that the
Presidency had to be the activist center of the United States govern-
ment, found this an intolerable situation.^^
The Presidency of 1933 was not without institutional resources
that could be applied to the task of coordinating the growth and activ-
ity of the positive state. There was the Cabinet, an institutional form
dating back to Washington's administration. Still the Cabinet is in
some ways as much a creature of Congress as the President. While
Woodrow Wilson's judgment that Cabinet members, because of their depart-
mental responsibilities, are virtual servants of Congress no longer
applied by 1933; Cabinet members were not completely free to be the
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President's servants eitherj^ Besides ties to Congress, Cabinet offi-
cers must also cultivate their departments and key constituencies.
Direct help for the conduct of presidential business had always
been meager compared to the need. Until 1857 Congress would not provide
funds for hiring even one presidential clerk. Presidents always had
made use of informal advisors and troubl eshooters of one sort or anoth-
er. These included department heads, officials borrowed from other
agencies, and persons with no formal government position. Yet these ex-
pedients presented certain problems in assuring legitimacy and accounta-
bility, and, most crucially, resulted in the lack of any institutional
memory. When Roosevelt entered office one element of the future Execu-
tive Office of the President was already in place, the Bureau of the
Budget. The Bureau of the Budget had been operating since 1921, but its
manner of operation was significantly different from what it was to
become. Today, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the
successor agency to the Budget Bureau, is the subject of greater public
attention than most Cabinet members. 0MB itself is perhaps the most
powerful instrument of presidential leverage over the rest of the execu-
tive branch.
The need for positive government and the parallel need for means
to direct it is mainly a consequence of industrialization. The United
States government was established in circumstances where the need of
national coordination was largely restricted to the contingencies of war
and internal revolt. The framers intended the President to provide
emergency coordination, mainly in the capacity of Commander-in-Chief.
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Even 1„ this .ole. the President's aM,1ty to coordinate fede., action
was ,u1te limited. Lincoln needed to assume ext.a-constltutlona, powers
to carry on the Civil War As tho n^r^ c ^w . e pace of industrial and urban develop-
-nt increased, the United States government did not have adequate In-
stitutional capacity to respond to the new kinds of problems that
arose. That is, the government had neither the type of personnel nor
the organizational experience to cope with the problems of industriali-
zation even if the political leadership before 1932. and especially
before 1900, had chosen tn art 1^ i j jn to act. Indeed, the institutionalization of
the constitutional doctrines of separation of powers and of checks and
balances in the national government resulted in a strong bias against
governmental coordination. To a lesser extent, this remains true today.
To most Americans living in the final quarter of the 20th century,
the Presidency seems the most obvious location for coordinating govern-'
ment activity. This was not always the case. The center of national
government in the period of rapid industrial development following the
Civil War was Congress. As an Indication of its power. Congress both
originated and passed the budget. The President had no official role in
the process. The Secretary of the Treasury had responsibility for
gathering agency estimates, preparing an aggregate budget estimate, and
simply sending the materials on to Congress. woodrow Wilson reported
that contests for the selection of the Speaker of the House received
nearly as much press coverage as did presidential elections.'^
This system of congressional dominance showed a number of weak-
nesses, theoretical and actual. Wilson, anticipating the problem that
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would
.esult in the creation of the Budget Bureau, noted that the budget
process only worked because there was usually a surplus. He goes on to
State,
necessaXTvrfinanctal' .^l^^^r^- absolutely
highly-ti^aineS and metact na to^a^v
'
ity, and this is just what our frnno^pcc? iT^ '^'^''"^ responsibil-
not allow. 20 ^^'"^
""^^ (congressional) committee system does
Of more immediate seriousness was Congress' inability to respond legis-
latively to the needs of urban labor and of farmers in the pre-1896
period. In the years from 1877 to 1901 only twenty-one major pieces of
legislation, excluding appropriations and pork barrel, passed Congress.
It was clear that Congress could not initiate its own policy response to
the problems faced by an industralizing nation.^! The electoral insur-
gency of the 1890s failed, and the period of economic prosperity that
coincidental ly followed muted the political expression of deep social
and economic tensions. However, the tensions did not vanish.
In retrospect, the Progressive movement can be seen as an attempt
by some elements of the victorious Republican coalition to address the
problems of industrialization without challenging the basic features of
industrial capitalism or initially the Republican party. As a group,
progressives realized that only government could address the problems of
the new era. Therefore, there needed to be some mechanism to mobilize
and coordinate the use of government. Congress could not be that mech-
anism. The institution was too decentralized internally and in its
relationships to external constituencies. Similarly, the progressives
initially rejected the political party as a coordinating agency.
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A.en-can political parties shared ™a„y of the sa.e shortcomings as
Congress. In any case the reformers did not find parties an attractive
-de Of political action. They were repelled by the corruption that
seemed intimately linked to partisan activity.
,t was also true that
many progressives felt strong loyalties or antipathies to a major party
following the polarization of the 1896 realignment. As such, the execu-
tive provided the one institutional basis for reformist action to im-
prove the managerial capacity of the national government.
The developing tradition of progressive sponsored institutional
reform at the state and local levels would have a ^rked influence on
reorganization in the New Deal. This tradition was firmly centered on
the use Of executive and administrative power. At this time there was
also a noticeable increase of executive power and initiative at the fed-
eral level. Following McKinley's election, Wilson observes in a revised
°^ Congressional Government that McKinley's more assertive pre-
sidential style might presage the future. Wilson stressed the growing
integrative role of the Presidency in the overall operation of govern-
ment to the degree that he speculates on the possible obsolescence of
his book's title. It can be argued that the modern Presidency, at
least in its personal elements, was complete when Wilson left office two
decades later.
However, it was Congress, perhaps because executive agencies were
products of legislative action, that conducted the first modern inqui-
ries into the need for reorganization of the federal executive. Con-
gress authorized several studies in the decades following the Civil War,
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culminating in the Dockery-Cockrel 1 Commission of 1893. No action was
taken on the basis of any of these studies. Yet these early studies
are important. They demonstrate a congressional perspective toward
reorganization that has lasted to the present. From the start, Congress
was more interested in the potential of reorganization to save money
than in the goal of increasing executive capacities to plan and imple-
ment policy. Congress valued "economy" over "efficiency . "^^
During this same period, Congress slowly began to respond to cer-
tain problems of an industrial society through establishing specialized
and decentralized administrative entities now known as independent agen-
cies. Beginning with the Interstate Commerce Commission, Congress ac-
tually reduced the potential for central coordination, whether by itself
or by the Presidency. Indeed, the Congress' decision to reorganize the
government in a fashion oriented to special treatment of narrow consti-
tuencies resonates with the later growth of the system of subgovernments
after the 1930s realignment. The result, as Harold Seidman aptly ex-
presses it, is ".
. .
An Alliance - which is what the executive branch
really is
- is by definition a confederation of sovereigns joined to-
gether in some common goal. Some members may be more powerful than
others, but they are nonetheless mutually independent."^^ The problem
under this circumstance is to make sure that those with a putative
responsibility to define and implement the putative common goal have
some real capacity to undertake those functions.
Congress took the first step toward creating a presidential ly
centered institutional mechanism that could help integrate federal
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activities With the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
It is not likely that Congress understood the potential effects of forc-
ing the Bureau of the Budget beyond the i^ediate goal of bringing the
federal deficit under control. The action was prompted by the disap-
pearance of the almost traditional budget surplus of the late 19th cen-
tury. The period of 1904-1910 was marked by an unheard of six consecu-
tive deficits. These deficits were followed by a series caused by World
War I spending. Congress' establishment of the Budget Bureau was en-
tirely understandable within the tradition of seeing econo^ as the main
purpose of reorganization. As such, many members of Congress believed
the agency would be as responsive to Congress as to the President.
Nonetheless, while Congress responded to the pressure of mounting defi-
cits, the response itself was designed by the executive.
The proposal for a central budgeting agency under presidential
direction, originally came from a special commission appointed by Presi-
dent Taft. Clearly Taft was in agreement with the commission's report.
Taft even prepared a budget of his own, which was promptly ignored by
27Congress. Wilson also strongly supported the formation of a budgeting
agency. The legislation he submitted almost passed during his second
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term. Among the advocates of central budgeting was Franklin Roose-
velt, who as Assistant Secretary of the Navy had pushed for more cen-
tralized control of programs as well as funds.
The 1921 legislation attached the Budget Bureau to the Treasury
Department rather than directly to the President. However the Budget
Bureau was to be in but not of the Treasury. Congress also decreed that
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Of the Budget Bu.eau. The President was to appoint the bureau's Direc-
tor and Assistant Director. In addition there was no conflr^tlon
requirement for the appointments, ™Hng the Budget Bureau's leadership
directly responsible to the President.
The Bureau of the Budget was directed to evaluate and revise the
funding requests of other agencies as well as to collect and aggregate
the., other agencies were specifically denied the right to ™ke appro-
priations requests directly to Congress. The Implication here, given
the President's control of Budget Bureau personnel. Is that the budget
proposal presented to Congress has the President's approval, not just
the bureau's. In fact the 1921 Act required the President to submit an
annual message to go with the budget proposal. Finally, the Budget
Bureau was empowered to make studies of other federal agencies for the
purpose of recommending changes in the Interest of economy and adminis-
trative efficiency. This second mandate was not implemented until after
the creation of the EOP.^^
The role of the Budget Bureau in its early years was very differ-
ent from what it would become after the 1932 realigning election. How-
ever, the agency's practices and understandings of its functions that
evolved in the 1920s had independent consequences for the ways the
agency changed in the 1930s. President Harding appointed Charles G.
Dawes the first Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The new director
had extensive experience in accounting and procurement in the Army, and
doubtless that experience informed Dawes' implementation of the Budget
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and Accounting Act ot ,.2, and the or,an1z1n, ot the Budget Bureau's
Structure and routines.
Dawes ,u1cMy established principles of agency operation. The
first Of these was that the Budget Bureau was an instrument of the
President, that its placement In Treasury was no .ore than accident of
history. Harding was highly supportive of Dawes on this issue. Harding
let Dawes use the Cabinet room for his meetings with department heads
and put Dawes in charge of the governmental retrenchment following demo-
bilization. Dawes' second principle was that the Budget Bureau would
act according to the tenets of good public administration as then under-
stood. The agency would always be impartial. Impersonal, and above all
else non-political. 31 Dawes denied that the agency had any role In
policymaking. On one occasion he noted.
Much as we love the PreslHont if r
appropriations ^Z%l fccTA^n^^^^ "'^^
political way ZJotlt^tZ^ll VZTsi Ihe^^xS^wIInd"""
Dawes' initial efforts bore fruit. Until the Nixon administration and
the reorganization of the Budget Bureau Into the 0MB, nx,st Washington
observers saw the agency's staff as the closest American approximation
to the spirit of neutral competence identified with the British civil
33
service.
Nonetheless, any agency involved in evaluating and revising a bud-
get has to make policy decisions. One reason that Director Dawes was
able to quickly establish his agency was the biases he embedded in
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agency routines were compatible with the objectives of President Harding
and his Republican successors. Dawes favored governmental retrenchment
and economy, and he and his agency developed their routines to achieve
those goals. The Budget Bureau even cut its own expenses. The agency
spent only $120,000 of its $225,000 initial appropriation. Dawes' imme-
diate successors at the bureau continued this policy, thereby depriving
the agency of the resources to carry out some of its mandated functions,
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e.g., administrative studies. More important in the long run was the
agency's initiation of the process of central clearance. Central clear-
ance refers to the power of the Budget Bureau or other presidential sur-
rogate to approve or reject an agency request for funding and/or pro-
grammatic authorization in the name of the President. It is this prac-
tice, whether for appropriations or legislative proposals generally,
that became the consolidating focus of presi dertiel efforts to control
the national government. The practice of central clearance laid the
institutional basis for the creation of the EOP.
In 1954, Richard E. Neustadt observed that legislative clearance
... is by far the oldest, best intrenched, most thoroughly insti-
tutionalized of the President's coordinative instruments - always
excepting the budget itself - receiving new stability and new sig-
nificance by virtue of its demonstrated power to adapt and sur-
vive. 35
Today Neustadt' s judgement remains accurate, although the locus of
clearance has shifted from the stylistically neutral Budget Bureau to
the highly politicized White House Office. Though clearance is usual-
ly thought of as a presidential function, the practice had its origin in
the mutual interests of the newly formed Budget Bureau and the
Appropn-atlons Co™lttees In Congress to stave off interference 1n the
budget process by executive agencies and other congressional co^ittees
The initial proposal for a clearance process ca„« fro. the House Appro-
priations Co^ittee in November 1921. Dawes promptly adopted the sub-
stance of this proposal in Budget Circular 49 of 12/19/21.37 jy,,
the clearance process as then adopted was expenditure control, not
central program planning or implementation. This decision, once insti-
tutionalized in agency practice, came to influence the applications of
clearance that would make sense to officials in the Roosevelt admin-
i Strati on.
Clearance of appropriations was not fully institutionalized imme-
diately. Cabinet officers strongly protested to President Harding and
Dawes. The bureau then backed off. For important matters
, and often in
practice routine ones, agency heads went directly to the White House.
Thus, while Dawes did not succeed in fully establishing clearance, he
did not have to recall Budget Circular 49.^8 jhe Budget Bureau could
wait until there was a President with the political will to fully
enforce central clearance.
Calvin Coolidge was just that President, being interested in ex-
penditure control both as a general principle and to offset the revenue
losses that were expected from the business oriented tax cuts drafted by
Treasury Secretary Mellon. Over the period of 1924-1926, the Presi-
dent's use of the Budget Bureau as his clearance agent became nearly
universal on funding requests. Indeed the Budget Bureau became rather
heavy handed in the exercise of its authority. Neustadt reports that
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Budget Director Herbert law "L
... peppered key departments with warn-ings, abjuration, and complaint, backed by a considerahipd ble amount of Bud-
^"^ -^'-^-'"^ central clearance continued in
this
.orm at tbe beginning of the Hoover administration. Subsequently
as the Hoover administration gradually became immobilized by the Depre^
s-n crisis, the use of clearance declined and then virtually disap-
peared.
As Should be Clear from the previous material, the Republican ad-
ministrations Of the 1920S did not reject the notion of the coordinating
role Of the executive out of hand. Rather, the role of the President
and the proper scope of activity for the national government was delim-
Ued by the final extension of the political logic of the 1896 realign-
ment. As Coolidge was reported to have said, the business of terica
was business. While it was now clear that the satisfactory operation of
the economy required some government activity, that activity had to be
in forms favorable to business, especially large business, and not
Interfere with the performance of legitimate business functions.
Specifically, the purpose of government was to exhort the private sector
to take appropriate action for Its own and thereby the country's wel-
fa re.
One facet of this style of state action has been labeled "adhocra-
cy." This term refers to the use of government personnel and services,
-alnly by business, without actual state control. The federal govern-
ment, especially the Commerce Department, supported the creation of
trade associations, coordinated the spread of technical information.
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aided promotional efforts ptr a j -,TT , e c. A second element of the adhocracy was
the use Of executive, including presidential, persuasion to convince
business and financial leaders to take necessary actions, m certain
emergency situations, the President could even initiate governmental
provision of crucial services like relief or loans to prevent bankrupt-
cies. Congress, potentially responsive to special interests (which at
this point in time did not include big business by the political defini-
tion of 1896) was not in a position to properly exhort the business com-
munity. Congress, according to the Republican Presidents of the 1920s,
was likely to take actions that would undermine business confidence,
such as farm relief or public power development.
This "Hooverite" theory of activist government bears some resem-
blance to the preconceptions that informed congressional action in the
creation of independent agencies, except that at least in the latter
case the agencies have substantial statutory authority to make and/or
enforce policy. Both the idea and practice of adhocracy had an impact
on New Deal programs such as the National Industrial Recovery Act and on
the development of the phenomenon of subgovernments which is such an
important form of state action today. Yet, FDR's election pointed
toward a change in the role of the federal government in general, and of
the Presidency in particular, from exhorter to the agency of policy
initiative. The executive branch would need the aid of Congress to
perform this new role. Franklin Roosevelt, aware of this new context,
stated in his first inaugural address:
These measures or such other measures a? Trl ^" ""^ '"^''"^'-e-ns experience and wisdom, I sha n seek w?.h ^^''^^ ™^ 0"t of
authority to bring to speedy adoption « constitutional
The election of 1932 did not mandate the eventual creation of an
Executive Office of the President, but the event does see. to have un-
leashed the forces that would require an integrative agency of some sort
attached to the Presidency. Given three years of economic disaster it
was hardly surprising that the nation elected Roosevelt and a massive
Democratic congressional majority. However, the size and distribution
of the Democratic landslide was somewhat unexpected, especially to ob-
servers familiar with post-1895 voting patterns. Roosevelt ran up a
Plurality of over seven million votes, an eight to one margin in the
electoral college, and carried 282 counties that had never gone to a
Democratic presidential candidate before. While some of these gains re-
flected the continuation of the party's growing popularity in the 1920s
among urban dwellers and farmers,^* the Democrats' gains were only
weakly correlated with those of 1928 and 1930.''^
Congressional results were equally impressive with the Democrats
acquiring a healthy majority in the Senate and massively adding to their
thin House majority. Congressional and presidential voting patterns
were closely matched, implying a strong coat tail effect."^ Further,
there was substantial turnover in the membership of the Democratic, as
well as the Republican, congressional delegation. Over 55 percent of
the persons who served in the House during the 72nd Congress did not
return for the 73.d/' One f1na, sign of the electorate's restlveness
and their apparent choice of FDR and the Democratic party as an agency
Of refer., was that the 1932 election was a bad year for progressive
Republican incumbents. The progressives had done very well in 1930,
despite the general turndown in the Republican vote/S i„
country had made a massive almost unidirectional shift to the Democratic
Standard.
In addition, many historians have inferred a deeper meaning to the
1932 election than the change in voting patterns. There was nothing ap-
proaching a unified Democratic viewpoint on the problems of the Depres-
sion, nor on their underlying causes. Many congressional Democrats had
economic views indistinguishable from those of the Hoover administra-
tion. Though FDR was widely believed to be progressive and activist in
outlook, his advisors and appointees held many different viewpoints.
Some appointees were quite conservative, including the first budget
director, Lewis Douglas.
The most important aspect of the political environment following
the 1932 election was the sharp decline in the position of large scale
capital as the preeminent source of action and legitimacy in the Ameri-
can polity; that is, the decline of big business as what Everett Carll
Ladd calls the main political class. William Leuchtenburg, the his-
torian, summarizes this phenomenon as follows:
As the depression deepened, amorphous resentment finally took form
in one overwhelming question: Who was to blame? The answer came
readily enough. Throughout the 1920s, publicists had trumpeted one
never-ending refrain: that the prosperity of the decade had been
produced by the genius of businessmen. If businessmen had caused
prosperity, who but they must be responsible for the depression?51
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The fact that it was possible for the government to ™.e signifi-
cant policy departures during the New Deal can only he understood in the
context ot the decline ot business legitimacy.
,n the Republican ad.in-
-trations following the 1896 realignment, typically more tnan 80 per-
cent Of the top executive appointments were given to persons who were
-.bers of the United States financial/industrial elite. I„ the Roose-
velt administrations of the 1930s elite representation in these posts
declined to 47 percent. Phillip h. Burch Jr.. on the basis of these
figures, claims that the Roosevelt administration was the most pluralis-
tic in all of United States history.
The sequence of events leading from the 1932 election to the
establishment of the ECP is neither short nor straightforward. In part
this is a reflection of Roosevelt's administrative style. FDR was known
to favor overlapping sources of information and structures of authority.
He felt this would enable him to retain firmer control over final policy
decisions. To accomplish his goals Roosevelt often relied on the per-
sonal support of a series of key aides such as Howe. Holey, and Tugwell.
This was more than a matter of personal style; it reflected the failings
of more institutionalized forms of support." However, the main reason
for the delay in setting up the EOP was that while the incoming adminis-
tration understood the need for integrative mechanisms, the administra-
tion lacked, save the World War I mobilization, much experience with
coordinative mechanisms at the federal level. This problem did not
arise from the idiosyncratic character of the Roosevelt administration.
It would have been a ™ajo. p^oblen, fo. any Incoming administration that
desired to use governmental power for new purposes.
Leuchtenburg reports that the Roosevelt adminsitration faced a
snuation in 1933 that was in many respects similar to that faced by
newly independent nations after the colonial administration leaves
There were few skilled Democratic administrators except for some veter-
ans Of the Wilson years.^^ The new administration could have tried to
retain many of the top officials from the Hoover administration. This
option was rejected given the probable hostility of most of these indi-
viduals to the new administration's aims. Many of the appointments made
to the rapidly constituted emergency agencies were chosen from outside
the ranks of the Civil Service for much the same reason. The adminis-
tration preferred to rely on new talent.
Another option was to proceed with fonnal reorganization to create
a fully integrated administrative structure. Despite FDR's support in
the 1932 campaign for this course of action, and a certain amount of
political pressure in its favor, the President was understandably more
concerned with programs aimed at increasing public confidence and ame-
liorating the economic emergency. ^6 i„stead, the administration's main
approach was to try a number of experimental devices. Through the
decade the use of these expediencies provided the administration with a
learning process on organizational issues.
The Roosevelt administration made relatively little use of the one
integrative agency available from the start, the Bureau of the Budget.
This was not odd, given that the agency's principal goal of budget
reduction was at variance with the administration's goal of expanding
the realm of government activity. Neustadt reports that financial
clearance came to a near standstill. The turnover in the federal admin-
istration left many agencies in the hands of officials who knew or cared
little about the clearance procedures
. FDR seems to have tolerated
agency efforts to circumvent the process. Further, as policy differ-
ences Sharpened between the President and his conservative Budget Direc-
tor, Roosevelt increasingly used personnel borrowed from other depart-
ments to do budget work. Apparently, Roosevelt did not see any poten-
tial in the Budget Bureau for any function beyond gatekeeping at this
time. 58
Nonetheless, Roosevelt did not force the bureau to rescind or
amend Budget Circular 49. Thus the basic regulations governing clear-
ance remained formally in effect. At the very point the Budget Bureau's
clearance authority appeared fatally weakened, the agency began to
reassert its authority. This was done slowly and cautiously. Low level
staff began to remind equivalent officials in other agencies of their
clearance obligations in early 1934. This was done on the Budget
Bureau's own initiative and prepared the way for the agency's quick
return to a position of significant power in the executive branch.
In the initial days of the administration, coordination, especial-
ly on fiscal and economic matters, was attempted through ad hoc groups
of advisors and officials including the famed "brain trust. By the
second half of 1933, Roosevelt set up a more definite structure to help
integrate the executive branch. This new entity was named the Executive
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council. The Executive Council was composed of a fairly large nu.ber of
department and agency heads. The body had no agenda, little staff sup-
port, and promoted little serious work or discussion on its members-
part except when Roosevelt himself was in attendance.
In November 1933, Roosevelt by executive order initiated a smaller
body, the National Emergency Council (NEC), composed of only ten offi-
cials heading departments or agencies that were central to the recovery
effort. While no formal power was initially granted to the NEC, the
agency received staff to prepare agendas, do research, and maintain li-
aison with a wide variety of federal and state agencies. Ultimately the
NEC became enlarged and thus subject to many of the failings of the
Executive Council (which was absorbed by the NEC in 10/34). While the
National Emergency Council at times showed signs of developing into a
genuine mechanism of policy and administrative coordination, the NEC
mainly served as a forum where agency heads could learn about their
counterparts' concerns and activities and as a mechanism to reduce
interagency tensions. Most NEC members had more interest in their own
agencies and constituencies than in the government as a whole. In ret-
rospect the NEC can be viewed as an opportunity for political learning.
Schlesinger expresses this interpretation of the NEC when he states,
... the NEC enabled the President to begin to gain control of the
administration's legislative program by providing for the central
clearance of all legislative proposals coming out of the executive
branch.
Roosevelt authorized the National Emergency Council to engage in
clearance of substantive legislative proposals in December 1934;
although the NEC itself had discussed the matter as early as February.
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Roosevelt has been quoted as beinn " ^ l. .
^
g
.
.
. quue horrified - not once but
half a dozen times
.
.
by finding out about some agency's plan for
submitting major legislation from the press or some other indirect
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source. By December 13th, NEC Director Donald Richberg announced an
initial set of procedures. While "substantive" matters would go to the
NEC Director or one of several NEC committees for clearance, the Budget
Bureau would officially resume clearance of requests for appropriations.
The Budget Bureau protested that the procedures were unclear given that
most legislative authorizations are meaningless without funding. In
April of 1935, Roosevelt directed that the situation be clarified. The
Budget Bureau drafted a new set of clearance regulations and managed to
get presidential support for them. Indeed Roosevelt personally informed
the NEC that the Budget Bureau now had his support. These proposals
were issued as Budget Circular 336 on 12/21/35.^^
Under Circular 336 the bifurcation of policy and appropriations
continued, except that there was a joint clearance process for legisla-
tion that involved both elements. While awkward on paper, the process
worked. This in large part reflected the Budget Bureau's long opera-
tional experience with clearance in some form. It also reflected the
rapid decline of the NEC as an effective and influential agency.
Neustadt points out that the basic procedures set forth in Budget Circu-
lar 336 have remained in effect ever since. More importantly, he notes
that legislative clearance was no mere extension of the budget process,
but a significant departure in executive coordination.
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creaiion I en ^ r c nTt tfTZ'. '''' Roosevelt's
tives, his freedom of action and\ .
^is budget, but his preroga-
of determined presiSen??al Ldersh^pJ^^^" °' ''''''''' -
Before the end of 1936, the Budget Bureau was in practice the only
agency engaged in legislative clearance. This fact was recognized with
the issuance of Budget Circular 344 in December 1937. While the decline
and ultimate death of the National Emergency Council can be attributed
to the routinization of the relief and recovery efforts and to an in-
creasingly conservative political climate in Roosevelt's second term,
the Budget Bureau took advantage of this situation to establish its pre-
eminent position in the area of central clearance. The bureau and ulti-
mately most other agencies simply ignored the NEC's rights under Circu-
lar 336.
This happened, actually, as a matter of course, a detail of admini^;trative tidying, a minor item among all the majo? changes in ?heBureau's status, role, and outlook
. .
.67 ^
n t
That is, the exercise of a new practice, closely related in form and
function to the Budget Bureau's traditional practices and understandings
gradually became codified into formal rules. While some major agencies
were at first willing to end run the Budget Bureau in 1935-36 (a prac-
tice clearly tolerated by FDR), by 1939 the Budget Bureau cleared vir-
tually all legislative proposals. One political scientist of the era
characterized the agency's performance as having such great influence
that it was "frequently commanding. "^^
During the early 1930s there were a number of other experiments in
policy coordination. One of these was the National Resources Planning
Board, which was later placed in the original EOP. The board had its
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beginning 1n July 1933, when Harold Ickes, then the Administrator for
Pubbc Works, appointed a three
.ember National Planning Board This
board was directed to coordinate and develop plans for public works con-
struction that would take account of the impact of these projects on a
Wide variety of social, economic, and environmental factors, as well as
the more traditional tasks of avoiding waste and preventing interagency
duplication and conflict. The board received additional status when FDR
reorganized it into the National Resources Planning Board in mid 1934.69
Overall, the board was successful in carrying out its function of ra-
tionalizing public works construction, with the exception of projects
where other agencies already had made heavy political or material in-
vestments.™ Congress ended the board's appropriation, and thereby its
existence, in 1942. At least one author attributes this event to the
then dominant conservative coalition's wish to prevent the presumably
liberal agency from shaping development in the post war period.'^ In
any case, the experience of the National Resources Planning Board In-
formed the structure and operation of future EOP boards with coordina-
tive functions, for example, the Council of Economic Advisors.
If the realigning surge of 1932 made an activist government pos-
sible, and with it the need for institutionalized forms of coordination,
the elections of 1934 and 1936 shaped the forms those coordinative
entitles would take. Most observers interpreted the election of 1934 as
a tremendous victory for the Roosevelt administration. In an off year
election, the Democrats made substantial gains in both houses of
Congress, gaining better than two third majorities in both houses.
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Further, many of the newly elected Democrats were more activist and
radical than either FDR or most members of his administration. The
victory of the Democratic party in 1936 was perhaps the greatest elec-
toral victory in the nation's history. Democratic congressional majori-
ties were raised to at least 3 to 1 in both houses. FDR won all but two
small states, nearly sweeping the electoral vote. 1935 had been a year
of programmatic innovation producing the greatest wave of social reform
in the 20th century, including the Social Security Act and the National
Labor Relations Act.
However the 1936 victory was very different than the one in 1932
and size was the least of the differences. From 1936 onward, the basic
voting patterns that would structure American electoral competition for
at least the next five decades, admittedly with gradually weakening
effect, were set in place. Those reference groups later identified as
basically Democratic, e.g., city dwellers, organized labor, and various
racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, voted for FDR by much greater
margins in 1936 than in 1932. Similarly, members of those groups subse-
quently identified with the Republican party, e.g., businessmen, white
collar labor, and small town dwellers, were in 1936 much less likely to
vote for Roosevelt or other Democrats than in 1932.^^ Using Nancy
Zingale's term, the 1936 election demonstrated a "realigning interactive
surge." That is, the election results demonstrated long term patterns
of political polarization.^^
The electoral alignment, and to a lesser extent the coalitional
lineup, that emerged from the 1936 election had some appearance of
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representing a class cleavage 1n A.encan society. While the guasi-
class
.akeup of the realignment can be greatly exaggerated, it 1s clear
that its composition was hardly what Roosevelt originally sought.
Rather, the adnlnistration intended to bring together a grand coalition
to meet the emergency of the Great Depression. Roosevelt's aim is
summarized by Leuchtenburg as follows-
Lime, wnen class and sectional animosities abated and the rlaimi nf
TnllTonl^ ZlTl^^'^'^^'
^-"^--^
--ific^^d' tt^l7ei:i
The truce lasted barely a year. By 1934 much of the business com-
munity had stopped backing the administration and began to favor the
restoration of the old political order and the dominance of the Republi-
can party. Much of the resulting political rhetoric portrayed the New
Deal as a proto- total i tarian phenomenon, closely related to the twin
horrors of Bolshevism and Fascism. Typical of this discourse was Her-
bert Hoover's 1934 book. The Challenge to Liberty , in which the author
wrote that the New Deal was
. . the most stupendous invasion of the
whole spirit of Liberty that the nation has witnessed
. .
."^^ This
discourse proceeded through action as well as word. For example many
employers refused to abide by Section 7(a) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act, which gave government protection of the right of labor to
organize and collectively bargain. Perhaps the most important form of
anti-New Deal activity was located in the national government. Begin-
ning in 1934 an increasing number of federal court injunctions were
directed against the New Deal. The Supreme Court's resistance is well
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known. Less cc^only appreciated is the resistance of the district fed-
e-1 courts. At this ti.e any district court could issue an injunction
suspending the enforcement of a law or regulation nationally. During
1935-36 the federal district courts issued an unprecedented 1600 injunc-
tions of this kind 7^
The creation of the American "welfare state" after the 1934 elec-
tions was in part attributable to Roosevelt's need to solidify his left
wing support. Roosevelt sought to protect his administration from left-
ist inspired electoral insurgencies. No doubt he felt this need because
the political right had largely abandoned the New Deal. However the
administration's actions in 1935 further increased the polarization that
would be demonstrated in the 1936 election returns. President Roosevelt
realized that increased polarization worked to his electoral benefit in
the short run. He told his advisors that the most effective Republican
campaign strategy for 1936 would stress moderation. He thought the
Republicans could adopt the general goals of the New Deal but criticize
it for excess and waste. This insight was related to Roosevelt's
growing interest in governmental reorganization. Clinton Rossiter
states that Roosevelt's intention to set up an EOF came from ".
Roosevelt's own candid recognition that an otherwise professional per-
formance during his first term ... had been hampered by a lack of
staff to help him stay on top of his ever-growing duties. "'^^ In this
vein, FDR appointed a Committee on Administrative Management in March
1936, chaired by Louis Brownlow. The committee's report coincided with
Roosevelt's increasingly strong views that reorganization should
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strengthen presidential cont™, over the executive branch. When the
administration submitted reorganization legislation to Congress based on
the Brownlow Committee report in January 1937, the administration
expected the measure to easily wi„ approval. Unfortunately for the
administration, the polarization that led to the great victory of 1936
would prove to be an increasing problem in terms of Congress and public
opinion.
Reorganization was not the only approach to improve executive
capacity that Roosevelt hoped to use. Since 1932 the administration had
some success in using the Democratic leadership and caucus in Congress
to pass p res identi ally endorsed legislation. After 1936 these efforts
were augmented by attempts to ensure that pro-administration candidates
got party nominations. This effort culminated in the notorious and
counterproductive attempt to purge some conservative Democrats in the
1938 primaries. A second attempt to increase administration control was
Roosevelt's attempt to expand or pack the United States Supreme Court in
1937 and thereby to get a working majority willing to uphold New Deal
legislation.
Whatever impact the court packing measure submitted to Congress in
February 1937 had on the Supreme Court's later decisions, the court
packing legislation resulted in the delay and ultimate defeat of the
first reorganization proposal. Further, the incident worked, along with
the concurrent wave of sit down strikes, to weaken the middle class
political support for Roosevelt and liberal Democrats. This decline in
political support, combined with a severe economic turndown in 1937,
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resulted 1„ a strong Republican comeback 1„ the 1938 elections The
newly enlarged Republican congressional delegation, while as a group not
openly against the New Deal, was virtually devoid of the progressive
.embers who had been a significant part of the party before the 1930s
The Democratic congressional delegation had never been entirely reform-
at. Many
.embers of the party remained committed to the conservative
policies and constituencies that had been central features of American
politics from the 1890s until the Depression. By 1936, it is likely
that the occupational /demographic profile of Congress was returning to
the lawyer dominated, high status pattern of the past.^O Thus, by 1937
the basis Of what is now termed the conservative coalition was in place
After the 1938 election, the conservative coalition would become the
dominant force in Congress.
The main reason for the defeat of the 1937 Reorganization Bill was
that it became a rallying symbol for a variety of anti-New Deal inter-
ests. Charges of executive usurpation made sense to the broader public
given the court packing episode, the rise of European fascism and the
possibility of war. Initially the reorganization measure seemed to have
public support. However, this support dissolved by the summer of 1937.
Public support for the bill decreased to 22 percent (as measured in
polls taken in March and May of 1938). Support for reorganization was
only 36 percent even among individuals who described themselves as
Roosevelt backers.^l The remarks of a woman interviewed in Philadelphia
by the Roper organization were typical, reflecting a new hostility
toward political experimentation: "We are just confused with so many
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Changes and theories, and want to stop „nt1l we get on our feet
again. "^^
Nevertheless, the fate of the proposal was probably sealed by the
peculiar internal discourse of Congress itself. The bill was defeated
almost by accident. The Senate floor manager forgot to n,ove that a con-
ference co™ittee be for.ed.83 p^.^aps such parliamentary mistakes
would not have happened if Roosevelt had consulted relevant members of
Congress about the proposal in late 1936. In addition, those parts of
the bill that involved or implied reorganization of the structures and
jurisdictions of line agencies created another problem in Congress.
Interest groups and bureaucratic agencies effectively worked with their
congressional allies to kill objectionable parts of the legislation.
Nearly every pressure group in American society took exception to
gamzation remained neutral, and their influent counted foMU-
Al ready the pattern of subgovernmental politics was beginning to take
hold.
Another factor in the defeat of Roosevelt's reorganization bill
was that members of Congress still evaluated reorganizational issues
mainly in terms of their traditional standards of economy and adminis-
trative efficiency. The Roosevelt administration put little effort into
explaining the experiences that informed their proposal. In particular,
the key member of Congress on these issues, Senator Harry Flood Byrd of
Virginia, still maintained that only economy justified reorganization.
Byrd had the tactical advantage of having generated a report from the
per-
Brookings Institution that tended to reinforce thP mr e congressional
spective on reorganization. The effect nf th.-c^'^^^^ 0^ this report was to negate the
Brownlow Co^lttee's clal. to un1,ue expertise on organizational p™.-
l-s. Beyond ai..e.ences 1n the understandings of what goals a reo.gan-
ization plan should achieve, there wp>-p ,1c„ =cn ere also a number of substantive
differences between the presidential and congressional approaches
These differences Involved disputes over the placement of certain agen-
cies, changes In civil service administration, and the Independence of
the comptroller General from the White House. Even some liberal Demo-
crats opposed the first reorganization bill because of these concerns.85
In 1939 the Roosevelt administration submitted a second reorgani-
zation bill to Congress. Despite the major Republican gains In 1938
congressional elections, the bill passed with little difficulty. No
doubt the previous two years proved to most members of Congress that
there was little chance of a presidential dictatorship, while the real-
ity Of a prospective general European war and its potential danger to
the United States was becoming increasingly obvious. This time Roose-
velt consulted with Congress before sending the proposal. The President
and congressional leaders found compromises on those substantive Issues
that had resulted In conflict during the previous two years. Congress
saved face by Including some language in the measure stating that the
main purpose of reorganization is economy; Congress also retained a veto
over presidential reorganization plans. The bill passed in late March.
In early April Roosevelt submitted a plan to establish an Executive
Office of the President Including a White House office, the National
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sented by the end of the month.
The basic structure and purposes of the EOP were codified 1n Exe-
cutive Order 8248 of September 8. 1939. In the case of the Bureau of
the Budget. Order 8248 sl.ply formalized the practices that the agency
had developed and enforced, often before full presidential backing, dur-
ing the preceding five years. These included, among others, budget
preparation and supervision, advising functions in the area of adminis-
trative management, serving as a conduit for information about the
activities^of most other federal agencies, and of course legislative
clearance.87 Another duty of the Budget Bureau was to recommend, on the
basis of its own analysis and the comments of other relevant agencies,
whether the President should sign or veto legislation passed by Con-
'
gress. That is, the bureau became the chief institutional advisor on
legislation. Neustadt claims this function, combined with the clearance
function, became the Budget Bureau's principal source of power. The
agency could now monitor the executive branch's participation throughout
the legislative process.
The Budget Bureau had given advice to the President on enrolled,
that is, passed appropriations as far back as 1921. However, because
there was no efficient way to get copies of the legislation to the agen-
cies and back to the Budget Bureau and the President within a ten day
period, the Budget Bureau was rarely In a position to have effective
influence in these matters. Beginning in 1934, the White House, because
of the great increase in legislative business, required fuller and more
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rap,d information on enrolled bills. This task fell to the Budget
Bureau due to its previous experience and institutional resources. Much
as in the case of legislative clearance, the agency aggressively too.
advantage of this opportunity. I„ particular, the Budget Bureau taMng
advantage of recent advances in copying technology began to insist on
rapid and detailed responses fro. other agencies. By early 1939. well
before the establishment of EOF, the Bureau of the Budget codified
evolving practice into Budget Circular 346. Vet the practices formal-
ized in Budget Circular 346 had been in widespread use for at least a
89year.
In this chapter I have used the development of the EOP after the
1932 critical election to show how various forces within and outside of
government impinged upon existing institutional practices and under-
standings, resulting in their transformation and ultimate codification
into formal institutional structure and process. The evolution of the
Budget Bureau is an important example of the implications of this
phenomenon. As the agency's capabilities grew, so did its potential to
give a President a way of integrating the activities of an otherwise
highly fragmented executive branch. However, the internal development
of the Budget Bureau since its inception had been directed at restrict-
ing programmatic initiative. Roosevelt gradually turned legislative
clearance over to the agency for this reason, to protect his administra-
tion from the unsupervised innovation of agency officials. Unfortunate-
ly, the end result of reliance upon the Budget Bureau, and the institu-
tionalization of its gatekeeper role, was to leave the evolving
Presidency without an institutionalized capacity to spur innovation.
Thirty years later this role would fall to the White House Office.
However, given that senior White House officials necessarily tend to act
in the immediate partisan interests of the incumbent president, and that
they cannot duplicate the experience and memory of an agency like the
old Budget Bureau, the White House Office has shown that it cannot
effectively perform this role.
Finally the initial development of the EOP suggests that institu-
tional change, even following realignment, tends to be conservative in
nature. Institutional change, at least in this case, follows pre-
existing courses of development. That is, to borrow Skocpol's and
Finegold's terminology, institutional change tends to occur where there
is previous institutional capacity. The EOP represented a new institu-
tion, let alone a new institutional form, in only the most artificial
sense. The EOP was constituted from existing institutions (e.g., the
BOB) and crystallizing forms of institutional activity (e.g., the White
House staff). In contrast, the Roosevelt administrations' attempts to
create new coordinative institutions, with the exception of the National
Resources Planning Board, failed before the creation of the EOP.
Thus, in the case of the EOP, institutional change is mainly the
result of changes in institutional practice. For example, the BOB un-
dertook new kinds of governmental functions such as legislative clear-
ance and the evaluation of enrolled legislation that were only distantly
related to its earlier clearance functions. By performing these func-
tions, often on its own initiative, BOB strengthened its position vis a
V1S
.est other government agencies, m particular BOB was able to sur-
vive and prosper because it was able to transform its routines (i e
institutional capacity) to fulfil, the need of the administration and
the new coalition of dominant interests for an agency that would help
™prove the capacity of the federal government to coordinate its ac-
tions. While coordination was not a major policy goal of the newly
dominant coalition, it was a necessary condition of the extension of
federal activity into new policy areas.
CHAPTER IV
CASE STUDY #2: REALIGNMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MlLgjTmeirt_a^^
In this chapter I emphasize the effects of realignment upon the
internal operation of institutions. By doing so I hope to bring into
even greater relief the relationship between changes in political pur-
pose and their institutionalization. The subject is the initial devel-
opment of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). m a strictly for-
mal sense the NLRB was created in 1935 with the passage of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
,
or as it is commonly called, the Wagner Act.
In the half century since its inception, the National Labor Relations
Board has been the central federal institution regulating the relation-
ship between private sector employers, organized labor, and workers
seeking to be organized. It is the NLRB that has primary responsibility
for interpreting and enforcing the provisions of the NLRA and its subse-
quent amendments.^
Indeed, the ongoing development of the NLRB as a governmental in-
stitution parallels the development of both labor law and social prac-
tice. The Wagner Act, as Karl Klare points out, ".
. . was a texture of
openness and divergency, not a crystallization of consensus or a sign-
post indicating a solitary direction for future development."^ The NLRB
would serve as the chief interface between the ongoing social conflict
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over labor issues and the adjustment of those issues within the tradi-
tion of American Jurisprudence. However, the NLRB's capacity to under-
take this mediating function rested upon the evolution of appropriate
institutional practice by earlier labor boards.
While the NLRB-s powers are intelligible in the context of United
States experience with independent regulatory commissions, the NLRB is a
singular Institution relative to the patterns of regulation of the
capital-labor relationship in other democratic nations. In most of
these countries the right to organize and bargain evolved with less gov-
ernment participation. Indeed, as McCulloch and Bornstein have pointed
out, given the United States judiciary's hostile application of the
common law tradition toward labor, any governmental initiative aimed at
rectifying this situation required the creation of a new labor law and a
new forum for its interpretation."^
The NLRB is a singular institution in another sense. The NLRB is
a regulative agency that is mandated to regulate a powerful and consis-
tently opposed party.4 The NLRB has largely fulfilled that mandate.
While the NLRB regulates labor as well as business, the board's primary
regulatory focus has been the latter. The normal history of federal
regulatory bodies has been to reach some accommodation with powerful
interests in the agency's immediate environment. The more powerful the
interest is, the more likely the accommodation will be on terms advan-
tageous to that interest. In a number of cases regulatory agencies have
been "captured" by those interests the agency was designed to regulate.
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That is, the public policy made and/or implemented by captured agencies
primarily serves the end of the
"regulated" interests.
Vet most observers agree that the NLRB has favored the less power-
ful interest in its environment, organized labor, over the potentially
greater power of private business. While it can be argued that NLRB
actions have generally served to incorporate organized labor into a sub-
ordinate position in the United States capitalist syst™, it cannot be
denied that the NLRB has often decided specific issues against the ex-
pressed wishes of the business community. Judgement on this matter is
highly dependent on the choice of a comparison model, whether that be
pre-1930s American practice, current practice in other industrial na-
tions, or a potential form of social relations. Nonetheless, despite
the institutionalization of management-labor conflict since the 1930s,
there remains enormous business hostility to the purposes as well as the
specific application of the NLRA. McCuUoch and Bornstein, writing
nearly a decade ago, said, "Today, nearly forty years after the passage
of the Wagner Act, the Board is required to act as a policeman to halt
patently lawless conduct by parties who only grudgingly obey the law."^
With a very conservative administration in Washington today, the ex-
pressed hostility of some segments of the business community toward
organized labor has, if anything, increased.
Still, the status of organized labor in the United States has
changed radically since the early 1930s. Few observers contend that
organized labor is as powerful as business or the government itself.
Many observers even believe the economic and political strength of
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organized labor is in decline. Nevertheless, it does not seem silly to
talk about "big labor" in the sa.e breath as "big business" or "big gov-
ernment." In contrast, a similar statement would have seemed nonsensi-
cal or at best wishful thinking before 1935. The notion of labor as a
power bloc capable of exercising countervailing power is intelligible
only in the context of the changes in the status of labor following the
realignment of the 1930s.
The changes in the situation of organized labor in the years fol-
lowing the 1932 election were enormous. In 1933 union membership had
dipped to under three million workers, barely 10 percent of the nonagri-
cultural workforce. In 1920 there were over five million unionized
workers who made up 19.4 percent of the nonagricul tural workforce. Most
of this decline took place in the prosperous 1920s, despite the histori-
cal tendency for union membership to grow in prosperous times. To this
1.6 million decline in union membership, the depression by 1933 resulted
in a loss of nearly 500,000 more members. Unionization was largely re-
stricted to the traditional crafts and had only minor footholds in basic
industries. Further, union leadership was demoralized, being primarily
occupied with retaining their organizational bases and fighting over
internal and jurisdictional questions.^ Politically, the labor movement
maintained its traditional posture of non-involvement. Unions had
little involvement in either electoral competition or in most areas of
public policy making.
The New Deal brought a massive change in the status of organized
labor. By 1946 the ranks of organized labor had quintupled to 15
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-llion persons.'
,„ the sa.e year the percentage of workers organized
as eligible under the NLRA, had reached 48 percent.^ Labor organization
became co^on in basic industries, so much so that it is only recently
that there is a general recognition that basic industries are far from
fully organized. Organized labor also became politically active. Since
the 1930s the labor movement has generally been both the largest single
source of contributions for Democratic, particularly liberal, candidates
and extremely active 1n promoting or opposing proposals for public poli-
cy. Labor became concerned with policies that had no direct Impact on
either labor-management relations or the Immediate welfare of union
members.
In particular, organized labor since the 1930s has been closely
associated with the Democratic party, perhaps the most important inter-
est group associated with the party. While labor's ability to mobilize
its members at the polls is questionable, union members, even fifty
years after realignment, are significantly more likely to vote for Demo-
crats than the general population. Of course, some of the most impor-
tant expressions of the changes in labor's status were reflected in
public policy. The passage of the National Labor Relations Act and the
establishment of the National Labor Relations Board are only the most
important of these. However, as will be seen, organized labor played
only a modest role in framing and adopting these policies.
It is unusual for a weak group in the United States to secure ad-
vantageous public policy. In 1933 organized labor was weak in both
numbers and leadership. Given the longstanding hostility of powerful
elements in American society to organized labor, how did such a weak
member of the political community gain such a fundamental improvement in
its status? For fundamental it was, or at least as great a change in
the material as well as symbolic situation of any other social group in
United States history. On one point there is near universal agreement.
Although the unions benefited from the policy innovations of the 1930s,
the unions' role in obtaining those policies was minor. Union leader-'
ship, especially the top leadership of the American Federation of Labor
(AFL), often resisted the attempts of unorganized workers to form
unions. Craft based unions were often more interested in maintaining
the privileged position of their members. ^ If the unions were secondary
and sometimes reluctant participants in their rise to social and politi-
cal power, who were the primary actors?
There are two basic understandings of who was most responsible for
the change in the status of labor in the 1930s and the passage of the
NLRA. One understanding focuses on the role of political elites in
realizing the time was appropriate for change. By 1933 the context for
political action had substantially changed. The composition of both the
government and of the individuals and groups with excellent access to
government had been transformed by two factors: the massive electoral
shift to the Democratic party and the concurrent delegitimation, however
temporary and symbolic, of business leadership. The new leadership
"cadre," faced with the emergencies of underproduction and mass unem-
ployment and less hampered by anti- union ideology, was willing to take
steps that would help to maintain social stability and to increase
P-cduction. Support for unionization In this context
.ade sense both In
ter^s Of Its potential stabilizing Impact on production and consumption
and as a fo™ of symbolic recognition for a constituency of some size
Further, the economic weakness of that constituency, the craft unions
was encouraging them to .ake some efforts toward mobilizing unorganized
workers.
A second approach focuses on the importance of labor instability
especially strikes and disruptions that occurred in either the absence
Of a union or without the sanction of union leaders, m this view, it
was the growing worker insurgency, most of it "spontaneous," that forced
the response of political elites. Indeed the rapid growth of unions
came only after the government conceded that the right to organize
should be protected by state power. When the insurgency ended, despite
the growth of unions, so too did further governmental initiatives to
improve the status of labor.^^ These t.o kinds of understanding are not
mutually contradictory, although to know which understanding is closer
to the truth would provide a valuable insight into the nature of social
change in the United States. The first understanding implies the re-
sponsiveness and perhaps the wisdom of political leaders and institu-
tions given an appropriate context for action. The second understanding
stresses the resistance of leaders and institutions to mass based
change, requiring those seeking change to press their demands in the
most vigorous way possible.
In both these understandings the general public, especially in the
form of an electorate, has a modest role to play in the process of
Change. The puhl^Vs actions a.e viewed as a contextual condition
favon-ng o. discouraging action 5y othe.sj^ Fo. exa.ple, McCulloch and
Bornstein believe that the passage of Section 7(a) of the National In-
dustrial Recovery Act and of the Wagner Act reflected 1n part a gradual
softening of public opinion toward labor that had been apparent at the
t1.e Of the passage of the Norrls-La Guardia Act In 1930. They point to
the growing public displeasure with the federal courts' Indiscriminate
use of anti-strike injunctions in the 1920s. ""^
Although the current basic labor policy and law of the United
States dates back to the 1930s, policy in this area, especially on the
subnational level, dates back to colonial ti.es. Early policy in this
area was unremittingly hostile to labor. Unions were at first viewed as
criminal conspiracies. Later when unions were recognized as legal,
strikes and many organizational activities were still judged illegal.
Before the 1930s, even when the laws were neutral toward labor activity,
the actions of governments were not. Government use of court injunc-
tions, police power, and often military force was blatantly anti-union.
Further, governments on all levels tolerated the use of intimidation and
violence by private parties against workers.
At first federal involvement in labor disputes was undertaken by
the executive and judicial branches. Congress, however, began to enter
this policy area after the Civil War. Initial congressional interest
centered on railroad disputes. Legislation such as the Railroad Arbi-
tration Act of 1888 and the Erdman Act of 1898 were in the context of
the era sympathetic to the interests of organized labor. By the early
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1890s Congress began to consider legislation restraining the use of fed-
eral court injunctions in labor disputes. This policy goal was seeming-
ly accomplished with the passage of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act in 1914
However, the Supreme Court, in Duplex Printing vs. Deering. managed to
render the Acfs anti-injunction provision useless. Congress finally
passed an effective anti-injunction measure, the Norris-La Guardia Act,
in 1930. Even in the anti-labor climate of the 1920s, Congress had
passed the relatively pro-labor Railroad Labor Act of 1926. This pat-
tern of congressional rather than presidential initiative in the field
of labor policy would continue through most of the Roosevelt administra-
ti on
.
There is no evidence to suggest that in 1933 President Franklin
Roosevelt, or any leading figure in his administration, was interested
in using state power to promote labor organization or collective bar-
gaining. While there is ample indication that Roosevelt had genuinely
wanted to improve the living and working conditions of American workers,
his interests seemed to lay in the area of social welfare policy, in-
cluding legislation covering unemployment insurance, pensions, wages and
hours, and the ending of child labor. Roosevelt and his advisors gener-
ally emphasized the potential for cooperation between business and
labor. While this was a pragmatic position in terms of encouraging
economic recovery, this position also reflected the progressive under-
pinnings of much New Deal thought and action. Roosevelt's views were
manifested in his first appointments of officials responsible for labor
policy. The new Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, came out of this
social welfare tradition. Her appointment was opposed by the AFL
mainly because of Perkins' lack of connection to labor leadership'
Similarly, Donald Richberg, a man sympathetic to labor concerns, but
Without close ties to organized labor, was appointed second in command
at the National Recovery Administration. Richberg, the principal author
of the 1926 Railroad Labor Act, supported collective bargaining. How-
ever, he emphasized that his support rested on his expectation that
collective bargaining would encourage cooperation between capital and
labor.
Given the political weakness of organized labor and the lack of
interest on the part of the incoming administration, where did the push
for an explicit labor policy come from? In particular, given that labor
issues per se were not an important element of the Democrats' 1932 cam-
paign rhetoric, how can one claim that there can be an organic relation-
ship between the realignment and subsequent labor policy?
One striking characteristic of post 1932 voting patterns was their
strongly class based character relative to earlier United States elec-
toral alignments. Apparently the strength of this relationship was
strongest in the elections in the decade following 1932 (not in 1932
itself), with a significant and steady weakening of this relationship
after World War II. While the concept of class is defined in a number
of different ways, there is general agreement that unsalaried nonagri-
cultural workers and their families provided an extremely important
source of electoral support for the Democratic party from the New Deal
period to at least the late 1960s. That is, the blue collar voter was
the most important element in the national Democratic electoral major-
ity.
In contrast, the blue collar voter in the 1896-1932 political era
was, at least initially, save in locations with large immigrant popula-
tions, more likely to vote Republican than Democratic. Most observers
explain this fact by noting the various sectional and ethnic cleavages
of the day. The political system was organized to suppress openly eco-
nomic or class issues. ^0 Late in this period of Republican dominance,
the Democratic vote among workers began to increase, reflecting secular
trends such as the growing voting strength of immigrants and their chil-
dren. Concurrently, the sectional conflicts of 1896 were slowly being
replaced by the class related economic and cultural conflicts arising
out of industrialization and urbanization. While the blue collar vote
shifted overwhelmingly to FDR and the Democrats in 1932, so too did the
vote of almost every other identifiable group. Only later in 1934 and
particularly in 1936 did the quasi-class nature of the Democratic coali-
tion become apparent. Yet, through most of the pre-1936 period the
Roosevelt government was sincerely committed to a program of class co-
operation, not class conflict. If realignments are "processes" through
which government policies are readjusted to coincide with putative
majority preferences, then the NLRA should have been passed in 1937, not
1935.
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However the NLRA did pass in 1935. Does this mean there was no
organic relation between the evolution of a national labor policy and
the realignment process? Must one conclude that the NLRA's passage was
a result of political forces unrelated to the realignment? I think not.
Realignments are more than changes in voting patterns and party coali-
tions. Realignments are also a kind of institutionalization of a major
societal debate. As before, I am using the term "debate" as Touraine
defines it. Debates are the "Public expressions of the tensions between
elements of a system
. .
."22 p^^ates do not necessarily refer to ex-
plicit dialogues or overt conflicts. Participants in a debate can speak
and act in ways at least partially unintelligible to other participants.
Indeed participants' actions need not be efforts to communicate; their
actions need only be responses to the tensions embedded in their lives.
As a process involving transformation in agendas, elites, and so forth,
realignments can be viewed as an important stage in the institutionali-
zation of important social debates. As these debates become structured,
first as systems of common discourse and then as systems of social ac-
tion (Touraine uses the terms "discussions" and "deliberations"), it
becomes increasingly possible to initiate new public policies and/or new
forms of institutional activity that in some way respond to the social
tensions expressed in the original and possibly incoherent debate.
The 1896 realignment is often interpreted as a resolution of the
conflict over who would direct the political, social, as well as
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economic development of the United States inu L a s in the emerging age of tech-
nology and industrialization. In short the answer was that large scale
financial capital and industrial capital would remain the main archi-
tects and movers of that development.23 on the surface it seemed that
most workers agreed, but the role of labor in industrial America was far
from settled. While it would be an exaggeration to say that labor is-
sues were absent from the political agenda of the post 1896 political
order, the dominant members of the era's majority coalition were gener-
ally hostile to an economically and politically strong labor movement.
Still, the size and economic importance of the industrial labor
force grew rapidly during the first three decades of the twentieth cen-
tury. Despite the growing weakness of organized labor in the 1920s, the
secular trends that supported the slow rebound of the Democratic party
suggested the fragility of the post 1896 "social contract." The same
pressures that were forcing some sort of new accommodation between capi-
tal and labor in other industrial democracies were also at work, if
somewhat less apparent, in the United States. In retrospect the need
for a new accommodation seems inevitable, assuming the continuation of a
liberal-democratic order. However, the nature and timing of the accom-
modation was not. The debate over the form of a capital-labor accommo-
dation was a long one. Frequently there was no real dialogue, although
there was often intimidation, violence, and other forms of repression.
It was the Great Depression and the rejection of Republican political
leadership that removed the greatest barriers to the clarification and
institutionalization of the debate of the previous half century.
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Earlier I noted two possible explanations for the adoption of a
national labor policy despite the weakness of organized labor. One form
Of explanation centered on the efforts of a reconstituted political and
economic elite willing to negotiate a new social contract to promote ec-
onomic recovery and to make the reforms needed to prevent a reoccurrence
of the Great Depression. The second type stresses the importance of
spontaneous worker action in wrenching concessions from elites. On
their face these explanations may appear contradictory. One could argue
that if mass protest was the crucial factor, then elites made involun-
tary concessions. Similarly, one could argue that if major change
resulted from elite action, then mass insurgency had little positive
effect. Perhaps, given this line of reasoning, insurgency may have been
counterproductive in that it tended to mobilize opposition within the
elite or the public more generally. Yet I would argue that these two
kinds of explanation are not intrinsically contradictory. The actions
of elites and insurgents can have a reinforcing and perhaps symbiotic
impact. As parties in a debate, the various social actors, through
their actions, may have a role in generating responses by other actors
tht would not have otherwise happened.
For example, let us assume that Section 7(a) of the NIRA was in
fact an elite concession that was meant to be symbolic; a sop to workers
or to organized labor intended to get their concurrence with the indus-
trial self-regulation provisions of the legislation. Even if powerhold-
ers regretted the spontaneous wave of labor organization and recognition
strikes that followed, the very existence of these conditions produced a
structure of incentives and penalties that had to be taken into account
in future policy making. Similarly, one could generate a comparable ar-
gument focusing on how elite responses to spontaneous worker insurgency
influenced the future course of labor protest. In fact, this is a
perfect example to demonstrate that a social debate does not require
explicit communication among the conflicting parties.
While I claim that the debate over the need for a national labor
policy can be traced back almost to the 1896 critical election, I want
to focus on the "heating up" of that debate in the period immediately
before the passage of the NIRA. For it is only with the efforts to de-
fine and implement Section 7(a) that the debate over national labor pol-
icy entered into its more explicit and institutionalized forms leading
rapidly to the adoption of the National Labor Relations Act. Beginning
in the late 1920s with the rapid decline of economic prosperity, first
for the worker and only later for the industrialist and financier, the
social debate over labor policy moved to a high level of engagement both
for potential insurgents and for the members of political and economic
elites.
Generally speaking, the Stock Market Crash of October 1929 is said
to mark the start of the Great Depression. However the prosperity of
the 1920s did not come to so sudden an end. Indeed for some groups,
most notably the nation's farmers, there had been no boom at all. For
industrial workers the characterization of the 1920s as a period of
prosperity was more genuine. Still, serious unemployment was apparent
by mid-decade. By conservative estimates, unemployment between 1925 and
unem-
1929 always remained above 6 percent, other observers clai. that
Ploy.e„t 1n this period was always over 10 percent of the workforce In
this sane period Industrial wage levels were stable, despite a signifi-
cant Increase in both prices and productivity. 2"
Despite the fact that organized labor had largely abandoned the
strike as a tactic, and that some industrialists felt that the fear of
unemployment promoted a more docile labor force, there was a marked
growth in labor conflict as the economy declined. Of particular note
was the wave of largely spontaneous strikes in the southern textile in-
dustry, as they demonstrated a new degree of militancy among a formerly
docile workforce. As unemployment grew and the real wages and working
conditions of employed workers declined, the strikes spread to other
regions and industries. As in the case of the textile strikes, the new
strikes were organized by either non-unionized workers or by union mem-
bers against the wishes of their national leaders. Further, advice and
support for these actions was in many cases provided by left wing acti-
25
vists. Left wing participation and/or sponsorship of militant labor
action or of unions of the unemployed had a siqnificant impact on the
labor struggles of the 1930s. Their activism accustomed workers to the
idea and benefits of labor organization as a political and economic
weapon. This helped to undo many workers' education in docility, an
education that had been provided by the official leaders of organized
labor.
The increase in labor insurgency that was well underway even be-
fore the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) was an
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easily observed phenomenon. There was also an increased level of debate
among elites, although the situation is more complex. The proper use of
the term "elite" has been a highly contentious issue in the social sci-
ences. No single formulation of the concept can please all analysts
since all formulations reflect differences over the nature and locati
of power. However, for the purpose of my analysis of the events leadi
to the establishment of the NLRB, I have adopted two working principles.
First, it is useful to distinguish between members of a political elite,
either holding public office or constantly interacting with public offi-
cials, and an economic elite which controls the major institutional
units of a corporate dominated economy. Granted, in a capitalist
society one should expect a large measure of mutual accommodation among
members of the two elites. Yet the degree to which such accommodation
takes place, or that individuals belong to both elites, or that one
elite dominates the other is a matter of substantial empirical varia-
tion.
Similarly, the term "elite" connotes substantial cohesion among
the members in terms of both belief and action. Since no definition of
"elite" requires complete unanimity among members, the pertinent ques-
tion becomes how much community of interest and cohesive action must be
present to refer to an aggregate of individuals as an elite. In prac-
tice I think the following criteria are sufficient: that the members of
an elite have a commitment to an overall pattern of institutional prac-
tice and share a general conceptual and normative understanding of
social life (e.g., "liberalism" in the United States). Of course elite
-bers
.ust hold app.opHate positions of Institutional authority o.
influence. Thus I feel justified In talking about the actions of an
economic elite, or of disputes within that elite, even thouoh Its .e.-
bers nay be substantially divided on specific Issues. These differences
may reflect differences In concrete economic Interests or In partisan or
ideological preferences.
Realignments result in significant turnover in elected officials.
This turnover often includes shifts in the ideological and occupational
backgrounds of officials, as well as changes in partisan identification.
Still this turnover can disguise continuities with the past. The Demo-
cratic legislative gains in 1930 and 1932 meant that the party members
who would hold most committee chairmanships and other leadership posi-
tions would be individuals who came from relatively safe, and in this
circumstance, mostly conservative districts. That is, these congres-
sional leaders would be relatively insulated from pro-labor political
pressure. Nonetheless, Congress as a whole was more Democratic, some-
what more "progressive," and certainly given the dire situation more
likely to accept substantial innovation. Pro-labor members, like Sena-
tor Wagner, would now have much greater access to the President, to much
of the executive branch officialdom, and to the majority leadership in
Congress
.
The 1932 election also brought significant changes in the execu-
tive branch. In the 1920s about 80 percent of high federal appointees
came from high corporate positions or were from families with large cor-
porate holdings. In contrast, this declined to under 50 percent in the
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Roosevelt ad.ins1t.at1on." On a .ore specific level I have already
mentioned that sone key administration officials were concerned with the
status and condition of the working class, even 1f these officials were
at most lukewarm about unionization and collective bargaining.
Of equal importance to changes in recruitment patterns were the
Roosevelt administration's actions to substantially limit the role of
officials and institutions with close representational or constituency
ties to the business community in making or enforcing labor policy.
During the 1920s, the Commerce Department had a major role in this area.
In the 1930s the Department would have virtually no impact on labor
28policy. While this separation was not as clear in the case of the
National Recovery Administration (NRA), the pre-NLRB labor boards were
never placed under direct NRA control. Therefore, while the formal
powers of these labor boards were weak, the boards' administrative inde-
pendence allowed them to openly contest the NRA's attempts to define
Section 7(a) to the advantage of the corporate sector.
The 1932 election, especially in terms of its effect on executive
branch composition, clearly represented an important event. The elec-
tion "gave" institutional power to those elements of a political elite
more sympathetic to a national labor policy. Further, the Roosevelt
government increased the political role of those elements of the busi-
ness community willing to tolerate unionization.
Throughout the post-1896 period at least some business leaders
wanted to reach an accommodation with organized labor. These leaders
hoped business would obtain labor stability in return for relatively
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modest concessions to workers and their unions. Yet the dominant view
of business toward organized labor remained hostile. These views were
pressed forward not only by individual firms, but by trade and peak
(i.e., cross-sector) associations as well. Indeed, some major business
groups, for instance the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)
were organized specifically to combat unioni zation. ^0 The development
of trade and peak associations had been encouraged by the Republican
administrations of the 1920s, which saw in these groups an acceptable
way of promoting the cooperative action needed in a large capitalist
economy. One effect of this connection between these organizations and
the Republican administrations was the largely unsympathetic administra-
tion policy on labor and social welfare issues.
The 1932 election represented a transition in the relation between
the economic and political elite in the United States. Even though by
1932 corporate power was increasingly institutionally rather than entre-
preneurally based, there remained (and still remains) a pronounced cor-
relation between "family" holdings and corporate institutional power.
In the 1896-1932 period, the influence of the "House of Morgan" and
those associated with it was especially great. Phillip Burch contends
that the Morgan financial empire was the single most important political
and economic force in this period, although its power was often con-
tested by other members of the corporate elite.^^ Burch also claims
that until Roosevelt's election in 1932 every elected President back to
Cleveland had been strongly linked to the Morgans.
In contrast, the Roosevelt administration received
.uch of its po-
litical and financial support from a coalition of other powerful family
groups. While this coalition contained long established members of the
politico/economic elite, e.g., the Rockefellers, W. Averell Harriman,
etc., the coalition also included emerging financial interests. Many of
these new "families" (e.g., Lehman, Giannini, Kuhn-Loeb) had little in-
fluence in the previous Republican administrations. In general these
interests believed that their limited access and influence were closely
related to the antisemitic and xenophobic attitudes of much of the old
corporate/banking elite. ^3 while this coalition was only one force in
the new administration, its members' desire to reduce the influence of
the Morgans encouraged the new coalition to be open to policy approaches
that the Morgans and their allies had worked against during the Hoover
administration.
Just as the 1932 election can be seen as a critical point in the
House of Morgan's political decline, so too does that election represent
a moment when the increased economic and political importance of corpo-
rate managers became much clearer. Although the importance of this
trend has been exaggerated, particularly by FDR brain trusters Adolf
Berle and Raymond Moley, the "managerial revolution" required a change
in outlook on the nature of effective corporate practice. For the
shift to greater managerial control promotes a tendency to look at
problems from an institutional perspective instead of from the personal
or entrepreneurial perspectives common to owner dominated firms. Speci-
fically, managers tend to look for institutional rather than personal
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solutions to the problems of labor stability and productivity. Thus
members of the corporate elite who were more fully incorporated into the
managerial ethos found it easier to contemplate and sometimes to support
a national labor policy. High level managers, such as Gerard Swope,
Walter Teagle, and H. I. Harriman, had an enormous influence on the
drafting and passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act, including
Section 7(a).
The National Labor Board and the old National Labor Relations
Board were administrative entities created to mediate or settle disputes
arising out of Section 7(a) of the NIRA. Most observers contend that
7(a) was intended to be a relatively minor part of the Act. That is.
Section 7(a) was aimed at gaining labor support for the seemingly more
important industrial self-regulation parts of the measure and to symbol-
ically demonstrate that the legislation would be of general benefit
rather than a piece of class legislation. Yet the possibility remains
that 7(a) could have been made either stronger or weaker. Therefore, it
is important to ask who was in fact involved in the drafting of the
NIRA.
The Roosevelt administration usually sought information and advice
from diverse sources. Thus, there are a number of accounts about the
importance of various sources of input into the original bill. One ac-
count stresses the role of a group of non-governmental officials, who
can be characterized as members of the corporate elite. Included in
this group were corporate figures such as Bernard Baruch, Swope, H. I.
Harriman, and James Warburg. However, Roosevelt also asked Senator
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Wagner to produce his own version of an econo.c recovery measure, which
given^Wagner-s history would certainly contain a strong pro-labor compo-
nent. In April 1933 Roosevelt was still unprepared to support any
particular industrial recovery plan. However the unexpected Senate
passage of Hugo Black's proposal to li.it working hours to thirty per
week forced the administration into action. As would often be the case,
the administration backed meaningful proposals only to head off more
drastic congressional action.
The composition of the group who wrote the actual draft of the
NIRA suggests the strong corporate influence on the legislation. Of
this group including Moley, BOB Director Lewis Douglas, future NRA head
Hugh Johnson, and Donald Richberg, only Richberg had any real knowledge
of or sympathy toward labor. Further, the strongly corporate stamp of
the NIRA would become clearer soon after its enactment in June 1933.
For example, the NRA Director, Hugh Johnson, had a close professional
association with Bernard Baruch. More significantly, the members of NRA
boards, especially the crucial Industrial Advisory Board, would for the
most part come from corporate positions. Of special note was the role
played by the Business Advisory and Planning Council (BAG). This group,
again composed of members who held important positions in very large
private concerns, was attached to the Commerce Department. BAC's main
purpose was to institutionalize corporate input in the administration
and to mobilize corporate support for New Deal policies. Nonetheless,
there was intense conflict in BAC. This ended with the departure of BAC
members who would have a major role in forming the anti -Roosevelt
Of the corporate elite wini„g to cooperate with (and secure cooperation
fro.) the administration. The ubiquitous Gerard Swope of General Elec-
tric was BAG'S first chairman.
Notwithstanding the corporate sector's dominance of the agency and
advisory boards that would implement the NIRA, the most important actor
1n the drama remained President Roosevelt. On the labor issue, as on
many other controversial matters, FDR avoided giving complete approval
to any single policy approach. Vet his Interest in speeding recovery
resulted In a community of Interest with capital, i.e., those who di-
rectly controlled production. When signing the NIRA into law, Roosevelt
stressed workers' obligations to act responsibly to aid recovery. He
specifically noted that 7(a) was not intended to encourage greater labor
34discord. Roosevelt's actions in the period up to the passage of the
NLRA were generally consistent with this position. Still, Roosevelt re-
fused to interpret 7(a) strictly in business 's short term interest. For
example, the NRA sought industry code provisions, so called merit
clauses, that would either force employees to join company unions or to
refrain from joining unions at all. Roosevelt promptly rejected this
interpretation of the NIRA.^O similarly, while Roosevelt would some-
times overturn the decisions of the labor boards, he resisted pressures
to put the boards under direct NRA authority.
Section 7(a) of the NIRA dealt with three matters: (1) that indi-
viduals had the right to organize and engage thereby in collective bar-
gaining; (2) that membership in any labor organization be voluntary; and
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(3) that enforcement of these rights should be worked out through the
NRA code making process. However Section 7(a) did not deal with these
natters in enough detail so that contesting parties could agree on the
basic intent of the section, let alone its application to specific
cases. As early as June 1933, the NRA argued that labor provisions in
the industry codes did not have to be collectively bargained to be en-
forceable. The NRA quickly began to approve such codes. Only in those
industries that were already strongly organized did the unions have any
real influence over the drafting or implementation of the codes.
Despite this, and the continuing depression, employees in many firms
attempted to unionize. The typical employer response to this wave of
largely spontaneous organization was to refuse to recognize the new
unions. Thus the summer of 1933 witnessed the greatest number of
4 2strikes since 1921. To promote labor peace and to mediate problems
arising out of conflicting interpretations of Section 7(a), Roosevelt
set up the National Labor Board (NLB) on August 5, 1933.
Evolving Practice: The National Labor Board
The National Labor Board and its successor the old National Labor
Relations Board provided institutional settings that allowed the devel-
opment of practices that would ultimately be codified in the NRLA and
the enforcement of that law by the NLRB. Historian James A. Gross notes
the importance of these labor boards when he states.
These boards, proceeding less by ideological premeditation than by
the pressure of circumstances, hammered out the essentials of a
labor policy on a case-by-case basis in a series of turbulent and
dramatic conflicts with employers and unions, President Roosevelt,
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League, the press and thp n»L ? I "f^cturers , the Liberty
In this process, the boards themselves changed as they reciprocally
modified their practices and their understanding of their functions. In
1933 the NLB stressed mediation and generally flexible interpretation of
the NIRA. By 1935, the successor board, the old NLRB, had evolved into
fnUl. ^
9"3sijudicial body of neutrals deciding cases bv settinaforth principles of law, conducting formal hearings issunS rulesand regulations, and requiring legalistic uniformit; In prScedure!44
Roosevelt established the National Labor Board without the use of
an executive order. As such the NLB's powers and jurisdiction were al-
ways in doubt. The board's composition reflected the precedent created
by the World War I National Labor Board. The NLB included three labor
representatives, three business representatives, and a public member.
In terms of purpose and function, the NLB was meant to operate much like
a NRA code authority; that is, to promote government sponsored self-
regulation among the immediately affected parties. The NLB's first
chair was Senator Wagner, the board's public member. The three business
representatives were appointed by the BAC dominated NRA Industrial Advi-
sory Board. The appointees included BAC Chairman Swope, Walter Teagle
of Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Louis Kirstein of Filene's.^^
The original board had only the reputation of its members and the
moral support of the President to persuade parties to settle. The NLB
had no power to subpoena persons or records and witnesses did not testi-
fy under oath. Board procedures were reputed to be extremely informal.
Yet the initial activity of the NLB suggested the beginning of a
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consistent policy approach. Typical settlements provided for an end to
the work stoppage, worker reinstatement, NLB supervised representation
elections, and an employer agreement to negotiate with the elected bar-
gaining agent.
At first glance the NLB appeared to be a major success. In its
first three months the board settled about 90 percent of its cases
through mediation and largely avoided having to explicitly interpret
Section 7(a). Still, the NLB had not intervened in conflicts involving
either large firms or anti-union industries. In particular the NLB had
not yet faced the issue of the legal status of company unions. Further-
more, a number of internal weaknesses were becoming clear. These weak-
nesses included insufficient member time and staff support to handle the
increasing demand for mediation services and problems stemming from the
tripartite structure of the board. To the extent that the NLB's deci-
sions split along industry vs. labor lines, the board was less able to
effectively mediate disputes. Losing parties attacked the board's "lack
of objectivity." While the NLB tried to solve the first problem by ex-
panding its staff and setting up reaional offices, the use of tripartite
boards continued to pose difficulties until the passage of the NLRA.^^
By late 1933 the NLB had moved toward a more uniform and legalis-
tic mode of operation. These initiatives laid the foundation for the
evolution of labor board practice. The reasons for this shift in prac-
tice were in part internal, reflecting the inevitable confusion arising
from the independent activities of the regional boards. However, the
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external pressures toward greater rationalization were far .ore i.por-
tant
The NLB was faced with two problems. First, business opposition
and resistance to NLB decisions was growing. Secondly, the NLB did not
have the power to enforce its decisions. The NLB had to depend on ei-
ther the NRA Compliance Division or the Justice Department for enforce-
ment action. It was obvious by early 1934 that neither of these organi-
zations was willing to help the NLB. Even in the NLB there was a major
conflict over whether the agency should emphasize mediation or attempt
to carve out a more authoritative role in making and enforcing labor
policy. In general this conflict reflected differences in perspective
between the board members and the staff. Board members, "representing"
a constituency from outside the agency, generally wanted their constitu-
ency to retain final decision making authority. This was true for both
labor and business members. In contrast the staff formed a greater
commitment to the activity they performed on a full time basis. They
wanted to be effective. Senator Wagner, as the public member and an
important member of Congress, proved to be the pivotal figure within the
NLB. As he slowly became convinced that the NLB could become effective
only if it operated in a more formal, legalistic way, the staff increas-
ingly acted in that legalistic mode—even though it had no formal
authority to do so.
The NLB's original instructions to its regional boards were to
"... make settlements even though you are told it violates all the
laws of the land, if it meets the dictates of sound judgement and common
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sense
, .
"^^
Regional boards also were directed not to interpret Sec-
tion 7(a) or to determine violations of the law. The NLB would have
exclusive jurisdiction over these cases. Yet the NLB was reluctant to
take on such cases. When, in the Berkley Woolen Mills case, the NLB de-
cided that workers could choose non-employees, i.e., union officials, to
represent them, the decision was seen as pro-union. However the oppo-
site decision would have been seen as pro-business. Any substantive
decision weakened at least one party's perception of the NLB's capacity
to be an objective mediator.^^ While this effect was a result of the
rising level of conflict between capital and labor, the NLB's tripartite
composition aggravated the problem.
In the internal NLB debate over this quandary, the staff led by
its director, William Leiserson, contended that to continue to stress
mediation instead of authoritative action would result in labor settle-
ments favoring the stronger economic party (i.e., usually business).
Their position was confirmed when the business dominated NRA decided to
interpret and enforce 7(a) itself. In general, NRA decisions condoned
the activities of anti-union employers. Both NRA Director Johnson and
General Counsel Richberg announced that 7(a) permitted company unions,
plural representation, and did not oblige employers to agree to any la-
bor contract. Further, the NRA set up local compliance boards in rival-
ry to those of the NLB. Only Wagner's threat to resign from the NLB
forced the NRA to retreat on these issues. Still, the NRA effectively
blocked enforcement of NLB decisions. The NRA either refused to
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prosecute cases or was willinn tn h^w^ 4.u^"""^ ^° ^^^^ those proceedings draq on indefi-
nitely. '
The NLB's weakness became all too apparent in late 1933. In the
Budd and Weirton cases, the employers completely refused to cooperate
With the NLB. indeed, in the Weirton Steel case, the employer conducted
an election for a company union under the company's own direction.
Weirton Steel took this action despite having previously agreed to an
NLB supervised election. Given this challenge, the NLB, through Senator
Wagner, approached the President for a more formal grant of authority.
Roosevelt complied, but in a manner that created further ambiguity about
the NLB's status. Executive order 6511, issued on December 16, 1933,
formally established the NLB and gave it authority over its own proce-
dures and administrative structure. However 6511 gave the NLB no
explicit authority to interpret Section 7(a), nor any authority to over-
see representational elections. Thus, employers interpreted Roosevelt's
order as largely symbolic in intent. In the period between the issuance
of Executive Order 6511 and a second stronger order in February, the NLB
had almost no success in either getting mediated agreements or compli-
ance to previously negotiated agreements.
Nonetheless, at this time the NLB began to conduct most of its ac-
tivity in a quasi-judicial manner. These actions cannot be understood
in terms of any sense of increased authority; 6511 did not provide any.
Instead, there was an increasing public debate over the necessity and
desirability of such power. Wagner did not publicly commit himself to
support of greater NLB powers until after 6511. Anti-NLB organizations,
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especially the NAM, quickly counterattacked. The increasingly formal
operation of the NLB must be understood against its hope that it would
be granted more substantive authority and its realization that the NRA
and the Justice Department would continue to be recalcitrant on enforce-
ment issues. By the end of 1933 Senator Wagner was beginning to prepare
the 1934 Labor Disputes bill with the technical assistance of the NLB
staff. From this time the NLB staff began to mold the agency's prac-
tice to fit the provisions of the draft legislation.
Without formal sanction for its substantive decisions, the NLB op-
erated very cautiously. For example, in the Dresner case the NLB
ordered a representation election. The Dresner Company then obtained a
restraining order from a state court to block the election. The NLB,
believing that it had little chance of winning in a hostile state court,
entered into a compromise agreement with Dresner. The election was
held, but was conducted by a third party under the conditions specified
by Dresner. The NLB made similar compromises in other cases involving
the definition of good faith bargaining and the connection of bargaining
to union recognition. Nevertheless, in this period the NLB worked out
an alternative "labor law" significantly more favorable to workers than
the common law tradition. Gross contends that:
Despite these compromises in pursuit of employer and union coopera-
tion, the board had begun to develop a common law of labor relations
from mid-December 1933 to February 1, 1934 by ruling that an employ-
ee discharged for union activity be reinstated with back pay . . .
that the employee's right to bargain imposed a corresponding duty on
the employer, that the parties approach negotiations with open minds
and exert every reasonable effort to reach an agreement, that self-
organization and representation elections concerned employees exclu-
sively
. . . that strikers be given reinstatement priority . . .
that all strikers be reinstated at the end of the strike when the
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The NLB's inability to get or enforce settlements soon forced it
to seek additional presidential support. In particular, the NRA had
again begun to encroach on NLB jurisdiction. The NRA Compliance Divi-
sion began to hold de novo hearings in cases sent to it for enforcement.
That is, the NRA chose to disregard the case histories developed by the
NLB. Apparently interested in preserving NLB independence from the NRA,
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 6580 on February 1, 1934. This order
was amended on February 23. Executive Order 6580 gave the NLB the power
to make rules for and to exclusively conduct all representation elec-
tions. The order also affirmed the NLB practice of allowing exclusive
bargaining agents based upon a majority vote in the relevant unit.^^
The NRA immediately sought to negate the impact of Executive Order
6580. On February 3, Johnson and Richberg told employers that 6580 did
not prohibit minority bargaining agents or even bargaining by individual
employees. Thus the White House was forced to deal with the new public
conflict between the NLB and the NRA. For the moment, Roosevelt decided
to back the NLB. The February 23 amendment to 6580 explicitly deprived
the NRA Compliance Division of any power to review NLB actions. How-
ever, the new version of 6580 did not settle the enforcement question.
In fact, in the coming labor crisis in the automobile industry, FDR
would retreat from his previous support of the NLB.
The enforcement issue was more forthrightly addressed by Senator
Wagner in the Labor Disputes bill. Introduced on March 1, 1934, the
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legislation provided for a National Labor Board that would have the ex-
plicit authority to interpret the legislation (replacing Section 7(a)),
to issue binding orders, and to enforce those orders through the federal
district courts. 60 After the promulgation of Executive Order 6580
(amended) and the introduction of the Labor Disputes bill, an emboldened
NLB moved further into a legalistic mode of operation and made more
assertive decisions. On April 16, the MLB directed its regional boards
to conduct their business in a more judicial manner. Regional boards
would now be required to collect and use evidence in a uniform fashion
and to maintain complete transcripts of all testimony. In addition
the NLB was no longer willing to compromise its authority. In contrast
to the Dresner case, the NLB insisted that unions elected by a majority
vote would be exclusive agents and that only the NLB could supervise
representation elections. Early 1934 decisions, especially those in the
Denver Tramway and Houde Engineering cases, continued this trend.
However, while the NLB was establishing the procedural and sub-
stantive foundations for the future NLRB, the NLB also faced a crisis
that led to its destruction. By March 1934 Roosevelt had to choose be-
tween actively supporting the NLB or accommodating a major industry.
Roosevelt chose the latter course. This decision was not surprising
given Roosevelt's interest in promoting economic recovery and his normal
caution in acting against the interests of a powerful constituency.
Nonetheless, Roosevelt took a course of action, that according to his
Secretary of Labor, the President would later regret. During 1933 and
early 1934, the United Auto Workers, under AFL tutelage, had organized
184
son^e 50.000 workers. Concurrently, the automobile companies had scram-
bled to set up company unions. In March 1934 the DAW asked the NLB to
supervise representation elections. The companies replied that they
would not allow any election under NLB auspices to take place. The com-
panies also appealed to the sympathetic NRA for assistance. NRA Direc-
tor Hugh Johnson convinced Roosevelt to create an independent labor
board for the auto industry outside of NLB jurisdiction. Further,
Roosevelt directed this Automobile Labor Board to accept the NRA backed
concepts of plural representation and the leqitimacy of company
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unions. Clearly, if the auto industry could get its own sympathetic
labor board, by implication, so too could other powerful industries.
Thus Roosevelt, through his actions in the auto crisis effectively
nullified his Executive Order 6580 of the month before.
The automobile industry settlement and thereby the gutting of the
NLB, severely weakened labor confidence in the government's willingness
to protect workers' rights under 7(a). Indeed, strikes and other forms
of direct action had become increasingly common since the NIRA's adop-
tion. Piven and Cloward claim that Section 7(a) encouraged and legiti-
mized workers' translation of their private troubles into social and
political issues. "Felt grievances became public grievances, for the
federal government itself had declared the workers' cause to be just."^^
By spring 1934, although the government seemed in retreat from its ear-
lier commitment, the government's new policy could not by itself serve
to delegitimate worker grievances. The spring of 1934 witnessed a
massive wave of labor unrest, including the nearly unknown phenomenon of
general strikes. It 1s important to note that these actions were dis-
couraged by the leaders of the AFL and its .ember unions. The protests,
even when union led. were fed by the militancy of rank and file workers!
However the 1934 worker insurgency ™st be understood against the
backdrop Of business resistance to the enforcement of Section 7(a) and
to labor organization generally, as well as the government's failure to
enforce its apparent labor policy. In addition to the general reluc-
tance of business to abide by NLB decisions or mediation agreements and
some businesses' attempts to create docile company unions, during this
period many firms, encouraged or aided by trade associations, took more
direct action to limit the spread of labor organization.
In the late 1930s, the La Follete "civil liberties" subcommittee
of the Senate Education and Labor Committee documented the vast sums of
money spent on anti-union activities. The subcommittee also documented
the use of intimidation and violence against labor, whether directly
conducted by private firms or by public authorities at the request of
6 6business. The public as well as private discourse of some business
interests was brutally frank. During the 1934 New England textile
strikes one trade journal editorialized that, "A few hundred funerals
will have a quieting influence. "^^ No doubt this remark represented an
extreme opinion. Nonetheless, members of the corporate elite sought
armed federal intervention into the large scale labor disputes of spring
1934. During the San Francisco general strike, Hugh Johnson, Cordell
Hull, Homer Cummings, and other high officials with strong ties to the
corporate establishment placed enormous pressure on President Roosevelt
to send troops. Roosevelt refused to acquiesce.^^ indeed, an increas-
ing number of other public officials, on both the state and local level,
refused to use force against strikers-even in situations where the use
of force would have been common before 1932. Clearly, the nature of
permissible governmental action was changing.
Another indicator of the growing intransigence of the business
community was its expressed hostility toward labor leaders and even gov-
ernment officials in the context of official contacts. If hostile
actions are condoned in an official context, there is every reason to
expect even more hostile actions in less public situations. Schlesinger
presents two examples of this phenomenon. He reports that Secretary of
Labor Frances Perkins organized an NIRA code meeting between the presi-
dents of six steel companies and AFL president William Green. Despite
the fact that Green was generally supportive of the industry's draft
code, none of the corporate leaders was willing to be introduced to
Green. They were afraid that simple action, and the public recognition
it demonstrated, would encourage labor organization in the steel indus-
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try. Similarly, during a 1933 visit to Homestead, Pennsylvania,
Secretary Perkins attempted to meet with a group of steel workers. In
this company town, the mayor refused to allow the meeting to occur in
any public facility. Schlesinger properly notes the questionable status
of first amendment rights in such business dominated communities. What
expectation could an ordinary citizen have that his or her rights would
be respected when even a high federal official had problems?^^
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In this situation of increased labor-capital hostility, Roose-
velt's actions in support of the auto industry and the NRA had important
effects beyond weakening the NLB. His actions also implied opposition
to Wagner's Labor Disputes bill, despite the fact that Roosevelt pri-
vately expressed strong support for the measure even after his auto de-
cision. Thus, perceiving a more hostile political situation, Wagner
introduced amendments to soften his bill. The draft measure no longer
prohibited company unions or placed a retroactive ban on contracts that
violated the proposed law.^^ jhe bill was further enervated in commit-
tee. The bill's final version was so vague that almost all members of
Congress and the administration could support it. However, by the start
of June, it was clear that neither industry, organized labor, nor the
press would support passage. The Labor Disputes bill seemed doomed to
failure.
Nonetheless, Roosevelt was convinced by the rising labor insurgen-
cy that the government needed stronger machinery to deal with industrial
conflict. In particular, the threat of a nationwide organizational
strike in the steel industry, and the steel owners' preparations for a
possibly violent response to that strike, moved the President to quick
action. Roosevelt had the NRA draft a measure that would allow him to
create a new labor board with the ability to hold representation elec-
tions. This measure. Public Resolution Number 44, passed Congress in
June 1934 with little difficulty. Supporters of the Labor Disputes bill
had still hoped to get action on that measure, but Wagner decided to
support PR 44 at the last moment. Bernstein reports that Wagner,
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feeling that 1t was no longer possible to get strong labor legislation
the 73rd Congress, thought that conditions for such legislation would
be .ore favorable after the 1934 electlon.^^ ^^^^^^^.^ ^^^^ ^^^^
despite its public silence on the issue, business was generally pleased
by the passage of PR 44. As evidence he quotes the statement of a U.S.
Steel vice-president:
LllTfl^.t t''''^' °^ resolution with equanimity It
Se subsJftuldT.Th''''"'"' ^^^t mo?e tha a'ye r willo bstituted for the permanent legislation proposed t Hn
personal opinion is that U is^^^^ilJI^'o ^b^oih^rTfJeJ;°:uch"^5"^^
This opinion would prove to be wrong (and Wagner's correct) for at
least two reasons. The 1934 election resulted in a massively Democratic
and very liberal Congress. Members committed to social and labor reform
were elected in even traditionally conservative districts. In Zingale's
terminology, the 1934 election was the beginning of the realigning in-
teractive surge that would peak in the 1936 election. That is, while
voting patterns favored the Democrats as they had in 1932, by 1934 one
began to see the electorate unify and divide on the political and demo-
graphic bases that would be characteristic of the coming electoral era.
The quasi-class nature of these voting patterns helped to convince
Roosevelt and his advisors that the President could govern and be re-
elected without the massive support of organized business. Indeed,
there could be partisan benefit to actively strengthening the status of
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organized labor. Much of the administration's legislative activity in
1935-36, the so-called second New Deal, is best understood as an attempt
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by the administration to consolidate and control its left winp support
However, the Roosevelt administration would still not support the Wagner
bill until very late in its legislative history. Secondly, the new
labor board, now known as the old NLRB, took a more activist stance than
might have been predicted when Public Resolution 44 passed Congress.
The old NLRB operated in a fashion that both continued and expanded the
institutional practice originated by the NLB.
Evolving Practice: The Old NLRB
On June 29, 1934, through Executive Order 6763, Roosevelt created
a National Labor Relations Board as mandated by Public Resolution 44.
The Board's powers were comparable to those of the NLB. Still, there
were significant differences in the authority given to the two agencies.
While the NLRB was given stronger authority to conduct investigations
and elections, it was weaker than the NLB in several areas. Executive
Order 6763 did not mention the majority rule principle previously recog-
nized in Executive Order 6580. Further, 6763 allowed the President to
create labor boards for specific industries. This allowed the creation
of separate labor policy for powerful industries. By early 1935 Roose-
velt used this authority, removing the auto, coal, and newspaper indus-
tries from the NLRB's jurisdiction. The Executive Order also estab-
lished a clumsy administrative relationship between the NLRB and the
Labor Department. Further, the ultimate enforcement of the Board's
rulings remained in the hands of the hostile NRA Compliance Division and
the Justice department.
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one genuine innovation in 6763 was that NLRB
.embers would no
longer represent or be selected by constituencies. All
.e.bers would be
-sponsible to the public. As significant, whether by chance or design
was that all three NLRB appointees, Lloyd Garrison. Edwin S.1th. and
Harry Millis, either came fro. legal backgrounds and/or institutional
positions that predisposed the. to favor uniform over expedient action
Garrison would soon leave. He was replaced by a lawyer, Frances Biddle
Given that the old NLRB retained ™st of the MLB staff, there was a
solidification of the prior support for a legalistic approach to labor
policymaking in the "new" organization.
The NLRB soon made its intentions known to FDR and the leaders of
relevant federal agencies. The Board intended to act as the primary
interpreter of Section 7(a), thereby overseeing the activities of its
own regional boards and the special industrial boards. ^ ^^^^^^
Roosevelt in August 1934, the NLRB insisted that,
some'aaInrv'^j°t"h»'r' ™f<"-«d, as it must be enforced,
unset?iBH f t e Government must pass authoritatively upon each
this Board"!' '"^ '^^^ ^'^^ to be the duty of
Of course this position required further deemphasis of mediation activi-
ties.
While the primary activity of the NLRB was to strengthen and
extend the nascent labor law the NLB had created, the NLRB undertook
several organizational reforms to insure that it and particularly the
regional and the special industry boards would handle cases in a legal-
istic manner. The NLRB stopped all mediation activity and limited the
other boards to mediating only those cases in which the dispute did not
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require an Interpretation of 7(a). The NLRB also worked to Insure that
regional boards followed standard procedure and kept c^plete case
records. Eventually this led to a bureaucratization of these offices
as board
.e.bers or staff were restricted to either judicial or adminis-
trative functions. During 1935-36 even the regional boards began to end
their mediation activities. This was only partially a result of .LRB
encouragement. Rather, the end of mediation activities mainly reflected
the increasing hostility between business and labor members of the re-
gional boards. In turn, this trend Increased the NLRB's role in deci-
sion making, since the regional boards were paralyzed by their Internal
conflicts.^^
Still, the real mission of the old NLRB involved the substantive
matter of the evolving new "labor common law.'- Two cases, Houde Engi-
neering Company and the San Francisco Call-Bulletin, demonstrate how the
NLRB extended the practice of the NLB. The Houde case focused on the
substantive interpretation of Section 7(a) of the NIRA. The Call-
Bulletin case, while involving important substantive considerations,
focused on the jurisdictional question. Neither case would be resolved
exactly the way the NLRB wished. This would be impossible until Section
7(a) was replaced by a genuine labor law. Nonetheless, the old NLRB
through its work on these (and other) cases contributed to both the
passage of the National Labor Relations Act and the practice of. the new
NLRB that was formed to enforce the NLRA.
The Houde Enginering Company case involved critical questions
about the nature of representation and good faith bargaining. The case
was first considered by an NLB regional board. That board ordered an
election at the Houde Company. Houde claimed that neither the regional
board nor the NLB had any right to compel the company to deal with a
union. The company also objected to the regional board's order for a
secret election. In a March 1934 ruling, the NLB rejected the Houde
position and subsequently supervised an election at Houde. This elec-
tion, also in March 1934, resulted in the selection of a UAW affiliate
as the bargaining agent. However, Houde still insisted that it had the
right to bargain with a company organization, the Houde Welfare and
Athletic Association, that had gotten about 30 percent of the vote. At
this time the NLB was willing to agree to having plural bargaining
agents in return for Houde dropping its demand to know the identity of
all UAW supporters. However, the union rejected this accord and pressed
its demand for recognition as the sole bargaining agent for the unit.
In the six months prior to the NLRB decision in the case, Houde refused
to seriously negotiate with the union. Houde did negotiate an employee
insurance plan with the Welfare and Athletic Association, although it
never discussed this matter with the union.
As an important case, and as one of the NLRB's first decisions,
the Houde case received exceptionally detailed consideration. Several
years later NLRB Chairman Garrison reported that the NLRB "... devoted
to no other case as much thought and discussion as to this one."^^ In
its August 1934 decision, the NLRB took positions in a form consistent
with a legalistic approach to labor relations and which in turn would
become codified in the Wagner Act.
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that under Section 7 a)
, ^Lp ye^^gamze and bargain collective v ' Lh 7 I ^ '^^^ht to or-
in self-organizatio
'f^r Ihe^^^ '"^ I' ^'J^'t ^'"terferencethat "the right of emoWp. tn • ^P^^ctive bargaining,"'
on the part o? the eZloylr to^,^^^^^^^^^^
' duty
that "without this dutVto barga n ? ^ r aht tn'h
^^P»:^^^"\^ti ves ,
"
sterile," and that "the only ^n?e?p^etat on . ^^''^.r^^^
can give effect to its purpLes is thlfJh^ ^^'^ ^^^"^^
majority should constitntl Jh! ^^e representative of the
gaining'w??h the e:plo^e^ "iS'
'''''''''
'''''' collective bar-
The implications of this decision were obvious to the business
community. If the NLRB ruling in the Houde case could be enforced, then
employers would have to bargain in good faith and in most cases with la-
bor organizations they did not sponsor. The NAM responded to the Houde
decision by telling its members to simply ignore the NLRB. Indeed, NAM
correctly noted that the NLRB's decision in the Houde case contravened
Roosevelt's decisions in the automobile crisis earlier that year. Large
business seems to have followed NAM' s advice in the following months.
In the period between the Houde decision and the NLRA's passage, only 2
percent of the cases that came to the NLRB involved units of over 1,000
employees. After the Houde decision, business members of the regional
labor boards resigned in large numbers. While to some extent the resig-
nations reflected business hostility toward the NLRB and organized
labor, some business members resigned because few serious disputes were
coming to the regional boards.
However, the NLRB's main problem following the Houde case' was that
it was still not able to enforce its decisions. This was true even
in the Board's strongest area of jurisdiction, the conduct of represen-
tational elections. Many companies began to use the court review
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provision of Executive Order 6763 and of Public Resolution 44 to create
delay. These companies understood that the federal courts were unsympa-
thetic to the New Deal. In 1935-36 alone, federal courts issued over
1600 injunctions suspending the enforcement of federal laws and regula-
tions. However, the NRA and the Justice Department remained the most
important institutional centers of resistance to NLRB decisions. The
Justice Department failed to obtain a single favorable judgement in any
of the thirty-three election related cases the NLRB submitted for en-
forcement. This was less the result of hostile courts than of the
Justice Department's unwillingness to prosecute. Similarly, through-
out the period after the Houde decision, the NRA remained hostile. The
conflict between the NLRB and the NRA reached its peak in early 1935
with the San Francisco Cal 1
-Bui 1 etin Case.
The case was brought to an NLB regional board by a former Call-
Bulletin employee who claimed that he was forced to resign because of
his pro-union activities. Soon after, the regional board was incorpo-
rated into the NLRB structure. The Cal 1
-Bui letin claimed that the NLRB
had no jurisdiction over the matter because Roosevelt and the NRA had
given jurisdiction to a different board established under Executive
Order 6763, the Newspaper Industrial Board (NIB). The Cal 1
-Bui letin
also claimed that as a newspaper it served a special public function
that exempted it from most forms of government regulation. The NLRB was
initially reluctant to pursue this case, no doubt remembering the fate
of the NLB following the auto settlement. However, the NLRB finally
agreed to decide the Cal 1 -Bui 1 etin case because of the agency's
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co™it.ent to the pn-„c1p,e of a consistent and rational labo. policy
The NLRB realized that the case would result 1n a direct confrontation
with the NRA, NLRB Chairman Biddle later stated,
Jh^^Sn^^ro%"::^e1u; Zu2ir. ' feltthe air, emphasize the Inconsistencies h» ' ^^owdovm would clear
vagueness of the way labo^S^spJ^er^l^e^^^rrS^^Sfedlis™^^^
In a December 3. 1934 decision, the NLRB defended its jurisdiction
over the Call-Bulletin case and by implication all other private sector
labor disputes. The NLRB claimed that Executive Order 6763 gave it ul-
timate authority over the principles and procedures used by the code
boards, including the NIB, that were outside the administrative control
of the NLRB. While the NLRB acknowledged that it would defer to the de-
cisions of such boards, provided they used correct procedures and inter-
pretations of 7(a); given the NIB's inability to reach a decision in the
Call-Bulletin case, the NLRB would also make a substantive ruling on the
dispute. The NLRB then ruled in favor of the former Gal 1
-Bui letin
employee. The NLRB concluded that the Cal 1
-Bui letin had interfered with
the former employee's right to self-organization under Section 7(a).
The NRA quickly responded to the NLRB's challenge. On December 6,
the NRA asked that the case be reopened. Donald Richberg, now the NRA
Director, supported the Industry position in a confidential memo to the
NLRB. Richberg contended that the NLRB's job was still to mediate labor
disputes in the interest of effecting economic recovery. Richberg went
on to ask for private hearings on the case, insisting that public hear-
ings would make cooperation among relevant government agencies more dif-
ficult. Finally, Richberg visited NLRB offices the next day. He hinted
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that he and Roosevelt had already reached a secret understanding with
the Call-Bulletin and the newspaper industry.
While the NLRB agreed to reopen the Cal 1
-Bui letin case, the NLRB
refused to retreat from its procedural rules, including the public hear-
ing requirement. While the NLRB's toughness in this matter can be in-
terpreted as stemming from its desire to promote its conception of good
labor policy, the simpler explanation is that the NLRB sought to protect
its institutional integrity. This integrity rested on the legalistic
mode of operation developed by the NLRB and its predecessor the NLB.
For reasons that are not fully clear Richberg conceded the NLRB's proce-
dural claims and sent NRA representatives to the public hearings. These
hearings added nothing significant to the case. No new evidence was
presented. As a result the NLRB upheld its previous decision in the
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case.
During the period between early December 1934 and February 7,
1935, when Roosevelt "resolved" the Call-Bulletin problem, all parties
to the dispute attempted to apply maximum political pressure on the
administration. This maneuvering was not limited to just business and
labor interests, but was also rampant within the administration. Rich-
berg continually protested to the White House about NLRB's "arrogant
self-assertion." More substantively, given that the Cal 1 -Bui 1 etin case
did not involve issues touching on representational elections, the NRA
Compliance Division was the agency responsible for enforcing the NLRB
decision. The NRA refused to enforce the Cal 1 -Bui 1 etin decision.
Instead, the NRA raised the level of conflict by sending the case's
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the Illegitimacy of the NLRB's claim of jurisdiction.
The NLRB's attempts to gain presidential support for its Call-
Bulletin decision failed. By late January, Roosevelt took the news-
Paper/NRA side in the conflict. In a meeting with the NLRB Roosevelt
admitted that the Board's decision in the Cal 1
-Bui letin case was the
correct one. Yet Roosevelt also reprimanded the Board for not recogniz-
ing his need for political flexibility in such matters. Roosevelt ap-
parently did not comprehend the internal development of his labor
boards. That is, the NLRB, because of its past practice and its mem-
bers' and staff's understandings of that practice, could no longer shift
easily into a predominately expedient (i.e., "political") mode of opera-
tion. In a January 22 memo to the NLRB, Roosevelt for the first time
denied that the NLRB had any substantive authority over labor disputes
in those industries, e.g., newspapers and automobiles, that he wanted
under NRA authority. At most the NLRB had a right to investigate.
Roosevelt ended the Call-Bulletin controversy on February 7, 1935 when
he dirrected the NLRB not to consider or discuss the Call-Bulletin
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case
Thus by February 1935 Roosevelt, perhaps inadvertently, accom-
plished two things. First, he made clear his willingness to remove any
politically controversial case from NLRB jurisdiction. Second, the NLRB
could consider cases similar to the Call-Bulletin only if the NLRB would
turn its back on the legalistic mode of practice that it and the NLB had
created. The NLRB was not willing to do this. The Board was now
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convinced that it could net get the Roosevelt administration to effec-
tively enforce Section 7(a). But the NLRB's
.e.bers and staff for the
most part remained with the aqencv in hnno ^-pui g y hope of encouraging the passage of
Wagner's new labor bill.^^
On July 5, 1935 Roosevelt signed the National Labor Relations Act
into law. As a result the old NLRB was replaced by a new board with the
same name. The new NLRB would have a strictly
"judicial function and
it would be the primary interpreter and enforcer of the NLRA. In those
cases where the NLRB needed to seek federal court action, the NLRB would
no longer need to use an unfriendly intermediary like the Justice
Department. Further, the substantive provisions of the Wagner Act
reflected, indeed largely codified, the substantive decisions made by
the NLB and the old NLRB in the two previous years.
Of course, the activities of the NLB and the old NLRB did not di-
rectly result in the Wagner Act's adoption. Rather, the NLRA's passage
was rooted in both the alteration of elite members and the growth of
labor insurgency that occurred because of the Great Depression. Even
circumstantial factors played a role in the NLRA's passage. For in-
stance, the Supreme Court's decision in the Schechter case destroyed the
NRA. The decision also invalidated Section 7(a) as a consequence of
voiding the entire National Industrial Recovery Act. The Court's action
forced Roosevelt to consider alternative mechanisms for promoting recov-
ery. In the field of labor policy, this meant that Roosevelt was more
amenable to the passage of legislation, like the Wagner proposal, that
might help to limit the number and severity of strikes that occurred
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around recognition issues. Nonetheless, the experience of the old labor
boards was a relevant factor in the NLRA's passage. Wagner himself
became convinced of the need for a legalistic approach to labor policy
only after seeing the contradictions involved in the NLB's mediation
activities. Indeed the labor boards served as experiments in organiza-
tion, process, and substance. The boards' very existence gave focus to
the debate over labor policy. Congress, relevant interests, etc. could
finally argue about the concrete impact of given principles of labor law
and labor board procedure, instead of engaging in a relatively unfocused
debate over abstract principles. Finally, the modes of practice devel-
oped by the labor boards proved an important resource for the new NLRB
in its initial operation. One could argue that the legalistic style
gave the new board the weapon that it needed to survive the initial
challenge to its existence.
Many observers expected the NLRA to be voided by the Supreme Court
as an unconstitutional expansion of the national government's power.
The new NLRB, relying on the institutional capacity developed under the
old boards, found itself in a strong position to develop a strategy that
would maximize its and the NLRA's chances of surviving the upcoming
court challenge. The Supreme Court decision to uphold the NLRA in the
Jones and Laughlin case was largely traceable to the decision of swing
Justices to make an accommodation with the New Deal. However, the
NLRB's own decision to limit its activities to those disputes that the
NLRB thought were most easily sustainable under past interpretations of
Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce certainly made it easier
for the Supreme Court to render a favorable decision.^^ The experience
of the labor boards proved important to the NLRB in a second respect as
well. While the members of the NLRB board were new, the core staff of
the agency was carried over. That is, the NLRB began with a set of
practices and ideas that were highly developed by past institutional
experience. The new agency did not have to face the constitutional
challenge, or subsequently hostile political interests, without the
benefit of previous institutional 1 earning.
In this chapter I showed how the realignment of the 1930s, through
both its initial electoral surge and its subsequent creation of new
patterns of electoral conflict, encouraged and molded the substantive
and more importantly institutional development of a national labor
policy. I also elucidated how the early labor boards, through their
practice, greatly influenced the codification of United States labor law
and the institutional development of the NLRB.
The critical actions in this process were the NLB's early decision
to adopt a legalistic form of institutional practice and the extension
of that practice in virtually every situation where the labor boards'
power was contested. This developmental path can be understood in part
by the boards' limited abilities to engage in other forms of political
conflict. The NLB and the old NLRB could not successfully compete with
the NRA or business groups for either presidential or congressional
favor. The boards had neither the resources nor the organized constitu-
ency to engage in interest group politics on favorable terms. Further,
as governmental agencies, the labor boards did not have the capacity to
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mobilize worker protest. Indeed, it is likely the boards would have
been su^arily disbanded had they tried. At best the boards could use
worker protest to strengthen their position vis a vis other agencies and
interest groups.
However, the labor boards" inability to win in explicitly politi-
cal contexts does not explain their development of a legalistic mode of
practice. Rather, the boards' actions must be understood within the
general American tendency to disguise substantive political actions as
procedural, especially legal, actions. While in the post 1896 period
this mode of political action had been used mainly and rather directly
for the benefit of propertied and other dominant interests, under the
twin pressures of depression and realignment judicial and administrative
agencies began to use procedural decisions to facilitate new accommoda-
tions between different components of the social order. In the area of
labor relations, the NLB and the old NLRB began this process before the
federal courts. As a result the labor board decisions often seemed to
contradict previous judicial decisions made before the NIRA. Nonethe-
less, the labor boards' decisions were firmly within the new under-
standings of the appropriate forms of judicial action that became domi-
nant by the end of the 1 930s.
Before the 1930s the federal courts maintained a strict ideologi-
cal separation of state and society by claiming that decisions were
essentially deductive applications of the general principles of law. By
the mid 1930s the federal courts, if only to preserve their authority,
began to openly recognize situational, that is, political considerations
in .ak1ng their decisions. The challenge the federal courts have faced
since the 1930s has been to adopt the doctrine of legal realis. in a way
that would be compatible with maintaining the public/private distinction
upon which a capitalist society rests. More cynically, the courts'
function was to find ways to justify state action in behalf of powerful
private interests while protecting those interests from "disruptive-
exercises Of state or state supported power." Klare shows that the
federal courts pursued just this course of action in its treatment of
cases arising under the NLRA. In particular, the federal courts inter-
preted the NLRA in a way that limited the scope of spontaneous worker
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action.
The members and staff of the pre-NLRA labor boards, especially the
old NLRB, were aware of the conflict and gradual accommodation between
the proponents of the legal doctrines of conceptual i st formalism and
legal realism. In general the boards were sympathetic to the aspira-
tions of labor. However when the Boards chose to mold their administra-
tive practice and their substantive interpretations of Section 7(a) in
forms akin to legal practice, they channeled labor conflict in direc-
tions alien to the spirit of the militant labor action that played a
large role in both the adoption of the Wagner Act and its "acceptance"
by employers. As labor conflict became incorporated into a legalistic
mode, procedure became more important than substance and moral rights
became privileges under a statute to be balanced against the rights of
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other parties. The benefits and costs of this structure of labor-
capital conflict have been extensively debated and will continue to be
so. However, the pre-NLRA labor boards' shift to legalistic practi
certainly presaged the federal courts' treatment of labor relations
under the NLRA.
ce
CHAPTER V
CASE STUDY #3: THE 1980 ELECTION AND
THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS
Introduction
The 1980 election, at least in popular discourse, is said to have
had a strong impact on public policy. The commanding victory of an ex-
plicitly conservative Republican presidential candidate, along with the
election of the first Republican Senate ^jority in a generation, is
said to have laid the groundwork for the subsequent major alteration of
the United States government's budgetary priorities. Some attempts, if
not fully convincing ones, were made to show that these policy changes
were a result of a recognizable electoral mandate.
According to some observers, the 1980 election resulted in changes
of the political process as well as of public policy. Many of the cri-
tical policy changes were in the areas of spending and taxation. Simi-
larly, much institutional change occurred in those parts of the politi-
cal process where budgetary decisions are made. Lance LeLoup, examining
the political success of the fiscal 1982 Reagan budget, notes that
".
. .
It appears that the reconciliation bill passed by Congress repre-
sents the first time in budgeting that Congress has really been able to
overcome its decentralized structure and its general pattern of accommo-
dation." While the Reagan "budget blitz" of 1981 was not fully
repeated in 1982, one observer of the process, Richard Cohen, reported
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that the process of institutional change apparent the ,ea. before had
continued.
In a demonstration of how conarp^<;inn;,i nv,^^ a
refined or exercised to sati^fv thi /T^'*'''^" informally
cuts by authorizing committees In addi?Z h spending
Yet even after the fiscal 1983 budget was adopted/ some observ-
ers, including most members of Congress, were not ready to say that im-
portant institutional change had occurred.
packaging scheme has already worn out its welcome and1 arCo^qresswill quickly return to its traditional legislative ways 5
In this chapter I argue the contrary. I claim that the movement to an
"omnibus" budgetary process is permanent, although the eventual form of
that process may be significantly different from the one developed
during the past two years. Nonetheless, that process, whatever its de-
tails, will strengthen the capacities of the Presidency to encourage the
adoption of relatively coordinated public policies in behalf of some
form of national constituency. The basic aim of this chapter is to de-
scribe, explicate, and interpret changes in the use of the Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 toward that end.
Important changes in public policy and, by implication, in the
political process, have been associated with realignments. At present
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^ost 05se.ve.s have not found substantial evidence to support the ,ud,e-
-nt that the 1980 election Is a realignment or represents a major
Change In the Ideological or policy preferences of the electorate «
Still, the 1980 election. In terms of Its apparent Impact upon public
policy, closely resembles previous realigning elections. Walter Dean
Burnham notes that
.
.
virtually without exception, previous policy
Shifts Of this magnitude have been crucial symptoms of critical realign-
ments." Burnham. while not claiming that 1980 Is a realigning elec-
tion, thinks that the Implementation of the Reagan program by Congress
and executive branch action may by Itself reconstitute the structure of
political conflict In the United States.
amorphous but decisive evenrirAmerican do^^^
^^'^
wnicn nas been in the majority in Conqress during the Dreredinnfifty years Accordingly, most voteri may well not have bee In
entf^fface^rAL'ric'a^'o^Uic'i' " ^'^^ ^'^'^^
In this chapter I look at the evolution of the budget process in
1980-82 to describe the character and process of institutional change in
this area. My purposes in doing this are largely conceptual rather than
historical. To the best of my knowledge, conventional journalistic
accounts of this history are accurate. ^ My goal is to use the descrip-
tive material about the budget process to inform my discussion of how
general economic and political forces, mediated by elections, encourage
specific institutional change. This discussion appears in the next
chapter.
Just describing the budget process itself presents a thorny con-
ceptual problem. It is never clear when and where the budget process
either begins or ends. It is too simplistic to say that Congress ever
finishes a budget, whether that is thought of as the completion of all
pending authorizations and appropriations, or since 1975 the passage of
a final budget resolution. Congress may be asked to pass supplemental
appropriations, or contrawise may have committed itself to spending in
future fiscal years. Even if Congress completed all of its budgetary
work by the start of a new fiscal year, significant changes in a budget
can occur through the executive branch's execution of that budget.
While some of these alterations now require Congress' approval, deci-
sions taken on either the presidential, departmental, or agency level
can significantly change the actual use of public resources. Any number
of events beyond the control of government officials (e.g., recessions,
natural and military emergencies, etc.) can change the actual patterns
of government activities. Nevertheless, there still is value in using
the standard conceptualization of the budget process, if only for its
familiarity. That is, the budget process is divided into three basic
components; the formulation of a budget proposal within the executive
branch, congressional action on that proposal, and finally the executive
branch's implementation of the congressional ly approved budget. While
there is considerable and increasing overlap among these components.
they can be thought of as occurring in roughly sequential order. In
theory, each component takes approximately one year to finish.
While changes can happen in all three parts of the budget process,
I li-t my examination of budget process changes to the first two compo-
nents of executive formulation and legislative action. I do not look at
budget implementation because, in part, it is still in process (at the
time Of writing) for the first two Reagan budgets. Further, the loca-
tions of budget execution decisions are multiple. Therefore it is dif-
ficult to separate technical fr^m political considerations in any budget
changes that take place. Finally, I believe there is a certain elegance
to stopping my examination at the adoption of a formal budget by Con-
gress and the President. This budget can be viewed as a basic statement
of the government's priorities and purposes, one that is more important
than other "statements" in that it ties tangible resources to intended
goals and has been approved by both "political" branches of the national
government. Certainly this statement is in reality something of a fic-
tion. However, the status of the implemented budget as a statement of
governmental intent is far from dubious. The alterations that are made
in the congressional ly passed budget occur in a highly privatized poli-
tical environment and are thus produced by "subversions" of the more
legitimate modes of public policy making.
Even within the two remaining segments of the budget process, exe-
cutive budget formation and congressional action, the problem of priva-
tization affects the attention I choose to give to different aspects of
the process. Regrettably, I give more attention to congressional
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action. I say
.eg.ettably because a knowledge of EOP Interactions with
bureaucratic agencies constitutes as important an aspect of the budget
process as EOP or departnient/agency interactions with Congress itself
While I look at so.e material on budgetary politics in the executive
branch,
.y largely journalistic data is far ™re complete in regard to
relations between the Presidency and Congress and those internal to
Congress.
Yet there are some positive aspects to this necessary focus on
congressional action in the budget process. First, the action is rela-
tively public. Therefore participants' interpretations of electoral
forces are more likely to be an important consideration in their ac-
tions. Second, if it is true that Presidents, provided they can reason-
ably claim coattails, find that they can build partisan coalitions on
Issues In Congress, then Congress will be an important location of any
effective efforts to change either budgetary process or priorities.
Beyond the obvious fact that Congress is in part organized on a partisan
basis, and that Congress must pass or appear to pass (i.e., continuing
resolutions) a "budget" for the government to operate; the legitimacy of
fiscal decisions made outside Congress is still generally questionable.
This was demonstrated by the political conflict, litigation, etc. that
followed Nixon's attempt to make major changes in the budget through
strictly executive action. Clearly, if President Nixon had a fairly
disciplined congressional majority, opponents of Nixon's budgetary
priorities could not have as effectively used the potent claim of ille-
gality against Nixon's policy changes.
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In any case Congress is presently a very attractive setting for
studying alterations in the budget process. One unintended product of
Nixon's efforts to remake the budget through executive action was to
encourage Congress to reassert its formal authority over spending. The
Single most important act in this reassertion of congressional power was
Congress- passage of the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
This law was aimed at two problems. The first problem involved the
regularization and limitation of executive activities in the implementa-
tion of the budget. I discuss this aspect of the Act only in passing.
I focus most of my attention on the new budget process that Congress
mandated in the 1974 Act. Nevertheless, this process did not emerge
from the 1974 Act fully developed. As Allen Schick points out, "Since
1975, Congress has been making budgetary war and peace within the budget
process it established in previous years. "^^ My focus will be on the
evolving use of this process from the initial use of the reconciliation
process in 1980 through the beginning of the 1983 fiscal year. While
artificial in a budgetary sense, this timeframe encompasses the politi-
cally relevant period of the 1980 election campaign through the Republi-
can setback in the 1982 midterm election.
To identify changes in the actual practice of the budget process
it is useful to establish a baseline for comparison. The basic process
and timetable set forth in the 1974 Budget Act serves this purpose. In
the years since the passage of that legislation Congress has more or
less followed the specified process, at least in its broad outline,
every year. While a number of observers have argued that the process
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^ad only
.a.g1„al effects on gove.n.ent spending untn the f1.st „se of
-conciliation In 1980, It Is Important that Congress
.ade
.eal efforts
to ab.de by at least so.e of the fo™al requirements of the Budget Act
Congress might sl.ply have Ignored the process In the same way It Ig-
nored those provisions of the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act re-
quiring the Appropriations Committees to coordinate spending through the
use of an omnibus appropriations blllj^ th1s change In congressional
behavior suggests that by the .Id 1970s members felt growing pressures
for at least the appearance of spending control.
Pre-1980 Practice of the Budget flrt
Before the passage of the 1974 Act, the congressional ly approved
budget was basically an abstraction. That Is, the "budget" was the to-
tal of appropriation measures and of backdoor spending mandated for the
coming fiscal year. Backdoor spending refers to spending resulting from
authorizations alone, for example entitlements, contractual authority,
and guaranteed loans. Indeed part of the pressure for budget reform is
traceable to members' concerns with the increasing percentage of federal
spending that was beyond the control of the yearly appropriations pro-
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cess. The procedures set up under the Budget Act gave Congress the
potential of creating a true budget document, one that despite its in-
evitable ambiguities in a world of uncertain revenues and spending com-
mitments could be a cohesive statement of national priorities. The law
also authorized the institutional resources needed to carry out the bud-
get process. It established standing Budget Committees in both houses
Of congress and a pe^anent budget office to provide Congress with an
-dependent analysis of the P.esidenf s budget and tax requests.
The 1974 Act gives Congress a roughly nine
.onth period to pass a
budget before the start of the new fiscal year on October 1. This ti.e-
span is somewhat artificial. Budget Co..1ttee staffs in both houses and
the congressional Budget Office (CBO) anticipate the new presidential
budget proposal for months before the start of the for^l budget cycle
After the end of the formal cycle Congress
.ay still be involved In the
passage of supplemental appropriations. The congressional budget
cycle is divided into four basic stages: (1) the preparation of a non-
binding first budget resolution by the budget committees, (2) congres-
sional passage of the first budget resolution, (3) committee and con-
gressional consideration and action on appropriations bills (concurrent-
ly the budget committees are preparing their versions of the second
budget resolution), and (4) the passage of a second budget resolution
and the adjustment of spending bills to this resolution.
The first stage of this process begins with the President and OMB
submitting the proposed executive budget with an estimate of the future
cost of current levels of government programs and activities. The CBO
is required to evaluate the accuracy of the economic assumptions, reve-
nue projections, and program costs included in the presidential proposal
and to report its conclusions to the budget committees by April 1
(although In practice the CBO reports in February). Meanwhile, other
congressional committees are expected to submit their own budgetary
estimates and views to the appropriate budget committee by March 15.
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The Budget Co^Utee 1„ each house reports the f,>st hudget resolution
to Us parent body by April 15.
Congress is expected to pass a first budget resolution by May 15
It is important to note that this concurrent resolution contains more
than a total limit on spending, m addition to the total spending lim-
it the resolution must specify expected revenues, all new budget author-
ity and outlays, projected surpluses or deficits, and debt authority.
Further, this specification must be made within functional categories.
At present there are nineteen of these functional areas. Originally the
first budget resolution was meant to provide general guidance on spend-
ing rather than impose definite legally or politically binding limits.
The Budget Act also requires that committee reports on new authorization
bills be finished by the same May 15 date.
While the Budget Act did not explicitly alter past congressional
practice in the third stage of the process, committee and floor consi-
deration of spending bills, the Act implied two forms of constraint.
The first constraint was the limited time frame imposed by the four
month separation between the first and second budget resolutions.
Appropriation committees and subcommittees would have far less time to
complete their business. Second, though the functional targets speci-
fied in the first resolution were not legally binding, the fact that
Congress as a whole had already recommended a general apportionment of
federal funds before Appropriations Committee action had taken place
suggested that those committees would have less autonomy than in the
past. That is, any member of Congress who was unhappy about major
Changes f.o. the fi.st resolution 1„ an app.opHations Ml, reported to
the floor could argue that the Appropriations Co^lttee had frustrated
the will of Its parent body.
The last stage of the mandated budget process is the passage of a
second concurrent budget resolution and the adjustment or reconciliation
of spending measures to its terms. While it is clear that the second
budget resolution was meant to be binding, Congress did not fully pro-
vide the machinery needed to accomplish this task. Congress, through
section 311 of the 1974 Budget Act, did rule out the passage of new
legislation that would raise spending above or reduce revenues below the
levels specified in the second resolution. still, the original pro-
cess required completion of spending legislation before the adoption of
the second resolution. This appears to mean that reconciliation could
take place within rather than after the second resolution. Given the
small amount of time Involved, It is likely that either of two things
could happen. First, the Budget Committees could incorporate all of the
bills passed by Congress into the second resolution. In this case the
Budget Committees would exercise little or no Independent judgement,
thereby acceding to the largely uncoordinated requests of other standing
committees. In this circumstance the budget process would be largely
ornamental. The second basic option was for the Budget Committees to
report a resolution embodying the committees majorities' perspectives.
While this course allowed the Incorporation of some spending not antici-
pated in the first resolution. It is still likely that there would be
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™Jo. differences between the
.epo.ted second
.solution and the actual
spending bills passed by Congress.
mentioned above. However, neither of these options 1s binding upon
Of binding budget resolutions. While this provision was Intended to le-
gn,.ate necessary spending co™it.ents ™de after the adoption of the
second resolution, the provision could also be used to resolve differ-
ences between a second resolution and actual spending. Functionally,
this is really a variation on the theme of incorporating all of the
spending measures already passed into the second budget resolution. The
Act provides another option in section 310. During the period between
the adoption of the second resolution and the start of the new fiscal
year the Budget Co^ittees can ask their parent bodies to amend legisla-
tion already passed to bring spending and revenues in line with the
second resolution. This is the essence of the Idea of reconciliation.
Yet this optional reconciliation procedure technically must take place
in a mere two weeks. Obviously the short time available mitigates
against the use of section 310, even in the absence of political opposi-
tion (an unlikely event in any case). In initial drafts of the 1974
Budget Act. the first budget resolution was binding. Tt,1s would have
allowed a longer period to accomplish reconciliation, provided the poli-
tical will to accomplish it was present. Thus the Innovative use of
reconciliation In 1981-82 had been anticipated years before by the
drafters of the Budget Act.
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There is a consensus that the process established by the 1974 Act
had little impact on the substantive content or size of the federal bud-
get before 1980. Have.ann points out that the budget's rate of growth
remained about the sa.e and that there were no .ajor changes in spending
patterns. He also judges that the President's budget remained the
most important determinant of discretionary federal spendingj^
to substantially agrees with Havemann's assessment of the budget pro-
cess. Ippolito also notes that the Budget Committees had not yet carved
out a truly independent legislative role. "Both committees are, in
truth, adding-machine committees that take the demands of spending com-
mittees and impose as much restraint on them as the current congression-
al mood allows. At most the congressional mood in the 1975-1979
period supported modest budgetary restraint, whether restraint meant ex-
penditure control or the coordinated setting of governmental priorities.
Schick succinctly explains why the process tended to continue old
priorities and to lead to higher expenditure totals. The targets set by
the first resolution were widely viewed as budgetary floors rather than
ceilings. Thus the targets served to institutionalize existing spending
patterns, especially those in policy areas where there were strong con-
stituency oriented coalitions. Schick quotes one close observer of
budgetary politics as saying,
.
.
-/ecipients of federal funds ... are going to expect the full
amount of the ceiling. And the pressure will build against the
Appropriations Committee, and the appropriations process, not toprovide less than the ceiling. My point is that lobby groups,
organizations, associations, people who represent other people withhuman needs, are going to figure out how to get up to that ceiling,
and then they re going to figure out how to bust the ceiling 20
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Thus a kind of symbiotic relationship developed between the Appro-
priations and Budget committees. By establishing targets the Budget
committees made it politically easier for the Appropriations committees
(especially the House committee) to pursue their traditional role as
guardians of the treasury. Appropriations committees could turn down
requests from authorization committees and/or clientele groups, noting
that they were but enforcing the Congress' will as expressed in the
first budget resolution. However, as long as the Budget committees were
unwilling or unable to enforce their targets, the Appropriations commit-
tees were still able to reward those constituencies they or their sub-
committees supported. The Appropriations comr^ittees also appreciated
the implications of targets for potentially limiting the growth of back-
door spending. Generally, the Appropriations committees do not like
backdoor spending because it falls outside their jurisdiction.
The Budget committees were the weaker partner in this relation-
ship. This weakness resulted as much from the structure and jurisdic-
tion of the committees specified in the 1974 Budget Act as from the
optional nature of the reconciliation process. Nonetheless, the Budget
committees, when conditions were favorable, attempted to increase their
influence over budgetary decision making. In addition, the character of
the Budget committees' accommodations and initiatives differed between
the House and the Senate. The separate histories of the two Budget
committees had a definite imprint on the evolution of the budget process
in the 1980-82 period.
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Standing committees derive much of their power from the stability
of their membership and their control of an area of legislative Juris-
diction. While these factors do not ensure that a committee will have
its way on the floor, any committee without these resources is at a
severe disadvantage. Yet members' terms are limited on the Budget com-
mittees, there is less opportunity to accrue power through seniority.
The committees also work with the disadvantage of having some of their
members appointed as representatives of other standing committees. A
particular Budget Committee member may see himself as a representative
of the Appropriations Committee or one of the revenue committees.
Another area of difficulty has been the Budget committees" lack of
a distinct committee jurisdiction. The Budget committees must deal with
the entire range of govenrment activity; hence, it is far more difficult
for their members to obtain deference on the basis of presumed special-
ized knowledge. In theory the Appropriations committees have a similar
problem, but they surmount it through their direct control of spending
and a well developed subcommittee structure. Thus the Appropriations
committees can develop and reward patterns of strong clientele and agen-
cy support. This option is largely denied to the Budget committees.
Their mandate is inevitably to limit not to enhance the normal congres-
sional practice of logrolling in support of particul arl i stic interests.
Therefore the power of the Budget committees is dependent on their
ability to link their interests to those of a stronger partner. For ex-
ample, I discussed the patterns of accommodation between the Budget and
Appropriations committees before 1980, a pattern that still favored
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particular interests as long as they had strong ties to the Appropria-
tions co™ittees or their subcommittees. Expenditure control or the
transfor,.ation of national priorities requires an exceptionally strong
coalition concerned with the overall character and impact of government
policy. The mst obvious ally in this regard is the White House/OHB.
Still the administration is often an ally of limited value since it does
not want to alienate the members of other comittees. This was certain-
ly the case in the 1975-80 period. However the changing political and
economic environment of the late 1970s and the turnover in government
personnel following the 1980 election established the preconditions for
an effective coalition between the Presidency and the Budget committees.
Nonetheless, if there is going to be any Institutionally based en-
forcement of the congressional budget procedures, it will have to come
mainly from the Budget committees themselves. Some observers believe
that the committees have been ineffective in their enforcement efforts.
In their opinion the analyses provided to Congress by the Congressional
Budget Office have furnished the only real check, stemming from the 1974
Act, upon presidential or congressional committee efforts to increase
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spending. Yet there is counterevi dence that suggests the Budget
committees made progress toward defending budget targets even before
1980. This was particularly apparent in the Senate where the Budget
Committee developed a bi-partisan consensual approach to its functions.
On several occasions the SBC went to the floor to oppose legislation
that exceeded budget resolution targets. The committee's success on the
floor has been mixed. The SBC was more effective to the extent that it
could define issues in procedural rather than substantive ter.s. This
suggests a high level of ne.ber support for the ideal if not the actual-
ity Of coordinated budgeting.23
^^^^ occasionally able
to use procedural considerations to get the Senate to enforce the
committee's views on substantive matters.
In the House of Representatives, the Budget Committee generally
sought to avoid conflict on the floor. HBC members have preferred to
reach accommodations with other standing committees, accommodations that
were usually weighted in favor of well organized interests. The HBC, in
the
1 975-80 period, also developed a highly partisan style. Co^ittee
decisions, staff activity, etc. followed strict party divisions. This
operative style was also apparent in floor consideration of the budget
resolutions. Again voting patterns were highly partisan, far more so
than in the Senate. However it can be argued that this pattern basical-
ly reflected the already high level of Republican cohesion in the
24House. The net result was that in a highly contentious partisan envi-
ronment the HBC limited itself to private deals on substantive matters
and only went to the floor to defend the integrity of clearly formal
aspects of the budget process. These issues were few, but on these
issues the HBC had good success. jhese patterns of committee behavior
and relationships with their respective legislative bodies were to have
an important bearing on the development of the budget process in later
years. When the SBC adopted the so-called fast track approach in 1981,
its actions were intelligible within its past activities and traditions.
Similarly, the passage of the Gramm-Latta substitutes in the House is
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more fully comprehensible given the highly partisan tradition of budget
conflict in both the HBC and the larger body.
Given that Congress, under relatively little presidential pres-
sure, had begun to develop practices of coordinated budgeting before
1980; it is important to note that institutional change in this area
should not be thought of only in terms of the relative balance of presi-
dential against congressional power. Too often the budget battles of
1981-82 were described simply as the Reagan administration's victory
over the old line Democratic congressional leadership who were committed
to spendthrift practices and moribund programs. While there is some
truth to this characterization, it distorts the nature of the changes
that occurred in budget practice and politics. This is because most
analysts sought to understand events mainly in terms of the actions and
motives of the individual participants. Should Ronald Reagan or some
future president fail to obtain his budgetary program, those who under-
stand budget outcomes mainly in terms of circumstantial or personal fac-
tors will conclude that the events of 1981-82 were ephemeral occur-
rences
.
Yet such conclusions may be wrong. If the reconciliation process
should remain in use, or the traditional expectations and operating pro-
cedures of congressional committees, bureaucratic agencies, and interest
groups remain different from their pre-1980 patterns, then one can rea-
sonably claim that significant institutional change has taken place.
Therefore, an examination of the budget process during the 1981-82 per-
iod must deemphasize circumstantial factors that perhaps made budget
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process changes appear .ore revolutionary than they actually were. A
greater focus on Institutionally based change, both 1„ procedure and
outlook, will help to dampen the extre.es of judgement that often flow
fron, descriptions and explanations that restrict themselves to indivi-
dual behavior and motivations.
It is here that realignment theory is most helpful, providing a
Plausible explanation for discontinuities in institutional structure and
practice. However, the value of realignment theory rests on the pre-
sence of two conditions aside from institutional change. First, there
must be evidence that social and economic tensions have led to the in-
stability of preexisting electoral and coalitional patterns. Second,
there must be evidence that election results encouraged political lead-
ers to make innovative responses to political instability in the inter-
ests of some identifiable political coalition.
1981: Presidential Centralization
While I cannot prove that recent changes in budget practice and
expectations are permanent, I will argue this by examining the intelli-
gibility of events within the terms of the impact of the economic stag-
nation of the 1970s upon the emerging political discourse of the 1980s.
Although this examination will be presented in a largely chronological
manner, the actual sequence of events is not of primary importance. I
believe a chronological presentation is the most straightforward way to
elucidate the connections among changes in institutional practice in
several related but conceptually independent areas, e.g., presidential-
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congressional relations, presidentifli ,no„ , .
.
idential-agency
relations, interest group
-tivity, internal congressional operation, and so forth. Above all
else I a. interested in the question of whether the relative decline of
the importance of particularistic power centers, for instance suhgovern-
ments, in the budget process is indeed a permanent one.
There is widespread academic agreement that both political acti-
vists and the general public judge presidential performance largely on
how well or poorly the economy is doing. The executive budget proposal
gwes the President a forum to make economic predictions and to proclaim
his administration's ideas on how to maintain or restore prosperity
through the activities and the levels of spending and taxation recom-
mended in the document. Despite this, and the Carter administration's
support for the first use of the reconciliation procedure, a thorough
pre-election analysis of Carter's performance failed to mention any of
his activities in the budgetary field. This analysis reflected the
realities of a fragmented policy process often dominated by particular-
listic coalitions. Thus it focused on legislative success and failure
in separate issue areas.26 Nonetheless, both Ronald Reagan and Republi-
can congressional candidates, individually and collectively, made exten-
sive use in their campaigns of the theme of alleged Democratic fiscal
irresponsibility. The fullest disclosure of Republican plans to re-
evaluate the whole budget was put forward by the Reagan campaign on
September 9, 1980. Reagan asserted his support of supply side inspired
tax cuts and his desire to reduce total government outlays by 2 percent
in each of his first two years in office." Given that Republicans
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usually ™n on the Issue of controlling Vunaway" federal spending, the
Reagan statement was seen as
.a1nly symbolic, despite the changing poli-
tical atmosphere of the late 1970s. However after the election the
incoming administration began to act to exploit the changed environment
Shortly after the election, the Reagan transition team began to
take substantive action on three fronts; generating a new budget pro-
posal for fiscal 1982 to replace the one that the lame duck Carter
administration would submit to Congress in January, discouraging the
cooptation of new agency leaders by their employees and the constituen-
cies their agencies serve, and preparing for the use and strengthening
Of the reconciliation process in Congress. Much of the initial budget
and tax planning was carried out by two of Reagan's principal pre-
election economic advisors, Caspar Weinberger (who headed the budget
transition team) and George Schultz. Both of these men were familiar
with past budgetary practice. Both had served as 0MB Director in previ-
ous Republican administrations. Weinberger's and Schultz's efforts were
aided with staff and input from a number of sympathetic organizations
including conservative think tanks, like the American Enterprise Insti-
tute, a House based task force headed by future 0MB Director David
Stockman and Phil Gramm, and perhaps most importantly the Republican
staff of the Senate Budget Committee. The Republican SBC staff prepared
a detailed report on possible cuts that more than any other document
laid the basis for the specifics of the Reagan budget. The budget
transition team also had an opportunity to plan major revisions in the
225
1581 budget. The 96th Congress adjourned without appropriating
.one.
for numerous agencies Including four departments.^^
Nevertheless, the Incoming administration was hardly of one .Ind
as to What needed to be done. There were proponents of three major pol-
icy approaches to economic problems. At times the President-elect
seemed to agree with all three groups, although to some extent the three
approaches were contradictory In their expected affects. Reagan and his
chief advisors settled the conflict by avoiding It. They rationalized
that the counterlmpacts of each approach would be minor. To begin, they
decided to give each faction In the administration control of one policy
area or track of its own. Those who most feared the impact of large
federal deficits on private investment were to be satisfied by the
efforts to control or cut non-defense spending. The monetarists were
satisfied by the incoming administration's strong backing of the tight
money policies of the Federal Reserve Board. Finally, the supply siders
were given their due with the three year tax cut plan.^^
Yet It would be unfair to say this exercise in conflict contain-
ment was simply a new application of particularistic politics. The
Reagan people claimed, at least publicly, that all three of these poli-
cies would have reinforcing effects. Spending control and tax cuts
would release private Investment capital to promote economic growth.
The expected growth would generate additional revenue which, hopefully
by 1984, would make up the deficit that would initially be caused by the
tax cuts. Similarly the tax cuts, by allowing more investment out of
current Income, would more than make up for the discouraging effect of
h^gh interest rates on investment. Vet because high interest rates
would tend to dampen the high inflation rate, economic recover, would
take Place without a .ajor inflationary spurt. This was the rationale
l>eh,nd the incoming administration's
"riverboat gamble." However flawed
this plan might prove to be on reflection it- h»H = u' nectio , it had a cohesiveness not
often seen in American economic policy.
It is however one thing to make plans and another to achieve them
To effectively control spending the administration had to limit the
usual scope of the particularistic politics so typical of American gov-
ernment. This involves not only the problem of constraining the actions
of legislatures and constituencies, but also the problem of controlling
one's own bureaucracy. However dubious one may be about how cohesive a
philosophy informed the Reagan administration's economic proposals; it
is clear that the administration acted in a rapid and coordinated fash-
ion to gain unusual control over the federal bureaucracy.
Most incoming presidents announce that the Cabinet will have a
greater role in making major decisions than in the previous administra-
tion. Then things return to normal. The President develops close ties
with members of the so-called inner Cabinet, i.e.. the heads of depart-
ments such as Defense. State. Justice, and Treasury that have important
coordinating functions. Other Cabinet members become immersed in the
constituency oriented politics of their home departments. While the
inner/outer distinction was again replicated in the Reagan adminis-
tration, the administration initiated a new pattern of White House rela-
tionships to the outer Cabinet and other agency heads reminiscent of the
pattern that was developing in the Nixon presidency. These relation-
ships stressed effective control. 'The Reagan White House has shown
What it means by "Cabinet Government.' It has imposed discipline akin
to that of a military chain of command.
The immediate reason for imposing tight control on agency heads
was to keep new appointees from forming alliances with agency staff and
constituencies as long as possible, at least until initial budget deci-
sions were made. Senior Reagan advisor Ed Meese was the principal ar-
chitect of administration efforts in this area. He designed the transi-
tion operation so that major appointees would learn about their agencies
mainly from conservative task forces rather than from agency personnel.
In many cases sub-Cabinet agency heads were assigned deputies with close
ties to the White House in order to set up a parallel chain of author-
ity, bypassing, if needed. Cabinet officials who might choose to act
independently of administration wishes. Meese also went to great
lengths to insure that Carter holdovers were encouraged to leave prompt-
ly. One result of this was that many sub-Cabinet posts were empty when
Reagan entered the White House. Yet this too served to weaken the
ability of newly appointed agency heads to understand the full implica-
tions of the proposed spending cuts.^^
In the first days of the administration, Meese and 0MB Director
David Stockman developed another technique to enforce budgetary re-
straint on agency heads. They formed a budget working group for each
department to review possible cuts. Members included the relevant
Cabinet member, Meese, Stockman, and a number of other officials. As
stockman late, pointed out, the membership of the groups were stacked to
enforce the presidential perspective. Cabinet secretaries had to fight
for their budget and program against a roomful of opposition. While a
few Cabinet officers were able to salvage some of their losses through
private negotiations with the President or later congressional action,
the working groups generally resulted in acquiescence to White House/OMB
views. 32 These working groups were eventually institutionalized in the
form of several "Cabinet councils," again reminiscent of the Nixon ad-
ministration innovation of the Domestic Council. Still the new councils
could not provide the administration with the same leverage as the ori-
ginal budget groups. Agency officials, by then, had become socialized,
and perhaps co-opted, to their agency's environment
.
The Reagan administration, by its actions to insulate agency lead-
ers from their agencies and usual constituencies, weakened the potential
strength of interest groups in the coming budget struggle. For the same
reasons the White House also directed 0MB to ignore the requests of some
interest groups for either information or negotiation over specific pro-
34grams. Indeed the White House and 0MB hoped to create a public
perception that sacrifices would be required of all, not just the poli-
tically weak. In this, the administration was trying to do two things.
They were trying to focus budgetary discourse in terms of what could be
called broad or public interests in a national economic emergency. Not
only did this language make it somewhat harder to raise specific inter-
ests, more importantly it justified the administration's delay or avoid-
ance of negotiations with affected groups over budget details. Second,
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this language provided a .oral posture that the administration hoped to
use to mobilize public support. Stoctan's statement to WilHa. Grelder
IS typical of this discourse.
ents";"*'''?h??elr ofTh^l^rf "-^ cll-
attack wea clients Je LI h ''^^ ""1
powerful c^^lllTlnu wea " a ^s M rtha;^""^-j"^ ''''''
success-both political and economic success!'?'
''^''"^ '°
While the initiatives outlined above, if successful, would weaken
the ability of interest groups to press their budgetary claims, the Rea-
gan administration would still need active support to persuade Congress
to adopt its budget and program priorities. Toward this goal it would
be helpful to have substantial interest group support. Thus the Reagan
administration needed to mobilize some interest groups support in terms
Of general economic goals as well as discouraging action in support of
particular government benefits. Given the nature of traditional coali-
tional patterns, the most obvious source of potential support was the
business community. Indeed, that community has been so important a
source of Republican financial support that if the Reagan administration
failed to mobilize that support on the budget and tax Issues, there
would be much less incentive for Republican members of Congress to sup-
port the President.
As a group the leaders of the business community were aware of the
increasing disjunction between the demands placed upon government and
the resources available. Essentially, they had already convinced them-
selves that the general weakness of the economy overrode the value of
the specific government benefits they received. However, the matter
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goes deeper. Earlier I noted that government policies, whether in ter.s
of spending or revenue production, can be divided into two basic kinds.
Some policies promote profitability, others can be viewed as state ef-
forts through either the carrot or the stick to maintain order and legi-
timacy. Relatively speaking the business community has little direct
stake in what O'Connor calls legitimation. Rather they are more con-
cerned with the nature of policies intended to aid capital accumulation.
While the upper levels of the business community could be and in large
part were persuaded to accept some reduction in specific benefits in re-
turn for tax breaks, reduced regulation, and if federal spending was
controlled, the hope of lower interest rates in the future; there was no
problem in mobilizing them against what from their point of view were
excessive expenditures for social programs. Riven and Cloward take this
line of argument one step further with their claim that the administra-
tion and its business supporters hoped to improve profitability by such
actions. That is, reductions in social programs would mean a more inse-
cure and thus docile labor force. In turn this would be translated into
lower labor costs.
Not only was it in the administration's interest to encourage
business support, but to do so in a way that would lessen the bargaining
power of specific firms and industries. Coalitions of interest groups
perform this very function by encouraging their members to reach some
accommodation with other member having somewhat different interests.
Such accommodations are needed before common action can take place. In
the case of the business community, coalitions must be formed by members
of different industries. Otherwise the m.int.-.f b , coalitions remain trade associ-
at.cns seeding
.e.y specific policy ends. The Reagan administration was
fortunate In that this sort of coalltlonal behavior was heco.ing en-
trenched before the 1980 election. In oart thi. h.hi p s behavior was a response
to the increasing Internal fragmentation of Congress during the 1970s
as co^lttee chairs^ prerogatives were limited and the number of subcom-
mittees expanded.37 Nonetheless some of these groupings were already
organizing around general economic concerns. For example, one such co-
alition, known as the Carleton Group, formed In 1978 to push for the 10-
5-3 tax plan. One of Its organizers, Charles E. Walker, headed Reagan's
tax advisory group for the election campaign. The Reagan administration
would effectively use such groups and more formal organizations, e.g.,
the Business Roundtable and the United States Chamber of Commerce, in'
the following months. The White House even appointed a special assist-
ant, Wayne Vails, whose main job was to coordinate those actions.
Apparently, previous administrations had not placed a high priority on
similar efforts.''^
The third element In the old structure of logrolling politics was
the most Important. No matter how much the administration succeeded in
limiting the pressure put upon Congress by either constituency groups or
bureaucratic agencies. Congress still had the final say in basic spend-
ing and taxing decisions. However, the 1980 election resulted in a con-
gress that in its Ideological makeup was sympathetic to Reagan's con-
cerns on the tax and budget Issues. Legislative success was mainly a
matter of creating the Incentives necessary to maintain the Ideological
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™Oon-t. 0. Republicans and conservative Oe.oc.ats. Schlc. su.™n.es
administration thinking on this point as follows: "P™. the outset the
had to get the marginal member on his slde."^^
The notion of what constituted a marginal member was somewhat dif-
ferent for each house of Congress. While there was a clear Republican
n-ajority in the Senate, and several senators who attributed their elec-
tion to the Reagan landslide; the body had a tradition of bipartisan
accommodation on budget Issues. The Institution also had a more liberal
approach to spending than the House, often acting as a "court of ap-
peal" on such matters.^ The administration's goal was to achieve
greater voting cohesion among Republican members. The basic strategy to
achieve this had two elements. First, the administration sought to re-
enforce the widespread perception that the electorate had demanded
spending restraint and tax cuts. Second, the administration hoped to
rapidly move its budget cuts through the Senate as a package. At least
at first, the new Senate Majority Leader, Howard Baker, saw his job
primarily as a presidential agent. His chief goal was .
. to mobi-
lize the Senate into an Instrument of presidential power. ''1 Baker,
along with SBC Chairman Pete Domenici and Stockman, sought to establish
politically strong budget targets even before the passage of the first
budget resolution.
They agreed that Reagan's election mandate and the unexpected GOPtakeover of the Senate gave Republicans a rare and probab" brief
opportunity to implement their campaign promises of paring federal
spending and the size of the bureaucracy.
. . . By compress Ino thebudget cuts into a single bill and a short time-span fheThoped
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mar-
they could hamstrina the intprpci-
targeted for cuts and
..uTZllZTol lZTel".VTS.ir'
Th,s agreement was the beginning of the so-called fast track strategy
With the Democrats 1n control of the House, the nature of the .
gmal
.e.ber there was different. If the Reagan administration could
get Republicans to vote as a unit, the administration would only need to
Pick
„p Just over fifty Democratic votes to win. Thus there were two
problems, maintaining control of Republican votes from relatively liber-
al districts in the Northeast and Midwest and picking up the necessary
conservative Democrats, who were mainly from the South. Even before the
1980 election. 95 percent of House Republicans were voting against the
HBC budget resolutions. Similarly many of the conservative Democrats
had already voted against their party leadership on budget Issues during
the same 1975-80 period.^ I„ the previous Congress. Phil Gra™, had al-
ready begun his pattern of active budget cooperation with the Republican
.embers of the HBC.^^ Thus the administration strategy was based on
encouraging existing voting patterns and „«k1ng those acco-odations
necessary for victory. It turned cut, at least for spending issues,
that neither the Gypsy Moths or the Boll Weevils extracted much in the
way of concessions.^^
Besides their emphasis on their electoral mandate, the Reagan ad-
ministration found other ways to increase the pressure on Congress.
They made effective use of congressional campaign contribution disclo-
sures, both for informational purposes and to mobilize pressure from
campaign contributors. The President also made effective use of the
inherent difficulty that Congress faces in drafting coherent legislation
0. its own. While cla1.1„g to hold out the hand of cooperation to Con-
gress. Reagan continually stressed that his budget had to be passed
because there was no real alternative to it other than profligate spend-
ing. The effect of these persuasive efforts was all the greater given
the increasingly grave economic situation and the electoral instability
demonstrated the previous November. Although the House incumbency rate
was still nearly 91 percent, this seemingly impressive figure hid a
trend that could strike terror into the hearts of ™st public officials
Traditionally, the surest way to be reelected was to stress constituency
relations and service. This had been particularly true in the 1970s.
Often members could turn marginal districts into safe ones by following
this formula. Yet by 1980 this route to a safe district seemed less
certain. For example, seventy-five new Democratic House members were
elected in the 1974 post-Watergate election. Of the 74 who ran for re-
election in 1976 only 2 (3 percent) were defeated. Because m.y of
these members came from marginal districts, they devoted substantial
effort to constituent service. Normally this would be expected to
strengthen their electoral prospects, but in the 1980 election 9 (16
percent) of the 57 remaining members of the 1974 cohort were defeated.''^
Thus, the Reagan administration, claiming a mandate, had the advantage
of an unusually fluid electoral situation in which to influence the
Congress
.
While the strategies the administration and its allies used to
accomplish reconciliation in 1981 were different in the two houses of
Congress, both strategies accomplished the same goal. "The aim of
-conciliation Is to dete. challenges to Individual spendin, cuts by
packaging the. In o.n1bus legislation.
,„ both the House and Senate
the 1981 use of reconciliation Involved
.edifying the precedents estab-
lished 1n 1980 to the political circumstances of each body. The
.ost
^portant of these precedents was the inclusion of savings taroets for
all functional budgeting areas in the first budget resolution. Although
there is some doubt about the substantive effectiveness of this require-
-nt in 1980, it established the principle that standing committees had
to alter their work to fulfill at least the formal requirements of the
budget resolution. On paper Congress made about 8.3 billion of the 10.6
billion dollars of savings and revenue Increases mandated by the first
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resolution. Congress also gained some experience with the unwieldy
conference procedure necessary to implement the reconciliation process.
On the other hand, attempting to avoid lobbying and electoral pressures,
Congress delayed work on reconciliation until after the November elec-
tion. This placed Congress and the Budget committees in the familiar
bind of having most of the spending legislation already a fait accompli.
This is one reason that Robert Hartman claims that the 1980 reconcilia-
tion procedure had disappointing results. He also contends that many
committees were able to meet targets by shifting fiscal 1981 spending to
future years. Because of this, these conmittees were able to both
abide by reconciliation and to protect favored interests.
Thus the Reagan administration's major task was to find ways to
make the budget targets stick. Previous congressional practice had been
to "hold" the total spending figure to that specified in the relevant
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budget resolution. The nineteen factional targets were largely ig-
nored. even 1n the binding second resolution.^^ However, since 1977
House Republicans had sought to maintain fi™ li.lts on functional to-
tals after the passage of the first resolution. It was this idea of
reconciliation that would prevail in both houses of Congress in 1981,
although In a more flexible form in the Senate. Indeed by the starf'of
the 97th Congress both Democratic and Republican members of the Budget
committees were actively looking for support for various proposals aimed
at converting budget resolution targets from pliant floors into Impreg-
nable ceil ings.
The path toward adoption of a strong reconciliation measure in the
Senate was a relatively smooth one. This was largely attributable to
the Republican party's majority status, which besides ensuring the votes
in any strictly partisan showdown, gave the administration effective
control of the budget process. The Senate tradition of bipartisan bud-
get action also had a reenforcing impact. Democrats did not feel an
immediate need to frame a partisan alternative and could expect some
accommodation to their individual needs. The SBC passed a resolution
containing reconciliation instructions by March 23, even before it began
formal consideration of the first budget resolution. The vote was 23-0.
The Democratic minority voted for the final version of the resolution;
their support was viewed as
. . an admission of Reagan's popular-
ity. "^4
Substantively the resolution meant approval of almost all of the
administration's specific program and spending cuts. The resolution did
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not add new spending. This reconciliation
.easu.e. S Con Res. 9. also
di-cted specific spending c.ts and changes In current laws to both
authorization and the Appropriations co^lttees. as well as establishing
binding functional targets. Further, co™ittees were expected to .a.e
mandated cuts for fiscal 1982 and 1983. The SBC expected that this
™it,-year procedure would overcome the 1980 proble. of co™ittees In-
validating cuts by
.aking future spending co»1t.ents. However the SBC
resolution, while reco^endlng specific progra. cuts, allowed co™,1ttees
to n,ake their own final decisions on progra. reductions provided the
co™ittees regained within their allot.ents.55
^he SBC and the majority
leadership also .ade It clear that they would take vigorous action on
the Senate floor to enforce reconciliation.
Enforcement proved unnecessary In the Senate. By late March, SBC
Chairman Domenlcl received general commitments from all other committee
chairmen that they would abide by the SBC targets 1f they were adopted
by the whole Senate. 57 s. Con. Res. 9 was adopted on April 2, 1981,
four days before the SBC began Its formal consideration of the first
budget resolution. Only two minor flaps developed before the final
passage of the omnibus reconciliation bill on July 31. 1981. A number
of SBC Republicans, worried about the size of the Impending deficit,
joined with the Democratic minority to defeat the administration backed
version of the budget resolution. The Republicans were brought back in-
to line by Stockman's "magic asterisk," the promise of unspecified
future budget cuts to make up for some of the revenue shortfall expected
from the Reagan tax package. Potentially more serious were the
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™n,bl1„gs out Of senate Appropriations Chai^n Mar. Hatfield, who was
promoting the view that the budget targets could not be binding. „e
strongly objected to authorization con™ittees
.aking cuts that hereto-
fore were in his con^ittee's jurisdiction.^S
^his potential con-
flict had no immediate bearing on the passage of the reconciliation
-asure, it proved significant in later ™„ths. m both the Senate and
the House, the Appropriations Committees would be major sites of opposi-
tion to the budget process.
There would be no fast- track strategy in the House of Representa-
tives. In addition to the fact that the Republicans were the minority
party, there was a history of partisan budget conflict in the institu-
tion. Further, the 1980 election produced an unusually strained atmo-
sphere in the House. The Republican party, violating congressional
norms, had made a concerted effort to defeat members of the Democratic
leadership. 59 Thus the Reagan strategy was to try to form an ideologi-
cal coalition to defeat any budget alternative the Democratic leadership
might suggest and then to pass and enforce the administration's own pro-
gram.
The Democratic leadership understood, because of their safe major-
ity on the HBC, that they could report to the floor nearly any budget
resolution they chose. They also understood that the administration
would be much stronger on the House floor. Therefore the leadership,
and in particular HBC Chairman Jim Jones, were willing to include large
budget cuts in the draft for the HBC report for the first resolution.
The HBC mark included slightly higher total outlays than the Reagan
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budget, but the
.ark had a lower target for defense spending ^0
Democrats also see.ed to be leaning toward loose enforcement of the
ultimate budget totals. Further, the Democratic leadership did not
believe that the Reagan administration would be able to so effectively
constrain the operation of subgovernments. Early in the 97th Congress
the Nationaijournai reported that Jones was conducting extensive nego-
tiations With interest group leaders. These discussions were aimed at
fashioning a compromise budget plan that would cut the budget's growth
on terms as acceptable as possible to those groups.^l clearly Chairman
Jones still believed that interest groups would retain their previous
political strength.
The HBC reported a first budget resolution that was essentially
the Jones mark. The enforcement provisions of the draft resolution were
similar to those adopted by the Senate. Authorization committees were
given both overall targets and suggested cuts. Again, the targets were
binding, but the committees had the option of deciding the spending
levels for specific programs. However, while the legislation included
provisions to block the final passage of appropriations and other spend-
ing that would surpass either the functional or total limits; there was
no provision for a mandatory omnibus reconciliation bill.^^ ^^^^^^^
of this provision became a major procedural issue in the House. The
Republicans and the Democratic Boll Weevils sought a single up or down
vote on all reconciliation issues. They expected, as it turned out cor-
rectly, that adjustments in behalf of their favored constituencies could
be accomplished through conference committee action. The Democratic
leadership, co-ittee chairman, and ™ch of the
.an. and file, wanted
the flexibility to protect constituencies that a separate reconciliatio,
vote on each functional area of spending would allow.
The conservative coalition won the first crucial budget vote in
the House on May 7 with the victory of the Gra™-Latta substitute over
the HBC's first budget resolution. The weakness of the Democratic lea-
dership^s position became apparent some days earlier with the approval
of most of Reagan's recissions for the 1981 budget and the failure of
fo^erly effective agencies, like the m and the SBA, to get expected
levels of interest subsidies for their loan programs." Gra^-Latta I,
beyond the substantive adoption of the Reagan budget, required an omni-
bus reconciliation procedure and that co™,ittees spell out specific cuts
and program changes in their reports. Like the HBC resolution, Gramm-
Latta's suggested cuts were not binding upon committees. The legisla-
tion also for the first time extended specific reconciliation instruc-
tions to future years, applying to entitlements as well as discretionary
spending.
After the passage of Gramm-Latta as the first budget resolution,
the HBC made a genuine effort to enforce the substitute's provisions. A
stringently worded directive, prepared by HBC member Leon Panetta (D,
Cal.), specified the limits on committee autonomy in the reconciliation
64process. Generally speaking the authorization committees complied
with the formal requirements of Gramm-Latta. Yet these committees made
enough marginal changes so that the HBC's reconciliation report greatly
resembled its version of the first resolution. Although these changes
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were Ur.e^y
„a.,1„al. the
.ea,a„ administration claimed that the House
also calmed that some of the House cuts were n,uso.,. Rea.an himself
led the public attack, claiming ^ . . the.e Is now a clea. danger of
congressional backsliding and a return to spending as usual At the
same t1.e Stockman and the 0MB staff were working with Gra™ and Delbert
Latta to prepare a substitute for the HBC's reconciliation report.
Meanwhile the House Democratic faithful were finding It difficult
to work together in defense of "their" reconciliation ^asure. This was
so for a number of reasons. Many of the party leaders were unwilling to
lead a frontal assault on Reagan's budgetary priorities. Instead they
tried to attack on the arcane issue of the faulty economic assumptions
that informed the Reagan budget." Further, most House De^crats, espe-
cially the committee chairmen, were deeply committed to protecting the
Interests of the constituencies and agencies they had worked with for
years. Had the Democrats been willing to take an all or nothing vote on
the HBC's reconciliation measure they most likely would have been able
to avoid its defeat by the second Gramm-Latta substitute. Members of
the HBC understood this. But Speaker O'Neill decided to support a more
flexible enforcement of targets and therefore separate votes on each re-
conciliation issue. The Speaker's approach prevailed over that of HBC
members Jones and Panneta.^^ In 1980 the leadership had found it diffi-
cult to overcome the resistance of the authorization committees to the
reconciliation procedure. To contain such intra-party conflict in 1981,
O'Neill and Rules Committee Chairman Richard Boiling assured several
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chai™e„ that the leadership would not allow reconciliation without
votes on cuts In each functional area or In so.e special cases for spe-
cific progra. cuts. In Its reconciliation report, the Education and
Labor Co™nttee stated that O^Nelll and Bollinc, had ,1ven an absolute
guarantee that separate votes and floor amendments would be allowed "9
On June 26, 1981 the House rejected Its
.ajorlty's reconciliation
package and accepted the Gra^-Latta I, substitute. Fron, a procedural
standpoint the ™,ost critical vote taken was the 210 to 217 defeat of the
Rules Committee's motion to allow separate votes on some of the spending
cuts. As such Gramm-Latta II was accepted on what was functionally a
closed rule. Most House members had received the details of the substi-
tute mere hours before the vote. Thus the House accepted the spending
cuts negotiated between the substitute's sponsors and 0MB and thus Ig-
nored the decisions of its own committees. Another result of Gramm-
Latta II was that the single up or down vote served to protect some
generally unpopular programs from the budget knife, e.g., the Clinch
River Breeder Reactor and the Infamous sugar and peanut support pro-
grams. These programs were either not funded or funded at a lower level
In the HBC's reconciliation measure.™ The results of the reconcilia-
tion conference were almost a foregone conclusion. When Congress com-
pleted final action on reconciliation on July 31, 1981, the final mea-
sure, even in its details, was remarkably close to the proposals the 0MB
sent to Congress the previous March.
Congress also passed the Reagan tax plan in late July. On the
surface the plan's adoption seems to contradict the claim that the
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administration had effectively H.ited the play of constituency po,1-
t-s. G,ven the competition between the White House and the Democra-
tically controlled Ways and Means Committee to each claim that they were
-sponsible for the tax cut, large tax concessions were made to certain
interests, Stockman noted. "The hogs were real ly feeding. The greed
level, the level of opportunisn,, just got out of control. Yet .ost
Of the political science literature on tax politics In the United States
stresses the role played by peak or quasi-class organization in this
area of explicitly redistributive policy making.'^ what happened was
that the White House, in the tax bidding war. lost full control over the
massive corporate coalition it had helped organize early In 1981 around
the budget and tax issues. The business coalition, so Important as a
revenue source for Republican candidates, took advantage of its central
role in administration lobbying activities. That is. the coalition
members did some lobbying on their own behalf as well as for the econom-
ic recovery program.
Business organizations and corporations greatly extended the rearh
CO ressionan'M^'h" ''''T. ''''''' Phone bankfto ca(cong ssional) embers and by urging their members and employees to
?h.t ;h ^"''P^JSn
contributors reminded Members-gently or forciblyt a they wanted a pro-Reagan vote. 73 ^ ^
""^ r iDiy-
Thus corporate business reaped benefits as a quasi-class through rela-
tively unified action. On the other hand, subgovernmental effectiveness
has usually been greater in the area of distributive politics, that very
area typified by budget outlays and authority. A Congressional Quarter -
ly Weekly Report study of so-called sacred cows noted that while almost
all of these programs survived the budget ax, most received substantial
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funding cutbacks.'^ Wh1,e so.e of the political weakness of Interest
groups can be attributed to the speed at which the political env1„
changed and the slowness of non-business Interest to copy the coalltlon-
al efforts of the business com^nlty, even In the second year of the
Reagan administration the basic question asked to organizations Inter-
ested 1n legitimation policies would remain, "What are you willing to
give up?"''^
Those unhappy with the substance of the fiscal 1982 budget and the
movement of effective political power to the Presidency in the 1981 bud-
get process had two basic options open to them in the coming year. They
could try to reassert the old pattern of committee/constituency/agency
domination of a segmented budget process. Opponents could also adopt
more centralized strategies, particularly ones focused on political
party leadership, broad interest group coalitions, and so on. Depending
on their preferences and political circumstances, opponents could use
this second approach to either frame and then press for the passage of a
budget alternative or to seek a compromise with the administration.
These courses would necessitate other steps to strengthen the influence
and cohesion of the Democratic congressional party.
Dennis Ippolito, in an analysis of the budget process written be-
fore 1980, stressed the relation between weak legislative parties and
the lack of incentives to engage in some form of coordinated budget
76
action. The events of 1981 demonstrated the obverse. Although
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congressional Republicans had long tended to act
.ore cohesively than
Den^ocrats. 1„ 1981 the Republicans would
.Intain al^st total sollda.-
on final budget and tax votes. No doubt this solidarity was built
in part out of so.e circumstantial factors, e.g.. the perceived elector-
al mandate and the large number of newcomers without entrenched consti-
tuency or agency ties. Nevertheless, while this solidarity weakened in
1982, the Republicans still maintained a very significant level of cohe-
sion on critical votes. In contrast. Democratic efforts to respond to
the "Reagan Revolution" were initially made on the basis of their tradi-
tional decentralized practices. I have already noted the Ineffective-
ness of these practices in the struggle over the adoption of the 1981
Reconciliation Act. While these practices were to prove slightly more
effective in the fall 1981 battle over appropriations, the Democrats
would in the following year increasingly turn to more coordinated action
on fiscal Issues. Despite the fact that the substantive aspects of the
budget and tax measures passed in 1982 largely reflected administration
priorities, the efforts that congressional Democrats made to achieve
greater party cohesion demonstrates that the political context arising
out of the underlying economic crisis provided more rewards for coordi-
nated action and the serious use of the budget process than incentives
to return to pre-1980 modes of decentralized and segmented political
action
.
The limitations of the constituency oriented approach were most
fully demonstrated by the administration's victory in the series of con-
flicts over the appropriation of money for the fiscal 1982 budget. The
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es in
Reagan administration was under increasing pressure fro. its alH,
the financial and corporate communities to contain the growing size of
the federal deficit. To deal with this problem, Reagan announced in
September 1981 the necessity for greater government austerity. He asked
for $13 billion in non-defense spending cuts. $3 billion in so-called
revenue enhancers, and the limitation of certain entitlement benefits.
This last proposal was quickly withdrawn because of a highly negative
public reaction. Reagan also said that he would veto any appropriation
that was larger than his March spending requests, even if that spending
was provided for in the Reconciliation Act. Despite this obvious chal-
lenge to Congress' actions, the President hoped that the Appropriations
committees would maintain their past practice of lowering authorized
spending
.
However the members of both Appropriations committees, particular-
ly those in the House, were feeling increasing resentment about their
limited influence in the evolving use of the budget process. While
Senate Chairman Hatfield agreed that there was a need for a strong re-
conciliation process, he suggested that reconciliation take place only
after the consideration of an omnibus appropriations bill. House Chair
Jamie Whitten also supported late reconciliation after final appropria-
tions action. He hoped that this would restore his committee's previ-
ous, and to him legitimate, authority over spending matters. However,
Whitten still insisted on separate appropriations bills. This position
reflects the strong ties between organized constituencies and members of
the House committee. These ties are traditionally among the strongest
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in Congress because they rest on thp Ann • •y e Appropriations Committee's accep-
tance of highly autonomous subcommittees.
The App^pn-atlons co™ntees. again especial,, the House co™it-
tee. drafted a nu.be. of appropriations bills that differed fro. the
conciliation targets. This reflected the power of so.e organized in-
terests and the efforts of the
.epuhlican
.,,ps. moths'' to protect their
electoral base in the industrial North. However, the sli. margins of
passage for the HUD and Interior ^ney bills
.ade it clear that the
eventual Reagan vetos would be sustained.^« As a result the 1982 fiscal
year began without the final passage of even one appropriation. Con-
gress passed a continuing spending resolution, followed by a second in
late November. Because continuing resolutions maintain the spending
patterns of the previous year's budget, Reagan, unhappy about the bal-
ance between domestic and military spending in the continuing resolu-
tion, vetoed the November measure. Most of the government had to shut
down until congress hurriedly approved a continuing resolution more to
Reagan's liking.^^ After this event it should have been clear that the
overall power of constituency oriented political action had declined
significantly. This was true even though Reagan's own popularity and
perceived effectiveness were also declining. The conflict over appro-
priations and continuing resolutions also represented a transition to a
de facto omnibus appropriation. Most of the government would operate
through the entire fiscal year without Congress' approval of specific
funding measures.
°'
^'^^ ^ong.ess. constituency oHented
ccnutees would stil,
.es1st the centralization of decision
.Mn, on
budget issues. However.
.0. the
.ost pan this resistance would pas-
s-e. Before 1981 co^lttee
.embers' specializations usually enhanced
their power, both In their o» co-lttees and In the larger institution
Beginning In 1981. specialization would prove to be a two edged sword.
Richard Cohen reports that members' oast rpii;,n.oiciMuerb p reliance on committee centered
patterns of action
.ade 1t .ore difficult for ™ny
.e.bers to perceive
the new realities of their institutional environment. Members' old
political habits and loyalties also lessened their capacity to engage in
forms of inter-committee cooperation and coordination not based on
logrolling.80
,„ December 1981, the House Budget Co™lttee asked the
other standing committees to submit by March 15, 1982 detailed comments
on the administration's fiscal 1983 budget request and the committees'
own proposals for alternative spending or reductions. The HBC's goal
was to use this infomation to construct a coordinated and politically
attractive Democratic budget proposal. However, most authorizing com-
mittees did not submit reports and those who did were unwilling to state
specific recommendations or budget targets. ^1 in the absence of consen-
sus among the Democratic leadership, the House again adopted an adminis-
tration Inspired budget substitute in June. As a result, the House
authorization committees were locked out of the decision making, process
for the second straight year.
Once again In 1982 the Appropriations committees made the most
active assertion of committee power in the budget process. The most
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notable instance of this assertion ca.e duHn, the House's consi deratio,
Of e,ght different versions of the first budget resolution on May 27
1982. Although none of these resolutions passed at that ti.e, all were
aniended at the insistence of Chair^n Hhitten to void the "deferred en-
rollment" provision (section 311) of the Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974. That is, even those completed appropriations bills that
approved spending higher than the functional targets set in the budget
resolution would again, as before 1980. be sent to the President for
final action.82 However, when the House finally passed a first budget
resolution two weeks later, the House restored the reconciliation en-
forcement machinery. Over the subsequent months, the House Appropria-
tions Committee continued its rear guard action against the budget pro-
cess. For example, Whitten violated the reconciliation instructions by
changing the functional limits for each Appropriations subco»ittee from
those mandated in the budget resolution. ^3 At this writing it is
uncertain whether Whitten's action had any meaningful effect. No appro-
priations bill passed before the start of the fiscal year on October 1,
1982
In 1982 the Reagan administration was again able to get favorable
treatment for its tax and budget proposals, although not quite as favor-
able as in the previous year. In part this was due to the slow unravel-
ing of the grand corporate and conservative coalition, and to the inev-
itable resurgence of constituency oriented forces in Congress, the
federal bureaucracy, and in the private sector. Although this resurg-
ence was speeded by the apparent inability of the Reagan program to
produce an i.p.ove^„t 1n economic conditions, it is litely that the
administration's gnp over its coalition would have declined even had
the economic recovery program been a huge success. For though under
current economic conditions there are now great incentives for a more
centralized style of institutional practice in the United States, this
is so relative to past practice and within the constraints imposed by
liberal ideology, fragmented government, and a capitalist economy.
A notable example of this almost natural fragmentation is found in
the highly public debate within the Reagan administration over the prob-
able effects of the increasing size of the federal deficit. 8" This
internal debate was paralleled by a similar controversy in the financial
conmunity that demonstrated that the administration's political allies
were increasingly skeptical about the value of the administration's
economic policies. Further, the administration lost some of its control
over agency involvement in the executive budget process. As might be
expected, agency heads, now familiar with their domains and often more
sympathetic to their agencies' programs, took a more active role in bud-
get deliberations for fiscal 1983. To counteract this tendency, the
administration strengthened its system of Cabinet councils and estab-
lished a budget review board dominated by EOP personnel. Still, agen-
cy heads increasingly made end runs to the President, supportive offi-
cials in the EOP, and particularly to the Republican congressional
leadership. Finally, as the economy declined and the 1982 election
approached. Republican members of Congress tried to place Increasing
distance between themselves and the White House. Many Republican
officials to communicate or negotiate with the White House.86 Even the
previously warm relations between SBC Chairman Do.en1ci and the White
House became strained when Reagan rejected Domenici's attempt to forge a
compromise during the continuing resolution crisis in the fall of 1981.
SBC staff director Stephen Bell reported in spring 1982
.
. the dra-
matic contrast to the previous year, when Domenici and his aides worked
daily with Reagan aides
. .
."^^
If the growing stresses in the still very effective Reagan coali-
tion demonstrated the inevitable centrifugal forces of United States
politics, the gradual strengthening of the capacities of congressional
Democrats for cohesive planning and action was all the more remarkable.
For congressional Democrats, especially the more senior members, had
been among the chief political beneficiaries of the half century reign
of interest group pluralism. With the adoption of the Gramm-Latta
substitutes in 1981, some congressional Democrats began to advocate
stricter measures to enforce party discipline on some substantive as
well as organizational matters. Congressional Democrats were not yet
ready for such measures, if indeed they ever will be. Instead, dissat-
isfaction with party "defectors" was initially funneled against the pet
programs of certain highly visible Reagan supporters. For example, in
October 1981 the House reduced peanut subsidies from the levels agreed
to in the reconciliation measure. The majority's main purpose in taking
this action was to punish Reagan budget advocate Stenholm (D-Tex.).
St.l, the
.est Significant kinds of party action revolved around
the efforts to reach a bipartisan compromise on the 1983 budget As
1982 began, there was a widely shared perception among House Democrats
that, despite the adoption of Gramm-Latta the previous year, the HBC
report represented something reasonably close to a consensus position on
budget issues for a majority of the party. Furthermore, the Democrats
understood that a large number of Republicans, because of either reelec-
tion problems or the worsening economic situation, were willing to con-
sider a tax increase or a deferral of the 1082 tax cut, a limitation on
further social program reductions, and/or a reduction in the rate of
defense spending growth. A variety of Democratic budget proposals were
put forth, most of them in general accord with the emerging bipartisan
understanding. Similarly, in the Senate the Hollings (D-S.C.) proposal
received favorable comment from the Republican majority leadership.
Beginning in March, budget negotiations began in earnest between
Democratic congressional leaders (e.g., Jones. Rostenkowski
, Boiling,
Hollings), Republican congressional leaders (e.g., Michel. Latta.
Domenici. Dole), and high EOP officials (e.g.. James Baker, Stockman).
The outlines of a compromise were brought in late April to Reagan and
Speaker O'Neill as the final parties to the agreement. Although this
final negotiation narrowed the remaining differences, the compromise
package was rejected by both men. Nevertheless, the activities of the
"Gang of 17" were important as they reflected the Democrats' growing
acceptance of the need for more centralized policy making on economic
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issues. The attempted co.pro.ise also laid the substantive basis for
the tax bill Congress passed the following August.
The administration followed the collapse of the spring budget
compromise with another public offensive on the budget. Again they
stressed that the Democrats had an eternal tendency to support archaic
and wasteful programs. The Democrats, at this point, finally attempted
to create an alternative discourse on budget issues, a discourse that
focused for the need for fairness and equity in future budget and tax
decisions.89 Nonetheless. Reagan was still able to mobilize the con-
servative budget coalition in the House to pass another Republican sub-
stitute. However, the Democrats, after the adoption of the first fiscal
1983 budget resolution, continued to make slow progress toward greater
unity in legislative action. By late 1982 the Democratic party, both in
Congress and nationally, was approaching a consensus on how to respond
to both long and short term economic problems. Further, there was
substantial support in the House for the adoption of rules that would
strengthen the Speaker's power over the conduct of business. The Demo-
cratic House caucus also seemed poised to oust some Reagan supporters
from their seats on the Budget and other major committees (for example
Phil Gramm).^°
There are few procedural changes in the operation of the budget
process in 1982. This fact is in itself significant. Given the round
of complaints that has followed each major innovation toward a more co-
ordinated budgeting process, the continuation of major changes in prac-
tice is a sign of their growing institutionalization. Between 1933 and
mo, the.e was a nearly continuous Increase 1„ the effective Influence
Of privatized coalitions of (.a1nly, economic Interests, bureaucratic
agences, and congressional co^ittees In the budget
.aking process
Th,s trend had accelerated since the earl, igsos.^^ Given the stability
Of this trend. In the absence of the level of change 1n the structure of
political conflict typical of realignments, subgovern.ents
, as a group
Should have had the political strength to restore the old .odus operan-
di. After all. the passage of the Budget Act In 1974 had no effect on
the practice of budgetary logrolling.
Nevertheless, the reconciliation process in 1982 was essentially
the sa.e as in 1981. The only major change In the process was a provi-
sion in the 1982 first resolution to make it. including targeted cuts,
binding if no second resolution was passed by the end of the current
fiscal year. In reality this was merely a codification of how the pro-
cess had been used the previous year. More significantly, the 1982
budget process witnessed the first time all the participants used a
common baseline for making budgetary decisions.?^ As a result a new and
unexpected problem in the process is becoming apparent. In 1981 the
Reconciliation Act required conformance to mandated savings. Since al-
most all the savings were accomplished through spending cuts enforcement
was nearly automatic. In 1982 the process mandated about $77 billion In
savings, but only targeted about $27.5 billion in specific cuts. Host
of the savings were expected to be met through new tax revenue. While
Congress did pass new tax legislation in 1982, the reconciliation
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process did not contain strong
.echanis.s to insure that a tax measure
would in fact be passed.
Finally, an examination of the changing political discourse on
fiscal issues should attend to both complaints about the evolving pro-
cess and proposals for the alteration of that process, m 1981-82 there
were many complaints. Representative Silvio Conte (R-Mass.), the rank-
ing minority member of House Appropriations, summarized the hostile
feelings of many members toward the budget process when on the passage
of the fiscal 1983 first resolution he said, "The best thing this Con-
gress could do is repeal the Budget Act.
. . . We're almost in molasses
here. Nonetheless, serious discussion of budget reform for the most
part has involved proposals to strengthen Congress' ability to make co-
hesive policy. Some members have suggested a two year budget process;
focusing on authorizations the first year, and appropriations the sec-
ond. Other proposals seek to alter the schedule for different parts of
the current one year process. For example, the Appropriations commit-
tees believe that reconciliation should be delayed until after a more
lengthy consideration of spending bills. Yet in all this discourse
there is at least grudging support for the concept of binding recon-
ciliation and in most cases its application early in the legislative
95
year. Again this seems to be a function of the perceived need to re-
spond to long term economic difficulties.
In summary, the 1980 election set in motion the forces that pro-
moted the growing centralization of budgetary decisions; through the use
of omnibus reconciliation bills, the de facto development of omnibus
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aPP^opn-atlons (th.ou.h the use c. continuing spendin,
.solutions,, and
the development of both executive and legislative practices a1.ed at
more coordinated decision ™.1ng. Concurrently the sa.e forces encour-
aged the Imitation of constituency based Influence In budget r^klng
CHAPTER VI
ELECTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
The preceding case studies describe changes in institutional rules
and practices following important electoral events. An implication of
the realignment Uerature is that such institutional changes are a
political response to deep social or economic tensions. It is the
election that both demonstrates and confirms the opportunity for a
transformation in the structure of political conflict. The preceding
case studies focus on the process of institutional change generally fol-
lowing electoral events. In this chapter I look more closely at how
elections can serve to encourage institutional adaptations to social or
economic tensions.
This examination focuses on the 1980 election and subsequent
changes in the use of the 1974 Budget and Impoundment Control Act. One
advantage of using this case study, instead of either New Deal period
study, is the greater accessibility to more recent social discourse it
presents. However, there is a more important advantage. Because there
has not been a classic realignment since the 1930s, many political sci-
entists are skeptical about the probability or even the possibility of
realignment. If realignment is either nearly or completely impossible,
the United States political system will lose its most important mechan-
ism to facilitate changes in power relationships, major shifts in public
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policy, and as I have argued, major changes 1n institutional structure
and process. As William Schneider notes,
.'Something is clearly chang-
-g, but it seems to fall short of the popular notion of realignment
A focus on the 1980 election allows consideration of this problem; that
how elections can have a profound influence on political change even
in the absence of a classic realignment.
I^Realigninq Electinnc; ;^ nH the
Potential for Change '
—
Historically, major changes in governmental action have been asso-
ciated with what are called realigning or critical elections. The key
indicators of these elections are major and durable shifts in voting
patterns and in the interest group and constituency coalitions associ-
ated with the major political parties. While realignments do not always
portend immediate major shifts in public policy (e.g., 1896), such
shifts usually occur. In contrast, non-realigning elections occasional-
ly result in major policy changes (e.g., 1980, 1964), but most often do
not. Indeed many non-real igning elections exhibit shifts in patterns of
political support that can have marginal but observable impacts on the
policy process. Nonetheless, those electoral factors leading to more
cohesive political action by public officials are normally stronger dur-
ing realignments.
Understanding why realigning elections increase the likelihood of
changes in governmental activity provides insights into why important
policy and institutional changes follow only a few non-realigning elec-
tions. Realignments present a special and in some ways extreme case of
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gn-
the dynamics of .ost 1f not all othe. national elections. The
.ea,i
-nt provides an opportunity for change by sen'ously eroding prevail,'
patterns of conflict and unity. This occurs hoth on the
.aero level o^
voting and coalitional behavior, and the
.icro level of replacing so.e
Officials and creating political insecurity for others. The realignment
also presents an opportunity for new patterns of political action.
Again, this occurs both on the institutional and individual levels. New
coalitions are tried out on the
.aero level. On the
.icro level indivi-
dual officials seek new bases for obtaining or protecting their posi-
tions. To borrow Schattschneider'
s concept, realignments are moments of
displacing and replacing the structure of political conflict. With this
process of displacement, new possibilities for conflict and cooperation
open up. Inevitably new issues arise and usually new policies result.^
Yet for Schattschneider and all other students of the realignment
phenomenon, the realigning election is only one part of a larger social
process. Realignments are a result of the failure of incremental action
to result in the amelioration of important and persistent social and/or
economic problems affecting American society. Political stability re-
turns when a reconstituted political elite achieves a "successful" reso-
lution of the underlying social or economic tension. Realignments are
thus associated with many of the grand conflicts of United States his-
tory. For example the realignment of 1800 allowed a resolution to the
tensions over the initial democratization of United States politics.
Similarly the realignment of the 1930s permitted a settlement of the
long debate over the need for an activist state. It is the explicit
PomicUat1o„ Of such tensions that helps create the widespread agree-
ment that there needs to be a .ajor adjustment in national policy to
resolve the social/economic crisis.
Realignments are "needed^' because the usual operation cf the poli-
tical order is weighted against non-incre.ental governmental action
indeed, it is this very difficulty that generates the impetus for poli-
tical readjustment in the form of realignments.
"It can be taken as a
necessary consequence of the realities cf incremental bargaining poli-
tics in the United States that they will tend to produce crises which
will lead to non-incremental change."* clearly though, there have been
some important changes in governmental activity without realignments.
Not all of these changes can be related to electoral phenomena, but many
can. For instance, the unexpected victory of Woodrow Wilson and Demo-
cratic congressional majorities in 1912 enabled the passage of new leg-
islation increasing the federal role in the regulation of economic life
(e.g., the Federal Reserve Act. the Clayton Anti-Trust Act). Similarly,
the 1964 Johnson landslide temporarily broke the power of the Conserva-
tive Coalition to effectively block or emasculate most domestic legisla-
tion. As a result the government adopted new policies in areas such as
civil rights, education, and social welfare. Policy innovation was pos-
sible in both these cases because the preceding election demonstrated
the weakening, albeit temporary, of the strength of the pre-existing
patterns of political conflict and unity. The 1980 election seems to
fit this pattern, not a realignment, but an election that provided an
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altered political elite with both opportunities and Incentives to fash-
ion a non-incremental response to serious economic problems.
The association, if not the causal relation, of elections to poli-
cy Change Is well established. The existence of a relationship between
elections and changes in the political process Is much less clear Any
particular form of political structure and process is likely to allow
some range of potential policies to be adopted. Vet it is equally clear
that institutional structure and pmcess can constrain the range of
probable policies. That is, structure and process can either encourage
or discourage the adoption of particular kinds of policies as well as
influence the ease or difficulty of adopting public policies in general.
If one accepts the view that institutional structure and process
generally favor dominant Interests and existing policies and that re-
alignments usually create new political majorities seeking large changes
In substantive policies, then it is logical to expect relatively large
institutional changes following certain elections, particularly realign-
ments. The Reagan administration came to office with policy goals
significantly different from those of past administrations, including
those of recent Republican presidents. Whether one conceives of these
policies as a "new beginning" or as the trojan horse of a corporate
dominated elite, the forms of institutional structure and process devel-
oped since the realignment of the 1930s represented a potential barrier
to the fulfillment of many of the administration's policy goals. The
general wisdom expressed in January 1981 was that the Reagan administra-
tion would be heavily constrained by the same patterns of political
fragmentation and constituency politics that constrained previous adn,1n-
istrations.
Elections and Social Debates
There is another correspondence between realigning and at least
some other elections that requires explication. The very dynamics of
the realignment that produce policy or institutional change should be
operative in some lesser sense in other elections as well. To under-
stand how change results from any social event is necessarily complex.
As a result observers seek to appropriately abstract or form metaphors
of complex events and processes to create an intelligible understanding
of the resulting social change. In the realignment literature the basic
metaphor is the electorate's exercise of its latent sovereignty over the
political process. Trilling and Campbell's summary of this view is
typical:
I^nn^f
element-citizen control of government-exists only in
tro? fntn' •
R^^lig^n^ent translates this con-
th.! m.J°c^^r^'' '"^ ^^^t that control can occurat makes the system democratic.^
Of course no political scientist believes that policy or institutional
change occurs directly and automatically from the election itself. An
important idea presented in the realignment literature is that of elite
responsiveness to the message of the new electoral majority. It is the
political elite that actually initiates and implements change.^ Still,
this political elite, consciously or not, is presumed to be acting in
behalf of an emergent electoral majority. By implication, the lesser
shifts in governmental action that occur without realignment can be
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the exe.c1se of that sovereignty would
.e constrained the structure
Of political conflict produced after the last realignment.
Thus discussions of the relation of elections to political change
Pn-.arily focus on the actions of the electorate, though it is well un-
derstood that the meaning of the actions of the electorate, even in
critical elections, 1s far fro. crystal clear. The metaphor of popular
sovereignty can obscure as much as it illuminates. A better understand-
ing would conceptualize the exercise of popular sovereignty as only one
element in the process of political change. An election, even a re-
aligning election, may or ™y not have a major effect on later policy
and institutional changes. Thus a more appropriate understanding starts
fron, the position that elections can have variable Impacts upon subse-
quent change, rather than having to overcome the potentially false
assumption of popular sovereignty.
It is more useful to view the social and political process of re-
alignment as a continual form of debate. ^ By debate I am not Implying a
structured interaction between conscious and opposing social actors.
This may be the case in some circumstances, but should not be assumed to
always be the case. Indeed, to the extent that political life Is neces-
sarily organized around certain conflicts and constituencies, some so-
cial and political debates must necessarily be carried on indirectly.
Rather, this concept of debate is based upon Alain Touralne's definition
of the term, the publicly observable expression of the tensions among
elements of a social order. Such tensions are always present to some
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that can be dealt with by gove.n.ental Institutions.^ within any elec-
toral alignment political elites will avoid dealing as long as possible
wUh those conflicts that threaten to seriously disrupt the prevailing
configuration of political power.
United States national elections have a potentially meaningful
role ,n social debates because elections allow the possibility of a
highly public fo™ Of debate, both in ter.s of wide public knowledge and
participation In that debate. Necessarily, elections are a highly
structured for. of public debate. Elections are structured In ways that
can obscure the meaning of .ost participants' actions. Realignments can
be thought of as representing debates that are less obscure. If the
literature is correct, critical elections occur under conditions of a
widely understood context of social or economic crisis. The social or
economic crisis Is said to produce a time of political examination,
debate, and finally politicization. It is this gradual political reedu-
cation and polarization that makes it Intelligible to say that citizens
are making or ratifying choices in a rational manner during the realign-
ment period. To a lesser extent this process can go on at an indivi-
dual, group, or regional basis in other elections.
The metaphor of debate, besides not overemphasizing the role of
popular sovereignty. Increases one's ability to think about the Impact
of elections on subsequent political change. This is especially true In
the case of institutional change. Granted the relationship between
elections and policy innovations is difficult enough to trace. However,
265
there 1s in fact widespread open debate before realignments and some
other elections, one can reasonably Infer a relationship between elec-
tion results, through elite mediation, and later governmental decisions.
As a case in point, many of the general policy directions of Franklin
Roosevelt's first administration could be predicted given the preceding
half century of debate over the need and desirability of a positive
state. Roosevelt was clearly perceived as a supporter of an activist
federal government, especially in the context of the Great Depression.^
Obviously, it would be more difficult to infer public support for speci-
fic programs, e.g., the NIRA or the Social Security Act. Most difficult
is the attempt to infer voter demands for institutional change per se.
Perhaps if one knew the public wanted the NIRA or Social Security, one
could then say that this implied support for those institutional changes
necessary to implement the programs. However this leap of logic can be
enormous. How then can one say that voters who understood that they
were mandating a more activist government "wanted" institutions, such as
the Executive Office of the President, to be established to provide a
coordinating center for that activism?
Debates and Institutional Change
Given a set of changes in institutional structures and processes
following an electoral event, how does one separate those changes re-
sulting from the election from those unrelated to it? It is here that
conceptualizing realigning and other elections as elements in an ongoing
social debate will prove most fruitful. Realignments happen in the con-
text of a widely recognized social or economic crisis. Yet it is known
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ta.es Place. This Is understandable in that political elites and .any
political constituencies have a sta.e 1n preserving existing patterns of
power, conflict, and policy. Ideas about how politics work, what are
legn«te issues, etc.. are by this t1.e widely shared and understood
These Ideas 1„ turn reinforce the
.ore externa, soda, and Institutional
relationships of the era. Thus
.ost political actors (and perhaps non-
actors) work fro. the assumption that the political future „11, be .uch
like the present. It Is hardly surprising then that .any observers
expected the Reagan Administration would find it difficult to implement
its budgetary priorities.
Yet the realignment literature points out that there is another
necessary condition underlying a critical election. There needs to be a
period of intense politicizatlon before realignment is completed. Given
that the political language along with the institutiona, and electoral
processes of any electoral era makes it more difficult to define new
issues, constituencies, and so forth; in the period before realignment,
during realignment Itself, and often after it, emerging political actors
and elites must struggle with the development of a new form of political
language. Without a different way of talking about political and social
life, it will be Impossible to conceive of new responses to the social
or economic crisis or to mobilize the political support needed to put
those responses into effect.!" This element of politicizatlon can take
a long time (e.g., preceding the 1896 realignment) or can appear to be
very rapid (e.g., the 1930s). Even in the case of rapid politicizatlon.
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dis-
the process of retooling political language takes a long ti.e The
course of the New Deal had roots going back to the start of the 20th
century.
The creation of new political language is not a straightforward
endeavor. The new language must be flexible enough to encompass new
issues, constituencies, and policy responses without being unintelligi-
ble or too radical to those citizens it is directed at. Any new termi-
nology Of political debate is constrained by the near universal accep-
tance of the liberal individualist world view in American society and at
least initially by the specific form of those ideas emphasized in the
current form of discourse. It is also constrained by the operation of
political institutions that are structured by existing patterns of
political conflict. Further, as the potential realignment approaches,
the language must be adopted and developed by professional politicians,
most of whom are initially committed to the old electoral system. As
social or economic crises develop and become the central concern within
the political system, increasing numbers of politicians begin to develop
an interest in the new issues, constituencies, and politics encapsulated
by the new political terminology. At the very least this happens be-
cause the political environment becomes increasingly unpredictable,
indeed threatening. However this adjustment is a difficult one given
political actors' fears of losing existing support. Similarly new
political actors find, because of this instability, an opportunity to
mobilize political support in ways that were impossible before.
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This modified political language has a number of functions. How-
ever, the two nost important are to provide an understanding of the dy-
namics Of the social or economic crisis and to suggest how policy makers
Should attempt to deal with the crisis. Given this, one can ask whether
a government action taken after an election is more intelligible within
the new terms of political debate than the old. If this criterion can
be met, then one can reasonably infer that the governmental action is a
response in the ongoing socio-political debate represented by the re-
alignment. That is, one can infer what I call an organic relationship
between the occurrence of the election and the subsequent governmental
action. It is not necessary to prove that the election was a causal
event, i.e., that the electorate exercised the power of popular sover-
eignty. In any case this would usually prove to be a vain undertaking.
Rather, the inference must be supported by two kinds of additional evi-
dence beyond the intelligibility of the change within new political
understandings. First, one must show that the election resulted in the
selection of officials and/or the mobilization of constituencies sympa-
thetic to the new policies or institutional arrangements. Second, one
must show that such actions are a tangible response to some aspect of
the underlying crisis.
Both substantive policies and institutional change can be de-
scribed as having an organic relation to realignments. For instance, in
the New Deal period a measure like the NIRA could be understood as hav-
ing an organic connection to electoral events because the policy was
intelligible within a framework that held unregulated industrial
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competition as both a cause of the Depression .nHr a d as a barrier to eco-
nclc
.ecovery. i„ the sa.e vein one can taU about an Institutional
development such as the establishment of the Executive Office of the
P-s,dent having an organic relationship to the 1930s realignment. That
is. the realignment set Into motion the forces that would produce a
larger and
.ore activist state, and with 1t the need to promote greater
governmental coordination. It Is useful to look at the Reagan adminis-
tration's departures In policy and practice 1n a similar light. Even If
the
,980 election did not constitute a realignment 1n any sense, one can
still ask whether there was an organic relationship between the election
and the administration's actions, especially in the area of budgetary
pol icies
.
Stagflat ion and the New Political Debate
Most analyses of the 1980 election focus on the defeat of Jimmy
Carter rather than the victory of Ronald Reagan. Dissatisfaction with
the Carter administration stemmed from the widespread perception that it
was incapable of effectively dealing with the nation's problems. There
seemed to be two points of concern. The first was the state of the
United States economy. High inflation and interest rates generally help
the electoral chances of Republican candidates. Perhaps most important
was the fact that for once the rise in the inflation rate occurred at
the same time as a general and substantial decline in real income in the
eighteen months prior to the election. Although real disposable per
capita income was higher in November iQfin ^-h •iNovemo 1980 than in November 1 976, in the
per capna inco.e dropped fro. $4,536 to $4,447 (i„ 1972 dollars) Durm the sa.e pen'od the unemployment rate Increased 3, percent (fro. 5
percent to 7.6 percent) and there was over a 1.5 percent decline 1n the
individuals Who perceived a decline In their economic position
were only halt as lUely to vote for President Carter as those persons
Who felt their economic situation had Improved In 1979-80 (25 percent
versus 53 percent). This pattern was also evident a^ong those compo-
nents of the electorate who traditionally support Democratic presiden-
tial cand1dates.l2 A second area of concern was the perception of the
diminished power and respect of the United States in the world. This
concern was focused by the Iranian hostage situation, especially by the
series of administration failures during the election year to rescue or
negotiate the release of the Americans being held prisoner. ^3 while
both these concerns were in a certain sense temporary and there is no
evidence that the electorate perceived a connection between the economic
and national security issues, both of these concerns are facets of a
deeper long term socioeconomic crisis.
The last realignment, that of the 1930s, was signaled by the mas-
sive shift of votes to Franklin Roosevelt among almost all groups in the
electorate, what is called an electoral surge. A similar dynamic is ap-
parent in the 1980 results. Most voting shifts in 1980 were quite large
and were almost all in the same direction. Even when the shift was
small, as in the widely publicized case of the female vote, Reagan
271
the Ideological breakdown of the vote for
.ajor party candidates was
virtually the sa.e as in 1976. implying
,,,,,
^^^^^^^^^^
structure of political ccnflictJ= Vet this „.y be misleading, for an
electoral surge, as in 1932, .ay provide an opportunity for .ore perma-
nent electoral and coalitional change. Indicative of this possibility
were the results of a NewJTor^JijHes exit poll. While only 11 percent
Of those Who said they voted for Reagan said they did so because Reagan
was a conservative, about 40 percent of the Reagan voters stressed the
need for significant changes in the direction of government action as
the main reason for their votesj^
A parallel theme is found in the results of the 1980 congressional
elections. The Republican gains in the Senate, which resulted in that
party's control of the body for the first time in a generation, are well
enough known to require no further comment. There were also significant
changes in the partisan composition of the House of Representatives.
The loss of 28 Democratic seats reduced that party's net majority from
117 to 51 seats, making it easier to reenergize the traditional coali-
tion between conservative Democrats and Republicans. As in the Senate,
the most prominent losers were liberals. Some of these defeated incum-
bents held leadership positions; for example, Brademus (D-Ind.), the
majority whip, and Ullman (D-Ore.), the chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee. Indeed, in the context of the House of Representatives, 1980
proved to be the worst election for incumbents in two decades, excepting
the post Watergate election of 1974. ""^ At least temporarily. House
members seemed to be facing a reduction in tho .y a the incumbency advantage,
s-ilar, if less in impact, to that affecting senators since the late
1960s. The first inference to be „ade in the context of a strong vic-
tory by the presidential candidate of the minority party is that there
has been a coattail effect. Objectively, there is no clear evidence
that the Reagan vote per se was the decisive factor in Republican con-
gressional gains.l« Nonetheless, the perception of coattails. or indeed
of generalized public support, is a significant resource for presidents
in building legislative coalitions.
It isn't surprising that President Reagan and the Republican con-
gressional delegation claimed an electoral mandate. What was unusual
about the 97th Congress was that many Democratic members conceded that
the mandate the Republicans claimed was a real one. By early March
1981, the Democratic leaders in the House announced that they would act
on the Reagan budget and tax proposals before the end of July. It was
reported that the House leadership feared that the Republicans would
effectively charge that the Democrats were blunting the will of the
voters if the House did not pass measures that reduced spending and
taxes. House Budget Committee chairman Jim Jones made the same point
more explicitly earlier in the session, "If we are perceived as going
back to fiscal chaos, there isn't a Democrat or Republican who would be
safe in the next election. "^^
In 1982 it was well nigh impossible to find Democrats referring to
a presidential mandate because it was an election year. However the
attempts of House Democrats to reach a budget compromise with the
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ad.inist.ation(i.e.,the episode of the >.an, of ^r, „ts that the
Democrats still felt strong pressure to pass a unified tax and budget
program. As late as June of that year, majority leader Wright told
House Democrats that he preferred the passage of even the Reagan backed
Latta budget to that reported by the House Budget Committee if that
turned out to be the only way the House could pass a first Budget Reso-
lution in reasonable time.^^ Representative Hefner (D-N.C.) summarized
this acceptance of an implicit mandate to produce a unified budget
package when he noted that "I am going to hold my nose a little and vote
for Jones ni hold my nose a lot if it fails and vote for Latta,
simply because we have to have a budget."22 p.^^^p^ ^^^^ .^^.^^^^^
of Democratic acceptance of Reagan's budget priorities is the fact that
both budget resolutions reported out of the House Budget Committee in
the 97th Congress, and even most of the alternatives presented by other
Democratic members, subscribed to the basic Reagan position in terms of
both expenditure control and resource shifts toward defense spending.
In fact the Democratic congressional delegation had already moved
somewhat in this direction during the 96th Congress when the party had
substantial majorities in both the House and Senate. The 1980 session
witnessed the first real use of the reconciliation procedure authorized
in the 1974 Budget and Impoundment Control Act. The Democratic leader-
ship both on the Hill and at the White House, apparently worried about
the electoral impact of Republican charges of promoting inflation
through deficit spending, decided to try the reconciliation procedure.
Although action on the reconciliation measure was not completed until
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after the election. Congress achieved 8.3 of the ,0.6 billion dollars In
savings
"directed" 1n the Budget Resolution passed the previous dune ^3
Th.s suggests that the forces supporting the Reagan administration's
1981-82 Initiatives were already Influential before the 1980 election
The use of reconciliation also suggests that significant changes In the
practice of the budget process were underway when Reagan entered office
Nevertheless, the political uncertainty that encouraged the use of re-
conciliation in 1980 grew geometrically with the November election.
Further, a new leadership emerged In both the executive branch and the
Senate with a somewhat different understanding of how the political pro-
cess should and could work.
In a certain sense the 1980 Republican victory was not surprising.
Poor economic performance during the administration of a majority party
president is by itself sufficient reason to expect a deviating election
to occur. Yet the degree of change following the 1980 election has been
far greater than that normally expected when an incumbent is removed for
apparent ineffectiveness. While it is true that Ronald Reagan is prob-
ably the most explicitly ideological president in this century and that
many of the newly elected senators are of the same mold, these facts
would have been of small account except that the economic difficulties
of the late 1970s were generally perceived somewhat differently than the
earlier recessions and inflationary periods of the post 1945 period.
Not only were past unemployment and inflation statistics less
severe than more recent ones, such conditions were once viewed as tem-
porary aberrations in an otherwise prosperous and growing economy.
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increasing,,, economic difficulties in the United States are viewed as
deep and persistent, a direct consequence of .ost individuals' and
institutions' experience since the late ,960s. So.e of these difficul-
ties appear in retrospect to have been inevitable, a result of the rela-
tive decline of American political and economic power ste™„ng fro. the
gradual post-war recovery of other industrial economies. Vet this de-
cline should only have been relative; it should not have resulted in the
long ter. stagnation of the United States economy. Another disturbing
factor has been the attendant social and cultural malaise that many
Americans, though disagreeing on its nature and causes, seem to per-
ceive. Finally, it is increasingly clear that there are some ™jor
problems facing the entire world industrial economy, irrespective of any
nation's political or economic system. It appears that the great age of
rapid economic growth that followed the Second World War has finally
come to an end. Thus, the United States faces precisely the type of
deep and prolonged difficulties that can disrupt old structures of poli-
tical power.
Though there is still little agreement on the root causes of the
United States, let alone the world, socioeconomic crisis, there is the
beginning of a consensus on the relationship between the government and
the economic system in the United States and its effect in causing or
exacerbating economic stagnation. It is not that most observers share
the same analysis of these relationships, but that something of a common
language is developing among experts of different intellectual and poli-
tical perspectives.
The heart of this approach 1s that an understanding of current
economic conditions cannot proceed s1.p„ abstractions of econdc
behavior derived fro. the assumptions of a competitive hu.an nature and
of marginal choice rationality in^ta^A „ ^ ^nty. Instead, one must begin with an under-
standing of group. Institutional, and/or class behavior.^* A number of
economists closely associated with the Reagan administration or the cor-
porate establishment, such as the Friedmans and Alan Greenspan, focus on
the economic consequences that follow the long term efforts of organized
groups to obtain government power and resources in contravention to the
"true public interest" in a free market. In their view what Is needed
1-s a retrenchment of state power and programs that directly or Indirect-
ly Impede the ability of private firms to operate or Invest profitab-
ly." A similar analysis, though one more supportive of state action in
support of non-business groups, has been developed by a number of social
scientists, for example McConnell, Lowi
, and Thurow.^^ F,„,i,y^ , 3^^^.
lar language has been adopted, though from a perspective more critical
of capitalism, by figures such as O'Connor, Lindblom, and Gough." I
will use this third approach because It best captures the state's role
In providing the necessary Infrastructure for economic activity. In any
case, all three approaches present a common frame of reference that has
become Increasingly familiar to political actors over the past decade.
This framework will be used to delineate the organic relationship of
recent changes In the United States budget process to the political
tension growing out of economic stagnation.
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''^""^^ I^^-filcaLCris^^
Charles E
Lindblo. in Politics.^n^^
.nt.oduce concepts that facilitate
understanding the actions of the Reagan administration in altering the
practice of the budget process. In brief, both authors see government
and private business locked into a permanent relationship requiring co-
operation but full of potential for significant if limited conflict.
Governments in capitalist societies are basically tax states. They can-
not directly generate most of the resources they need to operate without
changing their basic character. They must get resources by taxing di-
rectly or indirectly the operations of the private sector. More blunt-
ly, the state is heavily dependent on the largely independent decisions
of business to produce and invest.
Given that economic units can in some degree choose whether, what,
and how much to produce, these units will attempt to induce governments
to undertake policies that will maintain or increase their profitability
and/or that of the private sector generally. Indeed, private enter-
prises must receive a minimal level of state support to operate (e.g.,
the establishment and protection of property rights, enforcement of con-
tracts, etc.). Of course many firms may need or want higher levels of
support. Capital, individually and collectively, has significant capa-
cities to encourage favorable government action, including the crucial
power to withhold investment and production. This potential power is
rarely used, but is so great, that under almost all circumstances gov-
ernments need to reach some accommodation with capital. This is the
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essence of one
.ajor function of the activities performed capitalist
governments. O'Connor calls this function
"accumulation.
Social control is intrinsic to the idea of government. While un-
der many circumstances people engage in self-control, there is always
some probability that some persons will oppose the will of the govern-
nent or of other important institutions. The inevitable inequalities
produced in capitalist societies create a permanent reason to expect
occasional lapses in social order. Serious breakdowns in social order,
besides threatening the government's capacity to enforce its policies,
also threatens the stability needed by most businesses to operate pro-
fitably. The control and prevention of these lapses, whether through
incentives, penalties, or manipulation, constitutes what O'Connor calls
the second basic function of capitalist government, that is "legitima-
tion."^"
O'Connor, and by Implication Lindblom, make three critical points
about the relationship between the functions of accumulation and legiti-
mation. First, both must be performed to some degree in any capitalist
society. Without social order accumulation is difficult. Similarly,
failure to promote profitability results in economic problems which are
often reflected in social disorder. In liberal democratic systems, like
the United States, the pressure to perform the legitimation function is
usually greater because other interests besides capital are legitimate
competitors in political life, if often at disadvantageous terms.
Second, the performance of the two functions can be mutually contradic-
tory. To do more in the area of accumulation means, at least in the
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shon run, having fewer resources to perfor. the legitimation function
(and Vice versa). Further, the determination of an acceptable balance
is not a Simply technical problem. Any possible balance has social and
political effects and is therefore subject to being contested. Finally
the evolution of capitalism into its corporate and increasingly interna-
tional form has had the dual effect of increasing the minimum levels at
which the functions of accumulation and legitimation must be performed
and thereby, because of limited resources, decreasing the probability
that an economically and politically acceptable equilibrium can be
found. 3^ It is this heightened level of need and contradiction which is
the heart of what O'Connor calls the fiscal crisis.
The Limits on Debate
This crisis is exacerbated in the case of the United States by
certain long and medium term institutional, ideological, and structural
features of the society. Long term features refer to aspects of politi-
cal and social life that have been present through most of the history
of American society. These features should not be thought of as con-
stants, but as persistent themes that are manifested in different forms
of practice, structure, and belief over time. Medium term features are
those specific to a particular pol itical /economic era.
The three most salient long term features of the American polity
are (1) the extreme fragmentation of formal governmental authority,
(2) the hegemony of 1 i beral
-individual ist beliefs, and (3) the continu-
ous existence of a capitalist economic and social system. Without ask-
ing which, if any, of these features is most important to the origin of
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the others, it should be clear that historicallv p . .H y each has been reinforc-
-0 0. the othe.s. The fi.st the.e,
...mentation o.
.o™al authoHt.
----^ a d,>ectl. institutional fashion. The l.pUca-
tions Of concepts such as "separation of powers,"
..checks and haUnces '
and
"federalist" are widely understood, si.ply, institutional power-
'
holders can rarely act (legitimately) without securing cooperation fro.
others, conversely,
.ost Institutional powerholders are In a strong
position to block or delay policymaking and implementation. This ex
treme fragmentation was created to respond to a particular set of
political concerns. Briefly, the aim of the "framers" was to create a
stronger central government without seriously endangering their liberty
and property. Part of their solution to this problem was to tolerate
widespread rights of political participation but to ™ke it difficult
for majorities to mobilize and to translate their preferences into gov-
ernment action. The expression of this solution was the institutionali-
zation of the principle of extreme fragmentation of formal authority.
However, from the point of view of reformers and Increasingly of
dominant Interests. It is necessary to find ways to overcome this frag-
mentation to gain effective control of governmental activity. In parti-
cular, as capitalist societies have become more complex and interdepen-
dent, and as a result less self- regulating, the need for positive
government action has 1ncreased.32 So too has the need to bridge legal
fragmentation, whether by public majorities or private minorities.
Many observers have commented on the limited range of political
ideas in the United States in comparison to other liberal democracies.
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virtually all powe.holders 1„ the United States, whatever they call
the.selves-l1berals, moderates or conservatives-subscribe to the
general political perspective called liberalise. Even
.ost Insurgent
™ve.ents have largely phrased their aspirations and demands within the
framework of liberal Ideology In this broader sense. This phenomenon 1s
not of recent origin. It dates back to the earliest days of the soci-
ety. Whatever the reasons for this historical persistence of liberal
beliefs," key to liberalism's current dominance Is Its nearly com-
plete translation Into social practice, not merely the lack of competing
Ideological traditions.34 i„
.^^^^^ ^.^^^^^.^^
on American political life is that framework's limitation on definitions
of the realm of the political and on the forms of appropriate political
activity and governmental response. For example, the difficulty of
defending any substantive notion of public interest within the terms of
liberalism has encouraged the definition of Issues and policy responses
in terms of individual and narrow group Interests. Because political
institutions are organized in ways compatible with liberalism, such
political definitions and responses make good sense within the limits of
the system. In turn, the winners in this political quasi-market now
have Incentives to maintain and expand political Institutions and pro-
cesses, formal and informal, that overcome fragmentation in ways favor-
able to the goals of relatively narrow and privatized interests.
The final theme Is that of capitalism itself. Certainly the ag-
rarian and commercial capitalism of the nation's first century Is not
directly comparable to the concentrated industrial and financial
capitalism of the 20th centurv ^tiii 4. • •r y. still, certain important similarities
remain; the protection of property, the bundle of use rights attached to
property, the profit motive, the generation of inequality out of the
social relations of production, etc.35
,13,, ,3^-,^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^
acting as an organized class, has had two very important points of con-
tact with political life. It has controlled a high proportion of
available social resources that can be used to gain and maintain politi-
cal power. Capital also makes crucial social decisons (e.g., invest-
ment, technological development, income distribution, etc.) in a rela-
tively autonomous fashion. As capital has become increasingly central-
ized, especially in finance and critical areas of production, its power
has increased. Due to the increasing complexity and interdependence of
United States society, this increased ability to mobilize power occurs
in a context of an ever larger need by advanced capital for higher
levels of governmental support. As a result there are ever greater
incentives to convert plentiful resources into effective power.
However, capital exists as individual firms or as economic sectors
as well as a "class." Firms certainly have an interest in the protec-
tion and profitability of capital as a whole; but they also have a very
immediate interest in their own profitability. Particularly, in a
culture that stresses the legitimacy of self interested behavior, firms
find it more prudent, under most conditions, to pay more attention to
their own or their industry's needs than those of their class. A
highly fragmented political system provides an additional incentive for
this kind of behavior. Yet, if such interest group activity in
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aggregate is widely perceived to endanger the profitability of capital
-
general, then incentives for "class action" would be greater, despite
the barriers raised by extensive governmental frag.entation.38
While these three themes of fragmentation, liberalism, and capi-
talist have been continuously present, their manifestations change over
ti.e. One can specify historical periods in which the operation of the
political process has been noticeably different than in the preceding
and succeeding periods. These periods are of course the spans of time
roughly corresponding to periods of party alignment. If the Reagan
administration, as Burnham claims, is attempting to implement the scale
of policy and institutional change usually associated with realign-
ments. it is then useful to focus on the nature and perceived short-
comings of the forms of governance the administration is seeking to
replace. The last realigning period, that is universally recognized as
such, was that of the New Deal. Like all such periods, the New Deal
brought changes in how powerholders sought to overcome institutional
fragmentation, as well as changes in electoral coalitions, issue agen-
das, and policy responses. It is not only important to note that the
New Deal resulted in an increased role for government in economic and
social life, or that it did it in a way compatible with the interests
of large scale capital; but that the New Deal gradually produced a
distinctive form of institutional action.
284
1930s Realianitifint and 1970s Gnvprnan^
Perhaps the
.ost distinctive and Important fo™ of Institutional
action that evolved during this period Is that of tripartite bargain-
ing. This phenomenon Is well known but does not always receive the
attention It deserves as an Important and cordon form of political
practice In the United States. There are other names for this sort of
relationship; e.g., subgovernments, c1 lenteleism, and Iron or cozy tri-
angles. It is this last na^e which provides the simplest but essential
institutional description of tripartite bargaining. In brief, the
triangle" is a largely self contained political unit involving relevant
members of the executive and legislative branches and representatives of
organized Interests. These triangular coalitions seek to ™ke govern-
ment policy In a narrow subject area of mutual Interest to the members.
As might be expected, the unit's basic aim is to make policy which
favors the interests of Its members. The triangular coalition holds
together because members are better able to provide each other with
desired policy and political support than outsiders. These triangles
are normally well Insulated from external Interests and pressures.
While part of the triangle's autonomy comes from the lack of resources
or Immediate Interest of potential competitors, part comes from the
conrnon frame of reference that gradually develops among triangle parti-
cipants. Alternative views of the nature of problems or the range of
appropriate policy in a given subject area have a difficult time becom-
ing legitimate in the eyes of triangle members.
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My concern here is not with individual patterns of tripartite bar-
gaining, but With an overall system of many such units; that is, with a
government where policy making is to a large extent segmented and dis-
tributed to largely autonomous quasi
-private units. Clearly, this form
of policy making increases the total fragmentation of the policy making
process. However, for their members, patterns of tripartite bargaining
serve as a way to reduce the effects of fragmentation in the very area
of most concern to participants by privatizing both conflict and deci-
sion making to themselves. Notice that these arrangements overcome both
the formal separation between the executive and the legislative branches
of government and the public and private spheres. To understand the
persistence of this form of political organization, one must look into
the basic relationship among the different units of tripartite bargain-
ing, a relationship which is more often cooperative than conflict laden.
The best place to examine this relationship is in Congress, especially
in the appropriations process.
It is well known that the most important source of direction and
power in Congress has been its system of standing committees. Other
sources of power such as party leadership or the President have been for
the most part less important. Much of the weakness of other power cen-
ters can be traced back to the fragmentation of power discussed earlier.
However, congressional committees are themselves a source of fragmenta-
tion as they are largely independent of each other. At least until
1981, it seemed that any form of coordination must begin with the recog-
nition of a high degree of committee and sometimes subcommittee
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autono.,. Given that no co..1ttee contains than a s^al, faction
of the total membership, how can Congress act?
The major operative principle of cooperation between individuals
and/or committees is logrolling. Quite simply logrolling is an agree-
ment, open or tacit, to cooperate with a particular member or committee
in return for later cooperation on some matter of importance to the
second party. As most (though clearly not all) issues are of only sec-
ondary importance to most members, this process allows a substantial
amount of business to take place. For the most part the average member,
particularly in the House, is irrelevant to what gets serious considera-
tion in Congress. Committees and their key members are by far the more
important actors. Thus committees and their members can often secure
passage of what they want by aiding other cor^ittees and their members
in obtaining their goals. Put more broadly, a triangular alliance
rooted in one committee can often get what It wants at the price of
conceding to other alliances control of other areas of government policy
making.
Therefore, logrolling is a form of bargaining, but of a most un-
usual sort. It is not bargaining over the substance of an issue. It is
an agreement not to interfere in each bargainer's respective "business."
To the extent that the constituencies engaged in triangular alliances
are necessarily those with significant resources and power, this system
of mutual accommodation serves to maintain the existing distribution of
power, resources, benefits, and burdens. In practice this means that
capital is well represented in this system. Groups unable to form
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triangles fo. eithe. materia, o. ideCogica, reasons have found that
even when congressional co^Utees have been sympathetic to their
concerns that those co^ittees were generally unable to engage in
effective 1 ogrol 1 i ng.^^
While patterns of ™tual non-interference occur in both the autho-
rization and appropriation processes in Congress, the appropriation pro-
cess is the more appropriate place to demonstrate the implications of
the material presented about the relation between the state and large
scale capital. After all, government policies, whether directed at Pro-
moting accumulation or legitimation, require the spending of money
Clearly appropriation by logrolling can get to be a very expensive prop-
osition to the extent decisions are made by the principle of mutual non-
interference. Most triangular alliances will get most of what they want
most of the time. This system may be fiscally tolerable for partici-
pants and even many non-participants under some conditions. Indeed, if
there are slack resources new participants can easily be added to the
system. In situations where resources are equal to or exceed organized
demands there will be no fiscal crisis per se. The system also works
better when issues are largely independent of each other and can be
dealt with through small adjustments in the status quo. Although such
conditions have never really existed, something approaching them was
widely perceived to exist in the United States for much of the post
World War II period.
However, since about 1970 the United States has faced increasingly
severe and intractable economic difficulties. In addition, since the
1960S the nunber of claimants for government expenditures has increased
especially in the area of legi ti.ation.^3
^^^^^^^
ic, energy, and environmental problems associated with advanced indus-
trialization have demonstrated the futility of ameliorating such inter-
twined concerns through incremental action. In O'Connor's terms, there
has been a massive and in large part necessary increase in demands for
both accumulation and legitimation at exactly the time the political
system's ability to respond has been severely reduced. This crisis
provides an impetus for the gradual reversal of the political dynamic
which supports segmented policy making. To be more specific, the fiscal
and economic crisis has provided an impetus toward greater coordination
of policy and expenditure at the expense of the autonomy of units of
tripartite bargaining.
In the preceding material I have discussed some of the reasons
that the patterns of governance developed in the post 1932 period have
proved incapable of dealing with current economic problems, especially
the gap between public resources and effective public demands. Under
these conditions it is not surprising that decision makers have begun to
look for new institutional patterns and procedures which speak to cur-
rent problems and yet are reasonably compatible with the existing social
and political structure and culture of the United States. Still, these
new forms of institutional action must be able to neutralize the impact
of subgovernmental politics to have any capacity to promote a more
economically and politically acceptable resolution to the tension be-
tween the accumulation and legitimation functions of the state. While
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th,s and the preceding chapter focus on Reagan's efforts in this direc-
tion. I believe that serious attempts at adjustment began in the first
Nixon administration. Before discussing the aborted developments that
took Place in the decade before Reagan ca.e to office. I want to briefly
discuss why members of economic and political elites in the Great De-
pression and in subsequent years found government by tripartite bargain-
ing so attractive, that is beyond the prospect for material gain.
Given that the development of capitalism in this century required
greater levels of government support, it became important to develop
institutional forms that would respond to this need without seriously
disrupting existing patterns of economic power. While it is possible
that there were other basic solutions than those embodied in the New
Deal, tripartite bargaining satisfied two essential conditions reason-
ably well. Not only was tripartite bargaining compatible with corporate
capitalism, but it gave organized sectors of capital a particularly fe-
licitous way to translate their resources directly into political power.
Secondly, governance through tripartite bargaining was ideologically
defensible in that it was decentralized and allowed the most directly
involved interests to participate in. and often control, policy making.
Thus, it provided a way to defend against charges of statism and social-
44ism. Needless to say. any foreseeable solution to United States
economic/political difficulties must be seen as compatible with American
traditions of decentralization, liberalism, and capitalism. Reagan and
most members of his administration are particularly bound to these
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traditions and to political support from business, particularly the
corporate sector.
The Opportunity for Changp
As the costs, electoral, economic, and otherwise, of the post New
Deal pattern of governance grow, so too do the incentives for a greater
degree of coordination and explicit priority setting. On the micro
level this may be seen as arising from the more or less rational calcu-
lations of political actors and interests. To the extent such actors
come to judge that the injuries they individually suffer from the de-
terioration of the general social and economic environment outweigh the
specific benefits they obtain from government action, they will be
increasingly willing to consider trading those specific benefits for
more coherent public policies. In short this would mean less support
for the subgovernmental politics so typical of the post 1932 political
era. While many Americans have always been dubious about the value of
government expenditures serving constituencies to which they do not
belong, until recently these attitudes could only occasionally be mobi-
lized into political action, and only then against the interests of the
weak or unorganized. At present there seems to be a widespread percep-
tion of an "overload" of the political process and upon public re-
sources, thus of a greater need to explicitly choose among priorities.
Of course there is only limited agreement on which government purposes
should have priority. Thus, while there may be increasing structural
pressures for some degree of governmental retrenchment, the form of this
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retrenchment depends greatly upon the nature of the interests, if any,
that hold effective political power.
At present any political coalition must act within an institution-
al environment that will remain legally fragmented. It is also reason-
able to expect the ideological environment will remain essentially lib-
eral. Therefore, in the short run, the possible institutional bases for
greater programmatic and budgetary coordination and control are quite
limited. Indeed there are only two likely candidates. The first of
these is the use of political parties to achieve cooperative activity
among formally independent officials. The second means is the one that
has traditionally been the most centralizing element of the government
structure and the electoral system, the Presidency.
Most observers see American political parties as poor candidates
for effecting greater governmental control and coordination. At best
parties seem to be a form of holding action, i.e., they keep the system
from fragmenting more. It is well known that United States political
parties have developed in a way that reflects the fragmented environment
in which they operate. Factors such as the institutional arrangement of
elections, state regulation of political parties, and the formal frag-
mentation of governmental authority itself severely mitigate the possi-
bility of "responsible" parties along European lines. Through most of
the twentieth century the trend has been in the opposite direction,
toward greater disaggregation, as other social institutions increasingly
share in the functions once largely performed by parties alone. Despite
certain centralizing moves in recent years by the Republican party in
the areas of campaign advertising and fund raising, political parties by
themselves can do little to promote cohesive action
,y their
.e.bers
In particular, this is true of congressional parties where both institu-
tional organization and
.e.bers' normative ideas work strongly against
.ost for.s of party discipline. To the extent that parties can be
effective agencies of policy coordination, it will be in large part
because of presidential action to promote that effectiveness.
The Presidency, the second obvious source of coordinative poten-
tial
.
is the one more likely to be the Institutional heart of such
efforts. Several observers have noted the increasing responsibility
placed on the executive by both economic elites and the general public
for developing and coordinating aggregate economic policy.^ This his-
torical tendency has again been demonstrated by events in the first two
years of the Reagan administration. In any case, the evolution of the
office, at least since the 1890s, has been in this direction. Of
course the Presidency refers to an Institutional apparatus as well as to
the individual who formally holds the office. Occupants of the office
acquire a number of resources that can aid in any coordinative efforts.
The President is the only significant official elected on a national
basis, the nominal leader of a political party, the nominal head of a
vast national bureaucracy, etc. Nonetheless, the chief immediate re-
source a President has to attempt coordination of policy and expenditure
is his actual control of that part of the bureaucracy most Involved in
preparing the federal budget proposal, that is, the Executive Office of
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the President, especially the White House staff and the Office of Man-
agement and Budget.
While the budget passed by Congress is certainly not identical to
the one submitted by the President and 0MB. the reality is that Congress
does not have the political cohesion to do .ore than amend the presi-
dential proposal. ^6 .^^^^^^^^
^^^^^.^^^ .^^^ ^^.^^
tripartite bargaining were usually able to skew the budget in their
favor. When congressional cormittees, executive branch agencies, and
interest groups acted in concert they usually held the upper hand. The
point of the 1980 election was that this situation was changed. While
the election results could be viewed as an i»ediate cause of change in
policy and institutional practice, it is of course the growing disjunc-
tion between particularistic patterns of action and benefit that is at
the root of the matter. Any president elected in 1980, or thereafter
for the foreseeable future, will need to respond (if perhaps in some
cases by non-action) to the tensions created by the relative decline of
the United States economy and the gradual exacerbation of the fiscal
crisis.
In a certain sense these problems are old ones. In the twentieth
century claims for government resources have been continuously greater
than available resources. All presidents from Franklin Roosevelt onward
have attempted to use budget preparation to coordinate policy to some
degree. For the most part their efforts were neither extensive nor par-
ticularly effective. It was President Nixon who made the first
substantial efforts to gain effective presidential control of the
federal budget.
It was no coincidence that the Nixon efforts tn mn+v, in Auri TT o control government
expenditures occurred at the ti.e when intractable economic problems
arose for the first ti.e since the Great Depression. While there were
frequent changes in the Nixon administration's substantive economic
policies, and Nixon was willing to incur huge deficits for electoral
purposes, in terms of its procedural initiatives the administration was
highly consistent. Their principal method of increasing policy coordi-
nation was to increase their control over budgetary matters. The Nixon
approach, which was to come to full flower after the 1972 election, had
three main elements: (1) increased fonral and informal guidance of
agency decision making by the White House or by super councils headed by
a senior White House official or a politically loyal Cabinet member,
(2) an increased role for OHB in the evaluation of agency requests and
in the actual disbursement of money to the agencies based upon political
rather than technical criteria, and (3) unprecedented use of executive
"powers" of impoundment and transfer. The bulk of evidence supports the
view that the Nixon administration was achieving an unheard of degree of
central control."^ However, the Watergate scandal and the subsequent
weakening of the administration returned the situation to the pre-
Nixonian status quo. Not only were the Ford and Carter administrations
forced to retrench in this area, but Congress passed the 1974 Budget Act
to limit the use of impoundment and to at least formally strengthen its
role in the budgetary process.
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The Reagan administration also has attempted to obtain greater
budgetary control and coordination through the Presidency, indeed, in
the Simplistic sense of having Congress abide by the administration's
basic priorities, the Reagan people were highly successful in their
first two years. As noted in Chapter V, many of the administration's
tactics are similar in general outline, if not in specifics, to those
used by the Nixon administration. For example, the Reagan administra-
tion replaced the legally questionable Nixonian use of impoundment and
reprogramming of funds with the extensive use of the deferral and recis-
sion processes established in the 1974 Budget Act. Some Reagan oppo-
nents claimed that the President was trying to make de facto budget cuts
by submitting so many deferral requests that Congress would not have
time to evaluate them.^^ Reagan also made use of the other two compo-
nents of the Nixon approach, although in a less imperious or conspira-
torial fashion.
However, there are important differences between Reagan's efforts
and those of the Nixon administration in terms of method and of the ex-
ternal situation to which those efforts were applied. The shortcomings
of past operating procedures in dealing with economic and related prob-
lems is much more obvious to powerholders today than in the early 1970s.
Secondly, Reagan was perceived to have coattails. For the first time in
many years at least some members of Congress saw their fortunes as tied
to those of the administration. The impact of this perception was
directly reflected in the behavior of those members. At least in the
97th Congress, many Republicans gave Reagan some credit for either their
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own election or for the newly obtained majority status of their party
the senate. Further, many Reagan opponents conceded the President
popularity and the initial widespread public approval of Reagan's gen-
eral approach on salient public policy issues.^ Finally, the Republi-
can senate victory and the defeat of key members of the Democratic House
delegation resulted in changes in committee chairs and partisan composi-
tion that somewhat disrupted existing patterns of accommodation.^
A key additional feature of the Reagan strategy was to use party
affiliation as an important element in coordinating budget policy and
adoption. That is, the administration encouraged Republican members of
Congress to feel a deep identification with the administration's pro-
gram, thereby Implicating them in the success or failure of the economic
recovery program.^l This course was not open to Nixon, who saw the con-
gressional Republican party as much as an impediment as a resource. It
1s notable that Nixon divorced his 1972 reelection campaign from that of
the party he supposedly headed. Given the minority status of the Repub-
lican party and the continuing trend toward electoral and party disag-
gregation this was probably a useful strategy to maximize his own vote.
However, the 1972 Nixon landslide, which on its surface was much more
impressive than Reagan's 1980 victory, did not have any material impact
on the balance of political forces in Congress. Still, even if Nixon
had attempted to mobilize electoral strength on the basis of party it
would have availed him little. The gradual increase in levels of elec-
toral instability, for offices other than the Presidency, was still in
the future. Perhaps one of the most important effects of the 1980
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election win be the growth of a perception a.ong elites and .ayPe a.ong
the wider citizenry that officials cannot govern In isolation of each
other. The simple principle of punishing the Incumbent once again In-
creases the value of party cohesion to office-holders both as a risk
management device and as a way of seeking a return to electoral stabil-
ity on favorable terms.
Thus if the Reagan administration's economic recovery program
proves ineffective, the developing economic situation and its attendant
political instability will encourage future attempts toward resolving
underlying economic and social problems. While in the short run it is
not impossible that a particular administration or Congress might try to
return to the pre-1980 status quo, the inevitable deterioration of eco-
nomic conditions under those political circumstances will result in pub-
lic officials again turning to more innovative, less incremental, ways
of dealing with the nation's problems. Those who innovate will need to
set priorities and to coordinate the adoption and execution of those
choices. They will need to use some combination of presidential power
and party mobilization to seek to obtain their chosen needs.
CHAPTER VII
DEBATES, REALIGNMENTS, AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE: A SUMMARY
One goal of this dissertation is to der^onstrate and explore the
relationship between critical realignments and subsequent changes in
governmental structure and process. A second goal is to explicate the
ideas of governmental institution and institutional change. These goals
are closely related. While most Americans develop clear ideas of the
differences between governmental institutions and other kinds of insti-
tutions, it is very difficult to articulate those differences in a way
that allows the construction of an ostensive definition of the concept
of a governmental institution. As a result, it is difficult to identify
what really counts as significant institutional change. Exploring the
impact of realignments on governmental institutions requires clarifica-
tion of these questions. Indeed, these conceptual questions are impor-
tant to any study of governmental institutions and how they change.
In Chapter I, I noted there is little work that explores the rela-
tionship between realignment and institutional change. Yet many re-
searchers imply that realignments encourage institutional change. In
part their expectations rest on historical evidence. Institutional
structure and process do seem to change after realignments. Despite the
fact that the grand structures of the United States government have
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essentially remained constant since the 1970s, the forms or styles of
governance have changed several times.
Nonetheless, the study of the connection between realignments and
institutional change has been a minor concern to students of electoral
phenomena. Most researchers devoted their main attention to studying
the dynamics of realignments. Research has centered on the role of
social and economic tensions, as mediated by the actions of political
elites and insurgents, in encouraging the formation of persistent new
voting patterns, political coalitions, and issue agendas. Yet research-
ers have generally felt that realignments matter, in fact matter very
much. In brief, realignments are viewed as a major form of adjustment
within a relatively stable political system to new conditions and poli-
tical forces. Indeed, a system of party/electoral competition can be
understood as an institutional form itself. Partisan alignments embody
a set of purposes which have crystallized into rules and rule governed
social practices that are widely recognized as one process the society
uses to make binding, i.e., governmental ly enforced, decisions.
Although realignments can be understood as a major form of insti-
tutional change, I examined realignments and similar electoral events as
a "cause" of change in either other governmental institutions or the
relations among institutions. This argument, which has its roots in
Schattschneider's work, is that governmental structures and processes
tend to embody the purposes of the interests or social groupings that
designed, altered, and/or maintained those institutional arrangements.
If an emerging class or set of interests requires the occurrence of a
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-alignment to gain control of the state and of the political agenda
then n is reasonable to expect that newly dominant political forces
Will want to change the structures and processes of government in ways
that help them to obtain their policy goals. While some changes in
substantive policies can result from simply the turnover in government
officialdom, the complete maintenance of pre-existing institutional
arrangements will bias the government in the direction of replicating
the public policies favored by previously dominant political forces.
The case studies examined in this dissertation, the establishment
of the Executive Office of the President, the evolution of the pre-NLRA
labor boards, and the development of congressional and executive prac-
tice under the 1974 Budget Act, were selected to illustrate the process
of institutional change following important electoral events. In the
strict sense it has not been proven that institutional change is more
common following realigning or comparable elections than at other times.
However one cannot count the incidence of significant institutional
change as conveniently as one can count indicators of policy change,
such as Acts passed by Congress.^ Laws are discrete phenomena. In
contrast, institutional change, excepting formal alterations of struc-
ture, process, and authority, does not exhibit clear transitions from
the previous state of affairs. The identification of institutional
change is in part a matter of judgement.
One implication of the case studies is that formal institutional
change is the least common and important type of institutional change in
the United States political system. Formal institutional change usually
301
follows Change in institutional practices. When formal institutional
changes are instituted without previous changes in institutional prac-
tice, as in the case of establishing the labor boards or the inclusion
of the reconciliation option in the 1974 Budget Act, the formal changes
remain ineffectual or dormant until appropriate practices and under-
standings develop. Changes in institutional functions and power rela-
tions also seem to be more closely associated to changes in institution-
al practice than to changes in formal structure and process. Thus,
while it may be possible and ultimately desirable to construct a method
to count the incidence of institutional change, that method would neces-
sarily prejudge the question of what constitutes significant institu-
tional change. That standard would almost certainly be the same one
that informed the selection of the case studies in this dissertation.
An institutional change is significant insofar as it has a major impact
on what interests and issues receive governmental attention and on what
public policies are adopted and implemented.
The institutional changes described in the EOP and labor board
case studies have in fact had an enormous influence over what the United
States government did following the institutionalization of those
changes. Before the formation of the EOP, the federal government lacked
the institutional capacity to administratively manage the relations be-
tween the state and the larger society on a sustained basis. While the
value and effectiveness of that capacity are often questioned, the fact
that such coordinative capacity exists represents a constitutive differ-
ence between the United States political system since the 1930s and the
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one that previously existed. Effects of comparable importance followed
the development of labor law and administrative practice. These case
studies Of institutional change in the 1930s represent major components
of the governmental transformations that Dahl calls historical corr^iit-
ments and Lowi regime changes.
^ The relationship between these institu-
tional changes and the concurrent period of electoral instability and
recoalescence is not coincidental. Although the questions of governmen-
tal coordination and the status of organized labor were not major
partisan issues in 1932, these matters were continuous themes in the
ongoing debate and conflict of the era following the 1896 realignment.
It is premature to make a similar historical judgement about the
long run impact of the changes in the budget process that have occurred
since 1980. However the potential impacts of an omnibus budgeting pro-
cess upon both the character of politics and the distribution of public
resources are comparable to those resulting from the major institutional
changes of the New Deal. In particular, changes in the budgetary pro-
cess imply important changes in the power relationships among those seg-
ments of American society currently active in distributive politics.
Since the 1930s, public power has been expanded chiefly under the con-
trol and to the benefit of narrowly based coalitions. The current
transformation of the budget process, though far from complete, portends
a greater degree of central coordination of public policy in the inter-
ests of broader, though not necessarily more pluralistic, coalitions.
Despite some of the rhetoric of the Reagan administration, the continua-
tion of the positive state is not at issue. What is at stake is the
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fo™ the positive state win take and the Interests 1t win serve The
potential results ,„a. well be important enough to classify as a histoH-
cal commitment or a regime change.
The changes in institutional practice under the 1974 Budget Act
constitute, as explained in Chapter VI, a governmental response to the
political instability arising from prolonged shortcomings in United
States economic performance. Although the 1980 election cannot now be
called a realigning election, as Burnham notes, there is an unusual de-
gree of similarity between the period following the 1980 election and
the periods following realigning elections in terms of changes in the
political agenda, public policy, etc.^ mdeed, given the improbability
of a classic realignment occurring under the conditions of the late 20th
century, 1980 may turn out to represent a new kind of election that does
not fit the standard classification used by political scientists since
the 1950s. Elections like 1980 may provide the closest functional
approximation to realigning elections in the future.^
Earlier in this dissertation I listed five indicators of signifi-
cant institutional change. These indicators were (1) the appearance of
rrew institutional forms, (2) the creation of new institutional func-
tions, (3) changes in the relationships among institutions, (4) the ini-
tiation of new governmental functions, and (5) changes in institutional
process related to the dominance of new constituencies. To some extent
all three case studies illustrate all of the indicators of institutional
change. Yet, the appearance of distinctive new institutional forms is a
very minor theme. Even in the most pronounced example of this type of
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change, the ad hoc labor boards, the boards borrowed their organization
and routines from models provided by other governmental and private
institutions.
The appearance of new institutional forms is the most distinct and
visible type of formal institutional change. Its relative absence in
these case studies suggests that formal change in institutional struc-
ture and process is a secondary form of institutional adaptation in the
United States. Formal institutional change is not a crucial element in
any of the three case studies, although formal change is more signifi-
cant in the EOP and labor board cases. For the most part, formal change
is concentrated at either the beginning or end of the process of insti-
tutional change. The role of formal change is mainly either to provide
an opportunity for the development of informal practices and understand-
ings or to legitimize that development after the fact. This observation
is not surprising; it conforms with commonplace expectations about large
organizations. Much formal organizational change is little more than
alterations in personnel titles and organization charts. On the basis
of the three case studies, I tentatively conclude that formal institu-
tional change is a relatively unimportant indicator of electoral effects
on the form or style of governance in the United States.
Changes in the functions performed by governmental institutions,
the kinds of functions performed, and in the relationships among insti-
tutions are, on the basis of these case studies, far more important in-
dicators of institutional change. For example, the EOP represents an
increase in presidential power relative to Congress and to the executive
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bureaucracy. The EOP case also demonstrates an institutionalization of
the new function of overall coordination (however limited), m particu-
lar, the Budget Bureau facilitated this process by adopting new func-
tions in a changing and initially hostile political environment. Com-
parable summaries can be written for the other case studies. If re-
alignments should be understood as the institutionalization of the
political ends of newly dominant political coalitions, then institu-
tional change that follows realignments, or comparable electoral situa-
tions, should reflect these changes in purpose. This is clearly true in
al 1 three case studies.
The final indicator of institutional change, changes in institu-
tional process related to the goals of new constituencies, appears to be
the most important one. As noted earlier, most of this form of change
takes place as changes in institutional practices and participant under-
standings rather than as changes in codified institutional rules. Of
course informal change is a formal rather than substantive category.
Informal change can occur that has no relation to the demands of a newly
dominant political coalition or to the imperatives of a transformed
political environment.
However, in the three case studies, changes in practices and
understandings are a far more important part of the process of institu-
tional change than changes in formal institutional rules and structure.
As noted formal change is usually anticipated or routinized by informal
change. Codification generally followed institutionalization rather
than preceding it. The pre-NLRA labor boards created a labor law and a
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legalistic tradition of board procedure through the creative extension
of
.nfornal practice to new situations. The BOB entered the areas of
legislative clearance and the enrollment process mainly by creative ex-
tensions of old practice. The congressional Budget committees enforced
the reconciliation process mainly by creative extensions of past prac-
tice.
However, these extensions of institutional practice are not merely
products of some exercise of "institutional will." These extensions
occur in situations where previous understandings of the politically
possible have been expanded. In part this expansion is related to the
existence of deep economic and social tensions, in part to the long term
social discourse about those tensions, and in part to the political un-
certainty reflected in electoral instability. In turn, this expansion
of the possible is augmented through the extension of institutional
practice into new areas of policy and/or process. While the case
studies verify the actuality of disjunctive change in institutional
process and thereby policy, the dynamic of that change is unexpectedly
incremental in character. Realignments and similar electoral events
seem to multiply the rate of incremental change and to channel that
change in a consistent direction. Alterations in practices and under-
standings rather than formal changes in institutional rules is the
central feature of this process.
This tendency of institutional change to be rooted mainly in in-
stitutional practices and understandings may be particularly strong in
the United States. Certainly this interpretation is consistent with the
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liberal preconception to avoid the appearance of the exercise of govern-
ment power. In this, the phenomenon of informal institutional change
exhibits a family resemblance to aspects of American political practice
such as the tendencies to settle political conflicts through judicial
action and to use interest group based "triangles" as the operational
basis of the United States positive state. The dominance of informal
modes of institutional change in the United States has implications for
how one should study institutional change. The crucial element of gov-
ernmental institutions is how political purposes are translated into
participants' practices and understandings. The crucial element of in-
stitutional change is how new purposes, whether external or internal to
the institution, transform institutional life. To understand how pur-
poses crystallize into what are called institutions requires the exami-
nation of how participants willingly or not convert those purposes into
institutional practices.
Realignments as Debates
If realignments encourage institutional change, there must be some
link between electoral events and the transformation of institutional
rules and practices. Realignment theory provides one understanding of
that linkage: institutional change results rather directly from the
demands of an electoral majority. However this understanding is insuf-
ficient; it places an insupportable emphasis on the ready translation of
voter preferences into state action. I suggest that it is better to
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think Of the linkage between realigning and comparable elections and
institutional change as stages in an ongoing "social debate."
Realignment theorists share a common understanding or characteris-
tic "story" of how realignments encourage policy and institutional
changes. Realignment theorists begin with the contention that normally
there is a relatively stable structure of linkages between the citizens
and the state; in Schattschnei der' s terms, a characteristic mobilization
of bias. Generally, the most important form of linkage is the party
system, including voting patterns, interest group coalitions, and issue
agendas. Realignments are the transformations of relatively stable
mobilizations of bias to new ones. Old party systems, and structures of
political conflict, break apart under the pressure of social or economic
crisis. Ultimately new party systems which are organized around new
electoral majorities come to power. Elected and appointed officials
belonging to the new majorities then seek to resolve the realignment
crises on terms favorable to their period's majority. If perceived to
be successful, they will solidify their party's political base and
thereby the new structure of political conflict. In short, realignments
are stories of crisis and decline followed by renewal. In this story
the critical election (or elections) is the key event that initiates
renewal and the subsequent restoration of political stability.
Realignment theory and research not only furnishes a story about
political change in the United States of wide historical applicability,^
the literature also offers a near universal explanation for the policy,
coalitional, and elite shifts that follow realignment. The very
309
structure of this for. of explanation
.ests upon the existence of a .e.
explanatory
.etaphor. An election o. sen'es of elections, usually pre-
sidential, is viewed as the key «,t1ve force In the post-real 1gn.ent
period. Although the critical election cannot happen without an under-
lying soc1al/econo.1c crisis, response to the crisis can occur only In
the wake of an election that seriously disrupts the operation of poll-
tics and government as practiced In the previous political era. Simi-
larly, the actuality of the new political era can only be confirmed by
the results of subsequent elections. Thus, the central metaphor of the
realignment process Is the exercise of popular sovereignty through the
mechanism of presidential elections. The following statement by Trill-
ing and Campbell provides an excellent summary of this metaphor-
Nonetheless, while the principal metaphor offered in the realign-
ment literature is the existence of popular sovereignty in the United
States, there is a second theme incorporated into the explanatory struc-
ture. As the authors of the previous quotation observe the exercise of
popular sovereignty is an uncommon phenomenon. Major adjustments in the
operation of government and politics generally occur only after major
crises, and often with enormous tension and difficulty. However, this
contention represents a contradiction to the major theme of popular
sovereignty, not simply a limiting factor upon its exercise.
Most political scientists and historians agree that Americans,
both now and in the past, have generally preferred incremental political
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change. Paradoxically, the realignment
.etaphor proposes that it is
easier to achieve relatively disjunctive change through realignment than
incremental change on major problems at other times. Realignment theo-
rists could reply, and to some extent have, that political alignments
produce and then are maintained by a variety of political, ideological,
and institutional constraints. Some realignment theorists might add
that other factors can mitigate the will of a popular majority. The
existence of a dominant economic class or the extreme fragmentation of
formal governmental authority can serve as examples. Realignment theo-
rists admit that the period of political instability prior to a critical
election is often long. Usually political insurgents find it extremely
difficult to "induce" a realignment, however much they desire one.'' As
such it is singularly inappropriate to believe that all these con-
straints are simply absent at the point of realignment. Indeed, as a
number of researchers have confirmed, echoes of old political alignments
can be discerned in the voting behavior and forms of political organiza-
tion found in many localities and even regions. The metaphor of popular
sovereignty cannot render fully intelligible what researchers have dis-
covered about realignments.
While the metaphor of an electorate's exercise of popular sove-
reignty had unacceptable flaws as an explanation of how realignments (or
similar events) influence later policy and institutional changes, the
metaphor may be appropriate under special conditions. One approach to
the problem of constructing a more suitable metaphor for understanding
the effects of realignments is to examine the conditions assumed in the
311
prevailing explanation. I a. not claiming that any realignment theorist
believes that any or all of the following conditions are .et or ap-
proached in United States national politics. Rather. I want to show how
the current metaphor underlying the idea of realignment can distort the
understanding of policy and institutional change following realigning
and other comparable elections.
The metaphor of popular sovereignty suggests that realignments are
situations reminiscent of direct democracy. The metaphor suggests
images of New England town meetings, ancient Athens, or Rousseau's
republic. I have already discussed one respect in which this under-
standing is misleading. It neglects the impact of numerous forms of
institutionalized constraints. However, the metaphor is misleading in a
second way, which unlike the issue of constraint has been generally
unrecognized by students of realignment. Given the pluralist viewpoint,
and therefore liberal-individualist orientation, of almost all political
scientists interested in the question of realignment; little attention
is given to the question of the relationship between the understandings
that people have of their needs and interests and the articulation and
aggregation of such into political issues.^ It is now widely admitted
that any number of institutionalized constraints, especially the coali-
tional makeup of a party system, can prevent or delay the consideration
of certain kinds of political issues. Still, realignment theorists seem
to assume that individuals easily reconceptual i ze relevant personal
concerns into political issues.
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Yet there is as much reason to believe that individuals do not
commonly transform their personal troubles into public issues. As
C. Wright Mills points out, most individuals have direct experience of
and the ability to directly act in a relatively limited social milieu.
Political conflict and action take place largely in settings and forms
of discourse somewhat removed from most individuals' everyday life. The
private trouble must be translated into the language of public values
and in that translation the formerly private, though often widely
shared, concern can lose the concreteness and be divorced from its
original context.
This debate (on the now public issue) is often without focus if nnlvbecause it is the very nature of the issue, unl ike even w dL LS^
dL°tP .'nn'p'' 'I
'''''' '''' ''''
''''''' terms Sf e ^^:'ia e and everyday environments of ordinary men.
9
The empirical existence of political quiescence in the United States is
well established. ""^ Any satisfactory understanding of the realignment
process must come to grips with the fact that the translation of
troubles into issues is anything but automatic. Indeed the near hege- •
mony of implicit liberal-individualist beliefs among Americans exacer-
bates this tendency insofar as those beliefs establish a rather rigid
cognitive separation of private and public life.
Thus I find that popular sovereignty is a singularly inappropriate
image of the realignment process. An appropriate way of understanding
realignments would need to describe a plausible connection between the
realigning election and subsequent institutional change. While the pre-
vious analysis demonstrates that there cannot be a simple connection
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between the voting results of realigning elections and subsequent gov-
ernmental change; 1n past realignments major change has followed shifts
in voting patterns. Further, periods of substantial change in govern-
ment policy and process have not usually happened without a critical
election first J
^
The original understanding, based on the exercise of
popular sovereignty, seems fruitful to the extent that the critical
election is a crucial linkage in the realignment process, but this
understanding is clearly wrong insofar as it connotes that the election
performs a directly constituent function. The central explanation of
the realignment story must encompass both aspects of the phenomenon's
appearance.
Most realignment theorists claim that between the social or eco-
nomic crisis that sets the realignment process in motion and the re-
alignment itself is a period of progressively focused political debate
and the increased pol i ticization of the citizenry. While this process
is never completely linear, it is definitely cumulative. In Mills'
terms, one can say that social troubles are translated increasingly
often and accurately into an issue or cohesive set of issues. Yet
strangely, most of the elections associated with realignments have not
been as intensely contested as one might have expected given the preced-
ing periods of increasing pol iticization.
In 1932 Franklin Roosevelt generally sought to give the impression
of favoring modest governmental innovation to relieve the collective
burdens of the Depression and to promote economic recovery. Still, he
emphasized his symbolic approval of several contemporary political
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icons, such as the balanced budget, that allowed hi. to consolidate
conservative supportJ^ m contrast, the 1928 presidential election be-
tween Hoover and Smith had witnessed more intense invective and debate
on matters that in retrospect seem almost trivial.
The level of discourse in the 1896 election, coming after years of
increasing polarization, was remarkably mild. This was despite the fact
that many opinion leaders saw the election as a turning point in United
States history. It is true that campaign rhetoric was intense on one
issue. But it was a narrow one, the comparative virtue of the silver
versus gold backed currency. Otherwise the McKinley campaign was a
muted one based on generalized claims that the Republicans would restore
economic prosperity. While more aggressive in style, the Bryan campaign
essentially purged any reference to the institutional and structural
reforms that had formed the basis of the populist program.^^
Earlier realigning elections were fought on a more localized basis
than those of the 1890s and 1930s, reflecting the limitations of trans-
portation and communication in those times. Still, with the exception
of the 1800 election, the campaign discourse of realigning elections is
always mild compared to what it was reasonable to expect given the
increased level of political conflict prior to those elections. In con-
trast, elections which were in no sense realigning were often carried on
with extreme intensity by the rival candidates and parties. To give
contemporary examples, the elections in 1964 and 1968 were accompanied
by intense campaign rhetoric far exceeding in power the rhetoric of the
1932 election or the important, but unclassified, 1980 election.
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It is well known that American candidates and parties tend to
moderate their appeals to build the broadest possible electoral support.
That candidates and parties would still tend to do so in realigning
elections also seems reasonable for the same reasons that inform the
general rule; for example, institutional arrangements, the rather atten-
uated distribution of political outlooks in the United States, or the
vested interests of officials in maintaining old issues and forms of
political discourse. Nonetheless, it is still remarkable that the
intensity and the range of alternatives presented in directly electoral
discourse is not appreciably greater in realigning elections than in
other elections. If realigning elections are in fact exercises in
popular sovereignty, then the electorate needs some set of cues, however
subtle, to tell them that the election is really crucial. The existence
of a crisis is not enough; the crisis can continue for many years before
there is a realignment. The growth of third parties or of insurgencies
in major parties is not enough; insurgencies can occur for many years
without prompting a realignment.
One thing that does happen following realigning elections is that
many incumbent officials are turned out of office and are replaced by
new ones of usually a different party affiliation. Further, while some
of these changes occur in marginal constituencies, some occur because of
unexpected voting shifts within a constituency. A particular occupa-
tional group or ethnic group in an electoral district may now distribute
its vote for candidates and parties in a pattern that has no relation-
ship to its past behavior. This kind of change implies a shift or the
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nq
on
potential for a shift in the coalitional makeup of political parties
Certainly, one would expect this kind of phenomenon in a realignment by
definition. Yet this very effect will be seen in some electoral dis-
tricts in any election, especially in deviating elections. While bei
a rarity, the degree of electoral instability in a deviating electi
can exceed that of a realigning election. Of course in this case voting
patterns will largely return those expected in a given political era, at
least on a national basis, in the next election. Still, the fact that
voting patterns return toward the period's norm does not by itself
explain a certain problem. If changes in the party affiliation of
office holders can be as large in deviating elections as realigning
elections, why is the degree of observed policy and institutional inno-
vation much more significant following realigning elections?^^
One plausible answer is the perceived permanence of the new voting
and coalitional patterns. This answer is largely wrong. The greatest
periods of policy (and institutional) innovation have occurred in the
first presidential term following realignment. For example, most of the
New Deal was put into operation in Franklin Roosevelt's first four
years. Another possible answer is that governments elected in deviating
elections either do not attempt large scale policy innovation or if they
do the reinstatement of the dominant party results in the repeal of
those innovations.
There may be some truth to this construct, but it too has severe
problems. Occasionally, presidents and congressional majorities elected
against the grain of a political era will adopt significant new
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policies. The Wilson administration provides a ,ood example of this
sort. Yet despite the return of overwhelming Republican dominance in
the 1920s, most of the Wilsonian initiatives were preserved. How then
can one Identify, except in retrospect, the livelihood that an election,
particularly one that occurs in a period of social or economic crisis,
and following a period of intensifying politicization, is a realigning
el ection?
Burnham, Clubb, and Flanigan
.ake a useful suggestion that can be
applied to this problem. They contend that during the period of politi-
cization before the realignment, there is a process of narrowing or con-
straining the issue agendaJS However, before the realignment the new
agenda does not fully penetrate those areas of political and covernmen-
tal activity dominated by the political elites of the dying electoral
era. This is especially true for the electoral arena where the old
elites have an immediate interest in maintaining old forms of conflict
and cohesion. Despite the attempt to ignore or suppress the emerging
agenda, the increasing need to respond to that agenda, at least before
some other party does, encourages some political actors to make use of
the new issues. In the case of major party members, the use of the new
agenda is made in a somewhat cryptic fashion. That is, political actors
invent symbolic patterns which as Burnham et al. contend act as short-
hand explanations of the crisis and as suggestions of the general direc-
tion of ameliorative policy. Burnham et al . then claim that these
symbolic patterns become central to the political discourse in the years
following realignment. It is the institutionalization of the new
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political agenda, through what others might call "condensation symbols,"
that allows political parties to serve as the principal agency of what
Burnham et al. call a reintegration of the political systemJ^ Thus the
realigning election is not so much the ending of a debate over how to
respond to a social or economic crisis by the national electorate, but
an event that transforms the structure of officially organized political
debate to coincide with the real political agenda and that aives one po-
litical coalition an opportunity to act decisively to meet that agenda.
I think this idea of the transformation of officially organized
political debates is a useful place to begin a reconstruction of the
central metaphor for the realignment scenario. Yet the idea seems
vague, without any obvious reference to everyday life. In contrast,
popular sovereignty, despite its ambiguities in application, is a famil-
iar idea in American culture. The idea of popular sovereignty makes
intuitive sense because it is closely related to a preeminent value of
liberal cultures, i.e., individual choice. The understanding of the
idea of individual choice seems intuitive because it resonates with most
Americans' experience of economic and social action in their society.
One chooses his or her spouse, friends, occupation, place of residency,
and purchases of goods and services. Popular sovereignty is this prin-
ciple of individual choicemaking transformed into a set of rules and
practices applicable for conscious collective choicemaking. Can one
find a similar set of everyday experiences that will allow one to make
sense of the notion of alteration of debate on the official level?
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Many common situations involving interpersonal conflict have ele-
ments of precisely this sort. Imagine a conflict between a husband and
wife over whether the wife should seek a job. Let us make the increas-
ingly dubious assumption that the earnings of the husband are sufficient
to purchase those goods and services the family needs and wants. Given
this, the husband says he cannot understand why the wife wants a job,
especially given the things of value the wife and/or family will need to
give up. As long as the husband understands paid work as simply a way
to earn money, it will be difficult for him to understand why his wife
wants to enter the labor market, or will see it as resulting from a
greater, and perhaps illegitimate, desire for more goods and services.
Perhaps the wife has completely different reasons for wanting a
job: desires for self-development, new social relationships, community
recognition and so on. If she can articulate these reasons and make
them comprehensible to her husband, she will thereby change the nature
of the debate and by that the terms of the conflict. Indeed, to the
extent that her arguments reinforce either the husband's previously un-
articulated experience (e.g., that his job has many values not connected
to compensation) or the arguments he has heard in his social milieu or
through the media, her arguments are likely to be recognized as making
sense. While the husband may still object, in many cases the resolution
of the conflict will be different than if one or both of the parties
maintained their original understandings. This same sort of analysis,
including the analysis of cases where no transformation of the terms of
debate took place, can be applied to .est forns of interpersonal con-
flict familiar to Americans.
This notion of the transformation of debates is in many ways con-
gruent with Schattschneider's view that the results of political con-
flicts are greatly influenced by their scope, that is by the number and
resources of the combatants. Expansion or contraction of participation
in a conflict is likely to have asymmetrical impacts on the ability of
each side to win.^^ Similarly, changing the language of political dis-
course, by changing the sense of the conflict, allows the mobilization
of participants and resources on new terms. While, in principle, it is
easy to determine the scope of conflict by counting the bodies on each
side; the measurement of change in political debate is trickier. For
example, I said, extending the insights of Burnham, Clubb, and Flanigan,
that critical elections seem to only exhibit hints of the emerging dis-
course. Yet it is clear that the discourse is already widely understood
before the realigning election, as much or more by officials and politi-
cal activists than by the general public. After all, realignments are
preceded by periods of increasingly intense debate and pol i tici zation,
implying that the real change in debate among members of actual or
potential political elites occurs before realignment. Is there any way
to deal with this terminological confusion?
Alain Touraine provides a useful vocabulary through which to
overcome some of this confusion. Touraine uses three terms to talk
about differences in the character of various aspects of what I have
called social debate or discourse, clumsily distinguishing between
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official and underlying debates. Touraine's most general term, "de-
bates," refers to any public expression of the tensions among various
aspects of a social system. While debates require public expression, it
need not be in the form of articulated discourse. It is the situation,
not the discourse, that matters. For example, debates could be carried
on in forms as diverse as changes in the divorce rate, labor absentee-
ism, or the average actual driving speeds on interstate highways.
Touraine uses the terms "discussions" and "deliberations" to denote
progressively more articulated but also more institutionally constrained
forms of discourse. Discussions require organization as well as articu-
lation, with conflicting parties at least tacitly recognizing each
other's existence. Deliberations involve a fuller institutionalization
of debate, including the specification of roles, rules of procedure, and
a common language of discourse. Unlike debates, and to a lesser extent
discussions, in deliberations it is no longer possible for the parties
to completely talk past one another.
There are three points of contact between this material and the
realignment literature. First the debate is the public expression of
the tensions generated or exacerbated by the social or economic crisis.
Second, the term "discussion" seems to fit the activities carried on in
the time of pol i ti ci zati on occurring before the realigning election.
Finally, Touraine's concept of "deliberations" seems congruent ,wi th the
period following realignment, when the newly dominant political forces
are able to take action on the basis of the political discourse devel-
oped before the realignment.
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The main value of conceptualizing the realignment process as a de-
bate rather than as an exercise of popular sovereignty is that the first
understanding provides more insight into how post-realignment change
occurs. The metaphor of popular sovereignty, which informs almost all
realignment studies, proves unfortunately limited as a basis from which
to generate plausible explanations for how either institutional or
policy change takes place. Because this understanding of political
change emphasizes the role of the electorate in demanding and legitimat-
ing government action, the process of change is understood almost
entirely in terms of the electorate's beliefs and actions.
Realignment theorists offer two major variables to explain the
process of post-realignment change. One variable focuses on the state
of the electorate, its "motivation" in changing its longstanding voting
patterns. Some observers think that during realignment many voters are
actively seeking changes in public policy. This is called anticipatory
19
or prospective voting.'^ Another group of observers hold that the elec-
torate approves post-realignment change retrospectively, i.e., in later
elections. The initial change in voting patterns is interpreted as a
massive vote of no confidence in the dominant political party of the
fading political alignment. The new voting patterns become permanent
only if there is "majority" support for the actions of the administra-
tion formed by the newly dominant party/coalition.^^ Some analysts have
constructed syntheses of the two views.
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Technically, policy and institutional change is adopted and imple-
mented by government officials. But why do officials undertake such
change? In addition to electoral pressure, realignment theorists hold
that there are always groups or constituencies that actively seek policy
and by implication institutional change during realignments. Once again
there are two basic views as to who are the primary agents of change.
The first view implies a combination of wisdom and democratic respon-
siveness on the part of holders of institutional power, public and
private, in the realigning period. The second view credits non-elite
insurgents with forcing elite concessions. Often these concessions are
forced through "extra-political" actions as well as electoral instabil-
23ity. Once again, some observers have attempted to combine elements of
the two approaches.
On the basis of the case study material I examined, I conclude
that the occurrence of prospective and retrospective electoral judge-
ments in realignments (or other electoral situations) is largely situa-
tional. It is difficult to make a strong case that the electorate
demonstrated either prospective or retrospective judgement in regard to
the EOP, the pre-NLRA labor boards, or recent changes in the budget
process. Even if data about voters' issue positions was available for
these cases, it would be hard to confirm the effect of those issue
positions on actual voting behavior. Further, even when policy issues
related to later institutional changes were campaign issues, e.g., the
role of labor in 1936 and budget deficits in 1980, the institutional
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implications of candidate and party issue positions were rarely, if
ever, publicly mentioned.
Materials that can be used to support judgements about the rela-
tive influence of elites and non-elite insurgents in the process of
institutional change is more readily available. On the basis of the
case studies, the relative influence of elites and non-elites is speci-
fic to the historical situation. Mass insurgency played an important
perhaps critical role in both the adoption of a national labor policy in
the 1930s and in the development of institutional practice in that area.
Yet even in this case elite action also had an important impact on that
development. 2^ In contrast, it is difficult to find any insurgent acti-
vity, let along influence, in the formation of the EOP. The 1980-82
changes in the budget process represent an intermediate case, although a
case much closer to the elite agency model. Actions by ordinary citi-
zens, such as non-payment or underpayment of taxes and the passage of
tax or expenditure limitation referenda, appear to have created a con-
text that encouraged institutional powerholders to alter the budget
process
,
An advantage of viewing realignments and post-realignment change
as elements in a long term social debate is that it allows the observer
to systematically cope with these variations in the realignment process.
Debates can be followed through their increasing levels of clarity and
institutionalization. This dissertation looked mainly at the final
stage in that progression, the period of "deliberations." During such
periods institutional practice and rules are changed to more closely
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fulfill the purposes of newly dominant political coalitions. However,
this kind of institutional development is possible only because the
earlier stages of debate have occurred. Indeed, the stage of "discus-
sions," preceding the significant electoral event, establishes the pre-
conditions for institutional (or policy) change. New forms of institu-
tional action rest upon the extension of the realm of the politically
possi ble.^^
Throughout this dissertation I have argued that institutions are
forms of crystallized social action. While this crystallization is to
some extent codified by formal rules, it always exists in a deeper and
more extensive form in the practices and understandings of active insti-
tutional participants. In particular, prior to codification, practices
and their related understandings always permit a measure of flexibility
in their application. Yet the extent of this flexibility is not a
given; it is revealed and articulated through institutional action.
Brigham contends that ".
. . understanding an institution implies aware-
ness of the dynamics between possibilities and action. "^^ This claim is
made in the context of what a social scientist understands when he or
she understands an institution. By implication, something parallel
happens when an institutional participant acts in new ways within the
institution. The participant must first be aware of the possibility of
greater flexibility in action. However, each extension or transforma-
tion of practice implies new possibilities and thus a somewhat different
way of knowing the institution.
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Nonetheless, this process of extension is anythinc, but rando.n.
Institutions are always constrained environments. There are potential
rewards and penalties for each change of institutional practice. It is
here that the stage of "discussions," i.e., poli ticization (and by ex-
tension electoral instability), is so important. As the social debate
becomes more explicit and focused the possibilities for changes in
institutional practice grow, but only in ways related to the progress of
the debate. Similarly, pol i tici zati on and electoral instability provide
cues to the likely rewards and penalties that will be associated with
potential changes in practice and public policy.
Thus, the stage of "discussions" or poli tici zation provides the
cues for the development and crystallization of the new social knowledge
into rule governed institutional practice and in some cases into codi-
fied rules. This social process is the institutional component of what
has been variously called "the public philosophy" or "political
27
style." Although the emphasis here has been on this process as an
aspect of institutional change following realignments and other signifi-
cant electoral events, the approach can be applied to any study of gov-
ernmental institutions or institutional change to the extent that insti-
tutions are forms of social action.
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Realignment," in Realignment in American Politics
, eds. Bruce A. Camp-
bell and Richard J. Trilling (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980^,
p. 4.
^Cf. Brady and Stewart, pp. 335-36. Also see James L. Sundquist,
Dynamics of the Party System (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1973),
p. 37 for a possible explanation for this difficulty.
g
Burnham seems to be an exception to this contention. He some-
times notes the constraining force of the dominance of liberal ideology
upon the development of political movements/opposition in the United
States. For example, cf. Burnham, "Eclipse," pp. 7-17. In this article
he also talks about the constraint of policy change, in this case the
policies of the Reagan administration, in creating a new political
environment.
^C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1967), pp. 8-9. For a discussion of the issue of the
translation of personal troubles into public or political issues see pp.
3-13. For a related but distinct analysis see Richard F. Hamilton,
Class and Politics in the United States (New York: John Wiley, 1972),
pp. 83-85. Both authors agree that the translation process is diffi-
cult. However, Mills seems to think that individuals' abilities to
perceive situations as troubles can be constrained by the language/
concepts available to the individual. Hamilton seems to discount this
possi bili ty
.
^
^Powerful documentation of this is found in John Gaventa, Power
and Powerlessness (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1980).
In this particular case study, individuals are able to easily articulate
their personal troubles.
^^This generalization may be less useful than in the past. The
1964 and 1980 elections do not appear to be realigning elections, yet
both resulted in policy change comparable to that expected from
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realignments. This suggests the decline of realignment as the most
important agency of major political adjustment in the United States.
See Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of Amer-
ican Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970), pp. 170-74.
1
2
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1957), pp. 413-39.
1
3
Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Moment (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1978), pp. 270-86.
14
The 1896 election is an exception. But in this case the leading
coalitional partners wanted to maintain the form of state it had helped
create in the period following the Civil War.
1
5
Walter Dean Burnham, Jerome M. Clubb, and William H. Flanigan,
"Partisan Realignment: A Systemic Perspective," in The History of
American Electoral Behavior
,
eds. Joel H. Si 1 bey, Allan G. Bogue, and
William H. Flanigan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1978), p. 71.
1 g
Burnham, Clubb, and Flanigan, pp. 70-72. In the case of the New
Deal, the authors note that significant symbols of both cognitive and
emotive importance formed around terms such as "Herbert Hoover," "De-
pression," "FDR," and "New Deal." These symbols informed voter choice
in the following political era.
^^E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi soverei gn People (Hinsdale, 111.:
Dryden Press, 1960), pp. 1-5.
1 o
Alain Touraine, The Self-Production of Society , trans. Derek
Coltman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 72-75.
1 Q
Cf. Sundquist, pp. 275-81 and Gerald M. Pomper with Susan S.
Lederman, Elections in America , 2nd ed. (New York: Longman Press,
1980), p. 105. Proponents of this approach generally recognize retro-
spective elements of realignments as well as anticipatory ones.
^^This has been the dominant view in the realignment literature.
The classic statement of this view is found in V. 0. Key with Milton C.
Cummings, The Responsible Electorate (New York: Vintage Books, 1966).
^""For an example see Nancy H. Zingale, "Third Party Alignments in
a Two Party System: The Case of Minnesota," in The History of American
Electoral Behavior , eds. Joel H. Silbey et al . (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 106-33.
^^Virtually all formal realignment theorists hold this view,
although those who see major prospective elements to voting during
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realignments seem to hold this view less stronqly. See cf Sundauist
pp. 285-98.
lUMu b ,
23
See Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People's
Movements (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), pp. 14-32.
24
See Piven and Cloward, pp. 32-36, and Karl E. Klare, "Judicial
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Con-
sciousness, 1937-1941," Minnesota Law Review, 62, No. 3 (March 1978)
pp. 265-339.
25
Of course this expansion is not absolute. The expansion of pos-
sibilities in terms of the interests of a new dominant political coali-
tion always means the contraction of other possibilities. See, E. E.
Schattschneider, The Semisoverei gn People (Hinsdale, 111.: Dryden
Press, 1960, pp. 70-71.
26
John Brigham, "The Supreme Court: An Institution as Convention-
al Practice," mimeographed (Amherst, Mass., 1981), p. 8.
27
Cf. Lowi
, pp. 4-6, and Everett Carll Ladd Jr., American Politi-
cal Parties, Social Change and Political Response (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1970), p. 54.
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